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Ron Bailey of Reason congratulates Al Gore

October 15th, 2007 No comments

[updated] A great new post by libertarian Ron Bailey of Reason here:

Congratulations to Al Gore
But be wary of the man’s proposed solutions for global warming.
Ronald Bailey | October 12, 2007
http://www.reason.com/news/show/122960.html

1.  Here are some excerpts (emphasis added), followed by a copy of my comments over at Reason:

[Gore is] wrong to characterize global warming as a moral and spiritual problem. Man-made global warming is not some kind of environmental sin. It’s just another commons problem that has emerged as human civilization continues to develop. Most environmental problems arise in what are called open-access commons. That is, people pollute air and rivers, overfish lakes and oceans, cut down rainforests, and so forth because no one owns those natural resources and therefore no one has an interest in protecting them.

The point is clearest in the case of tropical forests and fisheries. No one owns the forests or fisheries, so anyone may exploit them. No one has an incentive to leave any trees or fish behind because, if they do, someone else will harvest them and get the benefits for themselves. In other words, those who immediately benefit from exploiting the resource do not bear the long-run costs of its ultimate destruction. This mismatch between benefits and costs is a recipe for disaster. Similarly, no one owns the global atmosphere, so there is no incentive for anyone to protect it from various pollutants, including greenhouse gases that tend to raise average global temperatures.

Generally, humanity has solved environmental problems caused by open-access situations by either privatizing the relevant commons or regulating it.  …

As a skeptic of government action, I had hoped that the scientific evidence would lead to the conclusion that global warming would not be much of a problem, so that humanity could avoid the messy and highly politicized process of deciding what to do about it. Although people of good will can still disagree about the scientific evidence for climate change, I now believe that Gore has got it basically right. The balance of the evidence shows that global warming could well be a significant problem over the course of this century.

Yale economist William Nordhaus … calculates that the optimal policy would impose a carbon tax of $34 per metric ton carbon in 2010, with the tax increases gradually reaching $42 per ton in 2015, $90 per ton in 2050, and $207 per ton of carbon in 2100. A $20 per metric ton carbon tax will raise coal prices by $10 per ton, which is about a 40 percent increase over the current price of $25 per ton. A $10 per ton carbon tax translates into a 4 cent per gallon increase in gasoline. A $300 per ton carbon tax would raise gasoline prices by $1.20 per gallon. Following this optimal trajectory would cost $2.2 trillion and reduce climate change damage by $5.2 trillion over the next century. …

Man-made global warming is an economic and technical problem of the sort that humanity has solved many times. For example, forests are expanding in rich countries because they have well-developed private property rights. Also in rich countries, regulations have helped once polluted rivers and lakes to become clean and have drastically cut air pollution. One of the keys to solving environmental problems is economic growth and wealth. …

In any case, global warming is not the result of environmental sin; it is the result of human progress creating another commons problem. … I have no doubt that man-made global warming is an economic and technical problem that an inventive humanity will solve over the course of the 21st century.

Still, congratulations are in order to Al Gore for being recognized by the Nobel committee for his persistence in trying to get humanity to pay attention to this new commons problem.

2.  Here is a digest of my comments to Ron:

Basically, a great post, but I’ve got a few small quibbles.

1.  You were right last year when you said that “In the end, the debate over global warming and its obverse, humanity’s energy future, is a moral issue.”
http://www.reason.com/blog/show/113924.html

2.  I share your understanding of the economics and institutional problem and agree that a straightforward explanation of these is important for very many.

3.  However, you forget what evolutionary psychology, Ostrom and Yandle have explained to us so well about how our innate moral sense drives and underpins mankind’s success as a species by enhancing our ability to cooperate and to overcome commons issues.
Ostrom: http://conservationcommons.org/media/document/docu-wyycyz.pdf
Yandle: http://www.fee.org/publications/the-freeman/article.asp?aid=4064

Our long history of developed rules and institutions (informal and formal now overlapping) are based on our moral sense and the effectiveness of these rules depends critically on our moral investment in accepting their legitimacy – witness our views on murder, theft, lying and “not playing by the rules” – and in voluntarily complying with them.

Our moral sense reinforces our judgments about when rules/institutions are not working and the need to develop new ones in response to changing circumstances and new problems.  When we see a problem that we think requires change, it is unavoidable that we respond to the status quo, the behavior of people within it and the need for change with a moral sense. 

This is simply a part of our evolutionary endowment.  (Of course, other parts of our endowment accentuate our suspicions of smooth talkers and help us catch free riders and looters and to guard against threats from outsiders.)

4.  Accordingly, while it’s unclear how deliberate Gore’s talk of “a moral and spiritual challenge” and “lifting the global consciousness” is or whether this is a productive approach for some people, I think it is fairly clear that, in order to build consensus for a solution to the climate commons problem (and other difficult commons problems) and to ensure that any agreed solutions are actually implemented, we will need to bring our moral senses to bear.

In other words, it is RIGHT to worry about climate change, but no meaningful/effective “solution” can be reached or implemented unless it is FAIR and the parties involved have sufficient TRUST (backed by information) in each other.

5.  You have understated the AGW problem, especially in light of the inertia both in our energy systems and in the climate, the long duration of CO2 and other GHGS, and the rapidity with which the climate is already changing – faster than even this year’s IPCC reports: http://www.carbonequity.info/docs/arctic.html

6.  It is surprising that in referring to Nordhaus you have not indicated the ways in which it seems clear that Nordhaus has understated the costs and risks of climate change and the utility of acting sooner rather than later, as noted by Weitzman, Sterner & Persson, Quiggin and others, or that by “revenue recycling” as noted by McKitrick we can substantially reduce the costs of carbon abatement policies.
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/Weitzman/papers/JELSternReport.pdf
www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-07-37.pdf
http://johnquiggin.com/index.php/archives/2006/11/17/stern-on-the-costs-of-climate-change-part-1/
http://www.uoguelph.ca/~rmckitri/research/co2briefing.pdf

7.  You fail to note that while there are real costs to our economies to build climate change institutions, once established in principle any resulting carbon pricing reflects real costs and is not a “cost” to the economy.

8.  It is a puzzle that you did not note that the most powerful way to call forth the investment and behavior changes that would help us to “find a cheap, low-carbon source of energy” and to limit GHG emissions would be to find ways that would effectively price GHG emissions.

9.  Finally, one further comment on this:

“One of the keys to solving environmental problems is economic growth and wealth.  … So keep in mind that anything that unduly retards economic growth also retards ultimate environmental clean-up, including global warming.”

Not sure what you’re driving at here.

As far as developing countries go, efforts by Western nations to address climate change are actually net subsidies to them (by dampening Western demand for fossil fuels) and are providing incentives and investment for growth.

And as for Western economies, at least in principle internalizing externalities by enclosing commons (that have provided value which has not been factored into GDP) doesn’t retard economic growth, but enables it by forestalling the destruction of resources, permitting greater wealth-generating private transactions and reducing inefficiency.

Have we already pulled the trigger on the methane gun? As Arctic warms, surprisingly large and uncontrollable releases of methane (much more potent than CO2) are growing from massive shallow seabed deposits and permafrost

May 6th, 2011 No comments

1.  Wikipedia, Clathrate gun hypothesis (emphasis added):

The clathrate gun hypothesis is the popular name given to the hypothesis that rises in sea temperatures (and/or falls in sea level) can trigger the sudden release of methane from methane clathrate compounds buried in seabeds and permafrost which, because the methane itself is a powerful greenhouse gas, leads to further temperature rise and further methane clathrate destabilization – in effect initiating a runaway process as irreversible, once started, as the firing of a gun. …

 

2.  Skeptical Science, Wakening the Kraken, April 23, 2011:

a major study in Science that found the vast East Siberian Arctic Shelf methane stores appeared to be destabilizing and venting.  The normally staid National Science Foundation issued a press release warning “Release of even a fraction of the methane stored in the shelf could trigger abrupt climate warming.”

Now there is a new Geophysical Research Letters study on a paleoclimate analog that may be relevant to humanity today, “Methane and environmental change during the Paleocene‐Eocene thermal maximum (PETM): Modeling the PETM onset as a two‐stage event.” …

We know that in the past there have been sudden changes in global warming associated with releases of greenhouse gases.  These rapid, massive releases were characterised by unusualdeficiency in carbon isotope 13 (∂13C ) and massive extinction of animals, most recently at the time of the Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM), about 55.8 million years ago. …

The description of Stage 2:  Very rapid and massive release of carbon deficient in ∂13C, does put one in mind of the Methane Gun hypothesis. It postulates that methane clathrate at shallow depth begins melting and through the feed-back process accelerate atmospheric and oceanic warming, melting even larger and deeper clathrate deposits.  The result:  A relatively sudden massive venting of methane – the firing of the Methane Gun.  Recent discovery by Davy et al (2010) of kilometer-wide (ten 8-11 kilometer and about 1,000 1-kilometer-wide features) eruption craters on the Chatham Rise seafloor off New Zealand adds further ammunition to the Methane Gun hypothesis.

It has been known for many years that methane is being emitted from Siberian swamplands hitherto covered by permafrost, trapping an estimated 1,000 billion tons of methane.  Permafrost on land is now seasonally melting and with each season melting it at greater depth, ensuring that each year methane venting from this source increases.

Methane clathrate has accumulated over the East Siberian continental shelf where it is covered by sediment and seawater up to 50 meters deep.  An estimated 1,400 billion tons of methane is stored in these deposits.  By comparison, total human greenhouse gas emissions (including CO2) since 1750 amount to some 350 billion tons.

Significant methane release can occur when on-shore permafrost is thawed by a warmer atmosphere (unlikely to occur in significance on less than a century timescale) and undersea clathrate at relatively shallow depths is melted by warming water.  This is now occurring. In both cases, methane gas bubbles to the surface with little or no oxidation, entering the atmosphere as CH4 – a powerful greenhouse gas which increases local, then Arctic atmospheric and ocean temperature, resulting in progressively deeper and larger deposits of clathrate melting.

Methane released from deeper deposits such as those found off Svalbard has to pass through a much higher water column (>300 meters) before reaching the surface.  As it does so, it oxidises to CO2, dissolving in seawater or reaching the atmosphere as CO2 which causes far slower warming, but can nevertheless contribute to ocean acidification.

A significant release of methane due to melting of the vast deposits trapped by permafrost and clathrate in the Arctic would result in massive loss of oxygen, particularly in the Arctic ocean but also in the atmosphere.  Resulting hypoxic conditions would cause large extinctions, especially of water breathing animals, which is what we find at the PETM.

Shakhova et al (2010) reports that the continental shelf of East Central Siberia (ECS), with an area of over 2 million km2, is emitting more methane than all other ocean sources combined.  She calculates that methane venting from the ECS is now in the order of 8 million tons per annum and increasing.  This equates to ~200 million tons/annum of CO2, more than the combined CO2 emissions of Scandinavia and the Benelux countries in 2007.  This methane is likely sourced from non-hydrate methane previously kept in place by thin and now melting permafrost at the sea bed, melting clathrates, or some combination of both.

Release of ECS methane is already contributing to Arctic amplification resulting in temperature increase exceeding twice the global average.  The rate of release from the tundra alone is predicted to reach 1.5 billion tons of carbon per annum before 2030, contributing to accelerated climate change, perhaps resulting in sustained decadal doubling of ice loss causing collapse of the Greenland Ice Sheet (Hansen et al, 2011).  This would result in a possible sea level rise of ~5 meters before 2100, according to Hansen et al.

Evidence supports the theory that sudden and massive releases of greenhouse gases, including methane, caused decade-scale climate changes – with consequent species extinctions – culminating in the Holocene Thermal Optimum.

In summary, immense quantities of methane clathrate have been identified in the Arctic.  Were a fraction of these to melt, the result would be massive release of carbon, initially as CH4 causing deeper clathrate to melt and oxidise, adding CO2 to the atmosphere.  Were this to occur, it would greatly worsen global warming.

While natural global warming during the ice ages was initiated by increased solar radiation caused by cyclic changes to Earth’s orbital parameters, there is no evident mechanism for correcting Anthropogenic Global Warming over the next several centuries.  The latter has already begun producing methane and CO2 in the Arctic, starting a feedback process which may lead to uncontrollable, very dangerous global warming, akin to that which occurred at the PETM.

This extremis we ignore – to our peril.

– Agnostic & Daniel Bailey

3.  Joe Romm, Climate Progress, April 25, 2011

Methane release from the not-so-perma-frost is the most dangerous amplifying feedback in the entire carbon cycle (see “NSIDC bombshell: Thawing permafrost feedback will turn Arctic from carbon sink to source in the 2020s, releasing 100 billion tons of carbon by 2100“).

It is worth noting that no climate model currently incorporates the amplifying feedback from methane released by a defrosting tundra. Indeed the NSIDC/NOAA study I wrote about in February on methane release by the land-based permafrost itself doesn’t even incorporate the carbon released by the permafrost carbon feedback into its warming model!

4.  Doc alert: Siberian methane (Jan 14, 2011)

 5. Joe Romm, Climate Progress, Paleoclimate data suggests CO2 “may have at least twice the effect on global temperatures than currently projected by computer models”, January 13, 2011

Methane release from the not-so-perma-frost is the most dangerous amplifying feedback in the entire carbon cycle.  The permafrost permamelt contains a staggering “1.5 trillion tons of frozen carbon, about twice as much carbon as contained in the atmosphere,” much of which would be released as methane.  Methane is  is 25 times as potent a heat-trapping gas as CO2 over a 100 year time horizon, but 72 times as potent over 20 years!  The carbon is locked in a freezer in the part of the planet warming up the fastest (see “Tundra 4: Permafrost loss linked to Arctic sea ice loss“).  Half the land-based permafrost would vanish by mid-century on our current emissions path (see “Tundra, Part 2: The point of no return” and below).  No climate model currently incorporates the amplifying feedback from methane released by a defrosting tundra.

6.  Joe Romm, Climate Progress, Science stunner: Vast East Siberian Arctic Shelf methane stores destabilizing and ventingScience: Vast East Siberian Arctic Shelf methane stores destabilizing and venting:  NSF issues world a wake-up call: “Release of even a fraction of the methane stored in the shelf could trigger abrupt climate warming.” March 4, 2010

Methane release from the not-so-perma-frost is the most dangerous amplifying feedback in the entire carbon cycle. Research published in Friday’s journal Science finds a key “lid” on “the large sub-sea permafrost carbon reservoir” near Eastern Siberia “is clearly perforated, and sedimentary CH4 [methane] is escaping to the atmosphere.”

 … the situation in the ESAS is far, far more dicey, as NSF explains:

 

The East Siberian Arctic Shelf, in addition to holding large stores of frozen methane, is more of a concern because it is so shallow. In deep water, methane gas oxidizes into carbon dioxide before it reaches the surface. In the shallows of the East Siberian Arctic Shelf, methane simply doesn’t have enough time to oxidize, which means more of it escapes into the atmosphere. That, combined with the sheer amount of methane in the region, could add a previously uncalculated variable to climate models.

“The release to the atmosphere of only one percent of the methane assumed to be stored in shallow hydrate deposits might alter the current atmospheric burden of methane up to 3 to 4 times,” Shakhova said. “The climatic consequences of this are hard to predict.”

And we also know that a key trigger for accelerated warming in the Arctic region is the loss of sea ice.

A 2008 study by leading tundra experts found “Accelerated Arctic land warming and permafrost degradation during rapid sea ice loss.” The lead author is David Lawrence of the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR), whom I interviewed for my book and interviewed again via e-mail in 2008. The study’s ominous conclusion:

We find that simulated western Arctic land warming trends during rapid sea ice loss are 3.5 times greater than secular 21st century climate-change trends. The accelerated warming signal penetrates up to 1500 km inland….

In other words, a continuation of the recent trend in sea ice loss may triple Arctic warming, causing large emissions in carbon dioxide and methane from the tundra this century.

Oh, and the Arctic warming could lead to another feedback according to a 2008 Science article:  “Continuation of current trends in shrub and tree expansion could further amplify this atmospheric heating 2-7 times.”  The point is that if you convert a white landscape to a boreal forest, the surface suddenly starts collecting a lot more solar energy (see “Tundra 3: Forests and fires foster feedbacks“).

 

 

“Our concern is that the subsea permafrost has been showing signs of destabilization already,” she said. “If it further destabilizes, the methane emissions may not be teragrams, it would be significantly larger.”

NSF explains:

“The amount of methane currently coming out of the East Siberian Arctic Shelf is comparable to the amount coming out of the entire world’s oceans,” said Shakhova, a researcher at UAF’s International Arctic Research Center. “Subsea permafrost is losing its ability to be an impermeable cap.”

 

 

 

Shakhova notes that the Earth’s geological record indicates that atmospheric methane concentrations have varied between about .3 to .4 parts per million during cold periods to .6 to .7 parts per million during warm periods. Current average methane concentrations in the Arctic average about 1.85 parts per million, the highest in 400,000 years, she said. Concentrations above the East Siberian Arctic Shelf are even higher.

The East Siberian Arctic Shelf is a relative frontier in methane studies. The shelf is shallow, 50 meters (164 feet) or less in depth, which means it has been alternately submerged or terrestrial, depending on sea levels throughout Earth’s history. During the Earth’s coldest periods, it is a frozen arctic coastal plain, and does not release methane. As the Earth warms and sea level rises, it is inundated with seawater, which is 12-15 degrees warmer than the average air temperature.

“It was thought that seawater kept the East Siberian Arctic Shelf permafrost frozen,” Shakhova said. “Nobody considered this huge area.”

The hardest of the hard core climate geeks (and we all know who we are) probably recognize the name Natalia Shakhova. She’s a Research Assistant Professor working with the International Arctic Research Center at the University of Alaska Fairbanks and is probably best know to people of our ilk for her work involving Siberian methane deposits. She gave a presentation at a US Dept. of Defense symposium and workshop last November, and it (and others from the event) are online.

Dr. Shakhova’s presentation is titled “Methane Release from the East Siberian Arctic Shelf (ESAS) and the Potential for Abrupt Climate Changes”, and you can download it in PDF format from the event’s site.

Based on that title and the things I write about here (and by “write about” you can substitute “obsess over”, if you’re feeling a need for unflinching accuracy), you’ve probably figured out that this is yet another unsettling collection of data about methane. A couple of tidbits to show that such a conclusion would be accurate, even without the benefit of context (emphasis in the original):

[Slide 34]

Interpretation of acoustical data recorded with deployed multibeam sonar allowed moderate quantification of bottom fluxes as high as 44 g/m2/d (Leifer et al., in preparation). Prorating these numbers to the areas of hot spots (210×103 km2) adds 3.5Gt to annual methane release from the ESAS. This is enough to trigger abrupt climate change (Archer, 2005).

[Slide 38, one bullet taken from the conclusion]

Considering the significance of the ESAS methane reservoir and enhancing mechanism of its destabilization, this region should be considered the most potential in terms of possible climate change caused by abrupt release of methane.

Methane (CH4) deserves attention it is such a highly potent greenhouse gas — 25-33 times more powerful than carbon dioxide (CO2) over a 100-year time-horizon, but as much as 100 time more potent over 20 years, according to the latest research!

Last year I reported on a major study in Science that found the vast East Siberian Arctic Shelf methane stores appeared to be destabilizing and venting.  The normally staid National Science Foundation issued a press release warning “Release of even a fraction of the methane stored in the shelf could trigger abrupt climate warming.” …

Most deposits of methane clathrate are in sediments too deep to respond rapidly, and modelling by Archer (2007) suggests the methane forcing should remain a minor component of the overall greenhouse effect.[10] Clathrate deposits destabilize from the deepest part of their stability zone, which is typically hundreds of metres below the seabed. A sustained increase in sea temperature will warm its way through the sediment eventually, and cause the deepest, most marginal clathrate to start to break down; but it will typically take of the order of a thousand years or more for the temperature signal to get through.[10]

One exception, however, may be in clathrates associated with the Arctic ocean, where clathrates can exist in shallower water stabilized by lower temperatures rather than higher pressures; these may potentially be marginally stable much closer to the surface of the sea-bed, stabilized by a frozen ‘lid’ of permafrost preventing methane escape. Recent research carried out in 2008 in the Siberian Arctic has shown millions of tons of methane being released, apparently through perforations in the seabed permafrost,[11] with concentrations in some regions reaching up to 100 times normal.[12][13] The excess methane has been detected in localized hotspots in the outfall of the Lena River and the border between the Laptev Sea and the East Siberian Sea. Some melting may be the result of geological heating, but more thawing is believed to be due to the greatly increased volumes of meltwater being discharged from the Siberian rivers flowing north.[14] Current methane release has previously been estimated at 0.5 Mt per year.[15]Shakhova et al. (2008) estimate that not less than 1,400 Gt of carbon is presently locked up as methane and methane hydrates under the Arctic submarine permafrost, and 5–10% of that area is subject to puncturing by open taliks. They conclude that “release of up to 50 Gt of predicted amount of hydrate storage [is] highly possible for abrupt release at any time”. That would increase the methane content of the planet’s atmosphere by a factor of twelve,[16][17] equivalent in greenhouse effect to a doubling in the current level of CO2.

In 2008 the United States Department of Energy National Laboratory system[18] and the United States Geological Survey’s Climate Change Science Program both identified potential clathrate destabilization in the Arctic as one of four most serious scenarios for abrupt climate change, which have been singled out for priority research. The USCCSP released a report in late December 2008 estimating the gravity of this risk.

The East Siberian Arctic Shelf is a methane-rich area that encompasses more than 2 million square kilometers of seafloor in the Arctic Ocean. It is more than three times as large as the nearby Siberian wetlands, which have been considered the primary Northern Hemisphere source of atmospheric methane. Shakhova’s research results show that the East Siberian Arctic Shelf is already a significant methane source, releasing 7 teragrams of methane yearly, which is as much as is emitted from the rest of the ocean. A teragram is equal to about 1.1 million tons.

Scientists learned last year that the permafrost permamelt contains a staggering “1.5 trillion tons of frozen carbon, about twice as much carbon as contained in the atmosphere,” much of which would be released as methane.  Methane is  is 25 times as potent a heat-trapping gas as CO2 over a 100 year time horizon, but 72 times as potent over 20 years!

The carbon is locked in a freezer in the part of the planet warming up the fastest (see “Tundra 4: Permafrost loss linked to Arctic sea ice loss“).  Half the land-based permafrost would vanish by mid-century on our current emissions path (see “Tundra, Part 2: The point of no return” and below).  No climate model currently incorporates the amplifying feedback from methane released by a defrosting tundra.

The new Science study, led by University of Alaska’s International Arctic Research Centre and the Russian Academy of Sciences, is “Extensive Methane Venting to the Atmosphere from Sediments of the East Siberian Arctic Shelf” (subs. req’d).  The must-read National Science Foundation press release (click here), warns “Release of even a fraction of the methane stored in the shelf could trigger abrupt climate warming.”  The NSF is normally a very staid organization.  If they are worried, everybody should be.

It is increasingly clear that if the world strays significantly above 450 ppm atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide for any length of time, we will find it unimaginably difficult to stop short of 800 to 1000 ppm. …

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Are Hayek’s essential "market morals" breaking down? Hmm … Is peace breaking out, or are things getting ugly?

March 30th, 2011 No comments

[Apologies for the weird font sizes – guess I’m too old to figure out the html stuff that creeps in when I cut and paste!]

I wanted to post a few additional and somewhat scattered thoughts I have had relating to the 1986 essay of Hayek that I recently stumbled across, “The Moral Imperative of the Market”.

What morals do we end up with as “market morals” are eroded?  In larger communities, the morals of a cynical or self-deluded selfishness and self-justification, accompanied by growing tribalism, insularity, suspicion, hostility, avarice, prejudice, jingoism and intolerance.

As the market breaks down, so also do market dynamics of broad exchange and sophisticated institutions, and things become each man for himself, finding friend and families to hunker down with, a hardening towards and less concern for others – who indeed may be viewed as either a threat or as fair game.

IOW, it’s the same load of aggressive, selfish and narrowly tribal stuff that once was ESSENTIAL to bands of humans when when we lived in a state of Nature and life was brutish and short, and that I’ve been giving other members of this and other communities grief over ever since I was marooned on these fertile but once hostile shores:

Cooperation comes naturally to man – among those we feel we can trust – but within limits, as so too does suspicion come naturally as to “others” who look like they might pose a threat. In building extended markets, we are always struggling with our predilection to form “Bands of Brothers”. In doing this work, we are always making use of our sophisticated yet at times quite reflexive native endowment.

As I noted a couple years back (you know, in ancient times when Al Gore won the Nobel Peace Prize) in a comment to libertarian science correspondent Ron Bailey at Reason Online:

you forget what evolutionary psychology, Ostrom and Yandle have explained to us so well about how our innate moral sense drives and underpins mankind’s success as a species by enhancing our ability to cooperate and to overcome commons issues.
Ostrom: http://conservationcommons.org/media/document/docu-wyycyz.pdf
Yandle: http://www.fee.org/publications/the-freeman/article.asp?aid=4064

Our long history of developed rules and institutions (informal and formal now overlapping) are based on our moral sense and the effectiveness of these rules depends critically on our moral investment in accepting their legitimacy – witness our views on murder, theft, lying and “not playing by the rules” – and in voluntarily complying with them.

Our moral sense reinforces our judgments about when rules/institutions are not working and the need to develop new ones in response to changing circumstances and new problems.  When we see a problem that we think requires change, it is unavoidable that we respond to the status quo, the behavior of people within it and the need for change with a moral sense. 

This is simply a part of our evolutionary endowment.  (Of course, other parts of our endowment accentuate our suspicions of smooth talkers and help us catch free riders and looters and to guard against threats from outsiders.)

Let all of us here at LvMI (and any strangers!) please be aware of our predilections, while we continue with the hard work of building strong, vibrant and open free societies.

I know, comrades, that you’re all dying for links to some of my relevant posts, which I certainly won’t begrudge to you :

Snicker-snack! We hold these truths to be self-evident: That WE’re right, and THEY are stoopid, deluded, evil AND cunning, out to destroy all that is good and holy

Bill Gates, Roger Pielke, Avatar & the Climate (of distrust); or, Can we move from a tribal questioning of motives to win-win policies?

I Can’t Stand Cant, Or, LeBron James and our Collectivist Scorn of “Collectivists”

Nick Kristof on politics: why we conclude that I’m right, and you’re evil (with a handy-dandy listing of a number of earlier fun posts!)

And a clip of a comment I made to Stephan Kinsella a little while back:

Austrians seem to act as if the love of reason requires a surrender of it in favor of the comforting distraction of a self-satisfied echo chamber of a type that would warm the cockles of any like-minded religious “alarmist” cult.

Mind Games: Bret Stephens of The Wall Street Journal panders to “skeptics” by abjuring science and declaring himself an expert on “mass neurosis”

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That annoying off-beat drummer: In response to the 'heretic' Dr. Curry, more on my pig-headed libertarian open-mindness on climate issues

March 24th, 2011 No comments

I alerted readers in January to a blog post on libertarianism and the environment by Dr. Judith Curry, who heads the School of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences at the Georgia Institute of Technology, and is known for her work on hurricanes, Arctic ice dynamics and other climate-related topics.

Scientific American  noted last October, in “Climate Heretic: Judith Curry Turns on Her Colleagues; Why can’t we have a civil conversation about climate?“, that:

over the past year or so she has become better known for something that annoys, even infuriates, many of her scientific colleagues. Curry has been engaging actively with the climate change skeptic community, largely by participating on outsider blogs such as Climate Audit, the Air Vent and the Black­board. Along the way, she has come to question how climatologists react to those who question the science, no matter how well established it is. Although many of the skeptics recycle critiques that have long since been disproved, others, she believes, bring up valid points—and by lumping the good with the bad, climate researchers not only miss out on a chance to improve their science, they come across to the public as haughty. “Yes, there’s a lot of crankology out there,” Curry says. “But not all of it is. If only 1 percent of it or 10 percent of what the skeptics say is right, that is time well spent because we have just been too encumbered by groupthink.”

While I recommend that interested readers review the whole thread, I copy below my comments and some related:

Judith, a climate scientist friend kindly gave me gave me a head’s up to your post.

I have been blogging and commenting for quite some time on environmental and climate issues from a libertarian perspective, and have also spent considerable time on trying both to help libertarians engage productively on environmental issues and to help leftist-environmentalists understand where libertarians are coming from.

Sadly, it’s largely a messy tale, reflecting how fights over government policy tend toward zero-sum games that blunt cooperation, the success that fossil fuel and other corporate interests have had in gaming the system, and how our tribal human nature leads many to abandon critical thinking in favor of choosing and reflexively defending sides and positions.

I have been highly critical of many libertarians in perpetuating unproductive discord, and have been the resident environmentalist pain-in-the-neck at the Ludwig von Mises Institute (for libertarian economics), which kindly hosts my blog. In particular, even while try to build bridges I have been critical of the Cato Institute, Competitive Enterprise Institute, Heartland Institute and MasterResource, which I view as being skewed by donations toward corporate agendas. There are of course some highly productive libertarians working on environmental and conservation matters; Terry Anderson and others at PERC (Properrty and Environment Research Center) have led the way on fisheries, water and other issues. (And then there are quasi-libertarians like Elinor Ostrom.)

Since you’ve expressed interest, allow me to load you up with a few links, to my exchanges with others such as John Quiggin, to my cajoling and castigating of libertarians, and to some of my views on climate/environment issues :

“Towards a productive libertarian approach on climate, energy and environmental issues ” http://bit.ly/ab3xJB

“John Quiggin plays Pin-the-tail-on-the-Donkey with “Libertarians and delusionism” ” http://bit.ly/8Zv5Y6

“A few more comments to John Quiggin on climate, libertarian principles and the enclosure of the commons ” http://bit.ly/eXaTKI

“A few more “delusional” thoughts to John Quiggin on partisan perceptions & libertarian opposition to collective action”http://bit.ly/f0FQ6K

“To John Quiggin: Reassuring climate “delusions” help us all to avoid engaging with “enemies” in exploring common ground ”http://bit.ly/eIFr4e

“The Cliff Notes version of my stilted enviro-fascist view of corporations and government ” http://bit.ly/9oBkC7

The Road Not Taken II: Austrians strive for a self-comforting irrelevancy on climate change, the greatest commons problem / rent-seeking game of our age http://bit.ly/14n6G0

For climate fever, take two open-air atom bombs & call me in the morning; “serious” libertarian suggestions from Kinsella & Reisman!?http://bit.ly/f2bRUr

Thanks, Dr. Reisman; or, How I Learned to Hate Enviros and Love Tantrums http://bit.ly/h4BI0B

“Escape from Reason: are Austrians conservatives, or neocons, on the environment? ” http://bit.ly/cJhov2

“The Road Not Taken V: Libertarian hatred of misanthropic “watermelons” and the productive love of aloof ad-homs”http://bit.ly/cqFlzh

OMG – those ecofascists hate statist corps, too, and even want to – GASP – end that oh-so-libertarian state grant of limited liability!http://bit.ly/gjJFnv

“Who are the misanthropes – “Malthusians” or those who hate them? Rob Bradley and others resist good faith engagement despite obvious institutional failures/absence of property rights ”http://bit.ly/hbONhd

http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/search.aspx?q=ostrom

http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/search.aspx?q=bradley
http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/search.aspx?q=manzi
http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/search.aspx?q=michaels
http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/search.aspx?q=lewis
http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/search.aspx?q=horner
http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/search.aspx?q=penn
http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/search.aspx?q=bailey

On non-climate issues:

“Too Many or Too Few People? Does the market provide an answer? ” http://bit.ly/8zlecI
http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/search.aspx?q=BP+oil
http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/search.aspx?q=Avatar

Sincerely,

Tom

  • Tokyo Tom, thanks much for your input. your post originally went to moderation owing to the large number of links.

    • Dr. Curry, thanks for your indulgence on this; given the time differences (bedtime now!) and my schedule tomorrow, I thought throwing out a few links might be useful (though I may be mistaken!!).

      Tom

    • If I can add one further thought before I head off to bed, it would be that a key prerequisite (as Ostrom points out) for tackling commons issues like climate change that involves many players and countries is the need for TRUST, an element that is sadly lacking (a resource that libertarian analysis indicates is destroyed by squabbles over government) .

      Bill Gates, Roger Pielke, Avatar & the Climate (of distrust); or, Can we move from a tribal questioning of motives to win-win policies? http://bit.ly/912Xkj

      On climate, myopic progressives console themselves by pointing out fossil $ behind science “skeptics”; but miss the same from left and ignore middle ground http://bit.ly/arSX5G

      ‘Night.

      Tom

One wee error in your intro:
“Sadly, it’s largely a messy tale, reflecting how fights over government policy tend toward zeronegative-sum games that blunt cooperation”
There. All fixed! ;)

Tom is someone who has managed to separate the difference between science and policy.

  • I am honored that you visit me, as you must be very busy in the Year of the Wabbit.

    Thanks, Eli, but it means that Tom is someone for whom the thrills of tribal comabt do not offset the woes of being the odd man out, if not “the enemy”.

    Tom

Michael, Climate Etc. has technical threads and discussion threads. This is a discussion thread. I usually monitor things quite closely on technical threads, which are pretty much troll free. There have been excellent discussions with very knowledgeable skeptics on many of the technical threads. If you look at the denizens list, there are many people spending time here with serious credentials and wide ranging and varying professional experiences. This is not a place where mindless people bother hanging out.

What am I hoping to accomplish on discussion threads? I raise thorny topics on the discussion threads, at the interface between science and society. People challenge their own prejudices by arguing with people having different opinions. Invariably I learn something when people suggest interesting things to read (on this thread, i have found some of Tokyo Tom’s links to be interesting.)

Assuming i have time in the next day or do (which is not a good assumption, I’m afraid), i will do a Part II on this thread, picking out some points/ideas to focus on in a follow on thread. Once we get the heat out of the way, we often generate some light over here.

bob, I would be interested in a part II to this subject, and it would be great if Tokyo Tom or Rich wanted to do this, provided the topic was about how to deal with global environmental issues and potential tragedy of the commons issues.

  • Not sure how you could reconcile the distance between these two. Yes, they are both Libertarians. But one sees the climate issue like so:

    Yeah, I deny the anthropogenic carbon dioxide global temperature forcing “hypothesis” (not that it deserves even the courtesy use of that term). It started out as an extraordinary – hell, preposterous – effort to account for a completely screwed interpretation of insufficient surface temperature data (gained initially, it appears, from Stevenson screen thermometers “sited next to a lamp” by way of all sorts of instrumental screw-ups related to urban heat island effect and similar artifact) thirty years ago, and has proceeded through those three decades not only without the development of convincing evidence supporting this brain-dead blunder but suffused with a continuing agglomeration of data-doctoring, book-cooking, code-jiggering, suppressio veri, suggestio falsi, peer-review-perverting, dissident-censoring, cork-screwing, back-stabbing, dirty-dealing, and bald-faced lying.

    and the other sees it a bit differently: [my emphasis added]

    On environmental issues in general and climate in particular, find me someone ranting about “Malthusians” or “environazis” or somesuch, and I’ll show you someone who doesn’t understand – or refuses to acknowledge – the difference between wealth-creating markets based on private property and/or voluntary interactions/contracts protected by law, and the tragedy of the commons situations that result when there are NO property rights (atmosphere, oceans) or when the pressures of developed markets swamp indigenous hunter-gather community rules.

    So what’s the deal? Here’s a perfect opportunity for skeptics to educate the supposedly market ignorant, but they refuse, preferring to focus instead on why concerned scientists must be wrong, how concerns by a broad swath of society about climate have become a matter of an irrational, deluded “religious” faith, or that those raising their concerns are “misanthropes” or worse.

    Some on the left likewise see libertarians and small-government conservatives as deluded.

    Both sides, it seems, prefer to fight – and to see themselves as right and the “others” as evil – rather than to reason

    While we should not regret that we cannot really constrain human nature very well, at least libertarian and others who profess to love markets ought to be paying attention to the inadequate institutional framework that is not only poisoning the political atmosphere, but posing risks to important globally and regionally shared open-access commons like the atmosphere and oceans (which are probably are in much more immediate and grave threat than the climate). And they also ought to recognize that there are important economic interests that profit from the current flawed institutional framework and have quite deliberately encouraged the current culture war.

    So, once again, ideological affiliations aside, there are people who look for ways to solve possible problems and people who look for reasons to ignore possible problems.

Categories: Uncategorized Tags:

A handy list of TT posts on BP, the Tragedy of the Government-Owned Commons, Corporations and Oil Serfdom

June 18th, 2010 No comments

For a preceding post, I put together an index to my posts to date, and  thought it might be useful to bump it up to a more neasily accessible stand-alone post.

In case anyone has missed it, I’ve done quite a bit of posting on the BP problem, in a manner intended to be fruitful (and not simply a noodge). Here are my posts, in chronological order:

Risk-shifting, BP and those nasty enviros (a response to Lew Rockwell)

Poor statists! If we close our eyes tightly enough, we can see clearly that Corporations are innocent VICTIMS, of governments that foist on them meaningless grants like limited liability & IP, and of malevolent, grasping citizens

Sheldon Richman doesn’t feel sorry for BP, either

Corporations uber Alles: Conveniently inconsistent on “abstractions” like “the environment”, Austrians overlook their preference for “corporations” over individuals,& their lack of interest in problem-solving

Persons-R-Us? Here’s someone’s interesting thought experiment: “What If BP Were A Human Being?”

Does it make any sense to treat corporations as “persons”, given the differences in incentives structures?

As BP’s oil spills into one of those inconvenient “ecosystems”, now even Reason TV rants about “dying oceans”

Time-out for some light humor on BP’s “ecosystem”: The BP Oil Spill Re-Enacted By Cats in 1 Minute!

Who’s at the short end of the stick when Government “Play[s] Fast and Loose with Civilization” in the Gulf of Mexico?

Ed Dolan on Other People’s Money: Government, Oil Spills, Financial Crises & Limited Liability

Scott Sumner misses government role in “sh*t happens”; epitomizes discussions of BP/offshore oil development

Kevin Carson says, “In a Truly Free Market, BP Would Be Toast”

More useful discussion by Carson, both on BP’s fate in a free market, and on the inept, feckless and captured regulatory state

Matt Yglesias, like many Austrians, misses the role of government in “Agency Problems and Corporate Misconduct”

A BP Reader: statist corporations, “the environment” and the Tragedy of the Government-Owned/-Managed Commons

Sheldon Richman joins Gene Callahan in naively arguing that, IF man’s activities are responsible for climate change, we need not government but simply louder and more obnoxious enviros

As Callahan and Richman laud consumer/moral pressure on polluters, others tell us a BP boycott is stupid

Rand Paul: a caricature of libertarian views on energy

BP: Unless we are to get lost in legal fictions, like Harry Shearer we must look beyond the shareholder curtain

Such a big crisis, yet so few words? Scratching my head over sporadic, thin drive-by postings at LvMI on our growing BP/Gulf disaster

Oil-Serfs-R-Us or the Tragedy of the Government-Owned Commons: the puny Lousianna “Shrimp King” humbled by BP & the Feds

“Economic insight and analysis”? Statist voicepiece WSJ headlines Broken Window Fallacy nonsense: Oil Spill May End Up Lifting GDP Slightly!

Sad: in a numbskull post, “libertarian” Ron Bailey touts cost-benefit analysis as justification for offshore oil drilling, ignores issues of who benefits, who loses & who decides

On ocean drilling, it’s time for Ron Bailey, oil flack (and other libertarians), to meet Ron Bailey, “tragedy of the commons” guru and to stand up for the Oil Serfs

The Eve of Destruction: Excellent post on how Government and statist corporations like BP are stifling community responses to the unfolding Gulf disaster

Disturbing news/views on the manageability of the BP gusher

Categories: Uncategorized Tags:

Towards a productive libertarian approach on climate, energy and environmental issues

February 10th, 2010 No comments

[This is a work in progress and largely taken from previous posts, but readers might find some value in it in the meanwhile.]

1. Heated but vacuous climate wars

On environmental issues in general and climate in particular, find me someone (like George Will) ranting about “Malthusians” or “environazis” or somesuch, and I’ll show you someone who doesn’t understand – or refuses to acknowledge – the difference between:

(1) wealth-creating markets based on private property and/or voluntary interactions/contracts protected by law, and

(2) the tragedy of the commons situations that result when there are NO property rights (atmosphere, oceans), when the pressures of developed markets swamp indigenous hunter-gather community rules, in many cases where governments formally own and purport to manage “public” resources, and when governments absolve purportedly “private” actors from liability for harms to others (such as via grants of “limited liability“).

So what’s the deal? Here’s a perfect opportunity for skeptics to educate the supposedly market ignorant, but they refuse, preferring to focus instead on why concerned scientists must be wrong, how concerns by a broad swath of society about climate have become a matter of an irrational, deluded “religious” faith, or that those raising their concerns are “misanthropes” or worse.

Such pigheadedness is met by those on the left likewise see libertarians and small-government conservatives as deluded and/or deliberate pawns of evil Earth-destroying corporations.

Both sides, it seems, prefer to fight – and to see themselves as right and the “others” as evil – rather than to reason.

While we should not regret that we cannot really constrain human nature very well, at least libertarian and others who profess to love markets ought to be paying attention to the inadequate institutional framework that is not only poisoning the political atmosphere, but posing risks to important globally and regionally shared open-access commons like the atmosphere and oceans (which are probably are in much more immediate and grave threat than the climate). And they also ought to recognize that there are important economic interests that profit from the current flawed institutional framework and have quite deliberately encouraged the current culture war.

2. Why the reflexive libertarian disengagement?

I have on numerous occasions tried to point out, to posters on the Mises Blog who have addressed climate issues, the stunning unproductivity of the approach that they have taken — that of focussing on science and dismissing motivations and preferences, rather than exploring root causes and middle ground, and have continued to scratch my head at the obstinacy and apparent lack of vision.

The following seem to be the chief factors at work in the general libertarian resistance to any government action on climate change:

– Many libertarians, as CEI’s Chris Horner has stated,  see “global warming [as] the bottomless well of excuses for the relentless growth of Big Government.”  Even libertarians who agree that is AGW is a serious problem are worried, for good reason, that government approaches to climate change will be a train wreck – in other words, that the government “cure” will be worse than the problem.

– Libertarians have in general drifted quite far from environmentalists (though there remain many productive free-market environmentalists/conservationists). Even though libertarians and environmentalists still share a mistrust of big government, environmentalists, on the one hand, generally have come to believe that MORE government is the answer, despite all of the problems associated with the socialized ownership of resources and/or inefficient bureaucratic management (witness the crashing of many managed fisheries in the US), the manipulation of such management to benefit bureaucratic interests, special interests and insiders (wildfire fighting budgets, fossil fuel and hard rock mining, etc.) and the resultant and inescapable politicization of all disputes due to the absence of private markets. On the other hand, many libertarians  reflexively favor business over “concerned citizens”, while other libertarians see that government “solutions” themselves tend to snowball into costly problems that work in favor of big business and create pressures for more government intervention. Thus, libertarians often see environmentalists as simply another group fighting to expand government, and are hostile as a result.

– Libertarians are as subject to reflexive, partisan position-taking as any one else. Because they are reflexively opposed to government action, they find it easier to operate from a position of skepticism in trying to bat down AGW scientific and economic arguments (and to slam the motives of those arguing that AGW must be addressed by government) than to open-mindedly review the evidence or consider ways that libertarian aims can be advanced by using the pressure from “enviro” goals.

This reflexive hostility – at times quite startingly vehement – is a shame (but human), because it blunts the libertarian message in explaining what libertarians understand very well – that environmental problems arise when property rights over resources are not clearly defined or enforceable, and when governments (mis)manage resources, and that there are various private steps and changes in government policy that would undo the previous government actions that are at the root of environmentalists’ frustrations.The reflexive hostility is also a shame because it has the effect, in my mind rather clearly, of rendering libertarians largely blind to the ways that large energy, power and certain manufacturing corporations continue to benefit from (and invest heavily in maintaining) the existing regulatory structure, in ways that shift large costs and risks to unconsenting third parties.

– There are some libertarians and others who profess to love free markets at AEI, CEI, Cato, IER, Master Resource and similar institutions that are partly in pay of fossil fuel interests, and so find it in their personal interests to challenge both climate science and policy proposals that would impose costs on their funders.

I felt particularly struck by the commonness of a refrain we are hearing from various pundits who prefer to question the good will or sanity of environmentalists over the harder work of engaging in a good faith examination and discussion of the underlying institutional problem of ALL “environmental” disputes:  namely, a lack of property rights and/or a means to enforce them. 

3. The whys of climate concerns and calls for “clean” energy

I want to get started with a list of policy changes that I think libertarians can and should be championing in response to the climate policy proposals of others.

The incessant calls for – and criticism of – government climate change policies and government subsidies and mandates for “green/clean power” both ignore root causes and potential common ground.  As a result, both sides of the debate are largely talking past each other, one talking about why there is a pressing need for government policy to address climate change concerns, while the other is concerned chiefly about the likelihood of heavy-handed mis-regulation and wasted resources. This leaves the middle ground unexplored.

There are plenty of root causes for the calls for legislative and regulatory mandates in favor of climate policies and clean / green / renewable power, such as:

  • concerns about apparent ongoing climate change, warnings by scientific bodies and apprehensions of increasing risk as China, India and other developing economies rapidly scale up their CO2, methane and other emissions,
  • the political deals in favor of environmentally dirty coal and older power plants under the Clean Air Act,
  • the enduring role of the federal and state governments in owning vast coal and oil & gas fields and relying on the royalties (which it does not share with citizens, but go into the General Pork Pool, with a relatively meager cut to states),
  • the unwillingness of state courts, in the face of the political power of the energy and power industries, to protect persons and private property from pollution and environmental disruption created by federally-licensed energy development and power projects,
  • the deep involvement of the government in developing, encouraging and regulating nuclear power, and
  • the frustration of consumer demand for green energy, and the inefficient and inaccurate pricing and supply of electricity, resulting from the grant by states of public utility monopolies and the regulation of the pricing and investments by utilities, which greatly restricts the freedom of power markets, from the ability of consumers to choose their provider, to the freedom of utilities to determine what infrastructure to invest in, to even simple information as to the cost of power as it varies by time of day and season, and the amount of electricity that consumers use by time of day or appliance.

4. Is a small-government, libertarian climate/green agenda possible and desirable?

So what is a good libertarian to suggest? This seems rather straight-forward, once one doffs his partisan, do-battle-with-evil-green-fascist-commies armor and puts on his thinking cap.

From my earlier comment to Stephan Kinsella:

As Rob Bradley once reluctantly acknowledged to me, in the halcyon days before he banned me from the “free-market” Master Resource blog, “a free-market approach is not about “do nothing” but implementing a whole new energy approach to remove myriad regulation and subsidies that have built up over a century or more.” But unfortunately the wheels of this principled concern have never hit the ground at MR [my persistence in pointing this out it, and in questioning whether his blog was a front for fossil fuel interests, apparently earned me the boot].

As I have noted in a litany of posts at my blog, pro-freedom regulatory changes might include:

Other policy changes could also be put on the table, such as:

  • an insistence that government resource management be improved by requiring that half of all royalties from mineral and fossil fuel development be rebated to citizens (with a slice to the administering agency), and
  • reducing understandable NIMBY problems by (i) encouraging project planners to proactively compensate persons in affected areas and (ii) reducing fears of corporate abuses, by providing that corporate executives have personal liability for environmental torts (in recognition of the fact that the profound risk-shifting that limited liability corporations are capable of that often elicits strong public opposition and fuels regulatory pressure).

5. Other libertarian discussants

A fair number of libertarian commenters on climate appear to accept mainstream sciences, though there remain natural policy disagreements. Ron Bailey, science correspondence at Reason and Jonathan Adler, a resources law prof at Case Western, Lynne Kiesling at Knowledge Problem blog, and David Zetland, who blogs on water issues, come to mind.

I`m not the only one – other libertarian climate proposals are here:

  • Jonathan Adler at Case Western (2000); he has other useful commentary here, here,
  • Bruce Yandle, Professor Emeritus at Clemson University, Senior Fellow at PERC (the “free market” environmentalism think tank) and a respected thinker on common-law and free-market approaches to environmental problems, has in PERC’s Spring 2008 report specifically proposed a A No-Regrets Carbon Reduction Policy;
  • Iain Murray of CEI; and
  • Cato’s Jerry Taylor is a frequent commentator and Indur Goklany has advanced a specific climate change-targeted proposal.
  •  AEI’s Steven Hayward and Ken Green together have provided a number of detailed analyses (though with a distinct tendency to go lightly on fossil fuels).

Several libertarians recently urged constructive libertarian approaches to climate change:

There have been several open disputes, which indicate a shift from dismissal of science to a discussion of policy; the below exchanges of view are worthy of note:

  • The Cato Institute dedicated its entire August 2008 monthly issue of Cato Unbound, its online forum, to discussing policy responses to ongoing climate change.  The issue, entitled “Keeping Our Cool: What to Do about Global Warming“, contains essays from and several rounds of discussion between Jim Manzi, statistician and CEO of Applied Predictive Technologies, Cato Institute author Indur Goklany; climate scientist Joseph J. Romm, a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress; and Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus, the co-founders of The Breakthrough Institute.  My extended comments are here.
  • Reason Foundation, posted an exchange on Climate Change and Property Rights June 12th, 2008 (involving Reason’s Shikha Dalmia, Case Western Reserve University law professor Jonathan H. Adler, and author Indur Goklany); discussed by Ron Bailey of ReasonOnline here; here`s my take.
  • Debate at Reason, October 2007, Ron Bailey, Science Correspondent at Reason, Fred L. Smith, Jr., President and Founder of CEI, and Lynne Kiesling, Senior Lecturer in Economics at Northwestern University, and former director of economic policy at the Reason Foundation.
  • Reason Foundation, Global Warming and Potential Policy Solutions September 7th, 2006 (Reason’s Shikha Dalmia, George Mason University Department of Economics Chair Don Boudreaux, and the International Policy Network’s Julian Morris).

 

Finally, I have collected here some Austrian-based papers on environmental issues that are worthy of note:

Environmental Markets?  Links to Austrians

Ones such paper is the following: Terry L. Anderson and J. Bishop Grewell, Property Rights Solutions for the Global Commons: Bottom-Up or Top-Down?

Resources on Elinor Ostrom

January 15th, 2010 No comments

[Note: This is a work in progress]

Elinor Ostrom is the guru of CPR regimes; anyone interested should look into her fascinating and highly-regarded work, particularly
her seminal and extensively researched Governing the Commons (1990). Here is a review.

A profile of Ostrom, who is a member of the National Academies of Science and and Editor of its Proceedings, is here:
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1748208

Her work can be found here: http://scholar.google.co.jp/scholar?q=Ostrom,+Elinor&hl=en&btnG=Search

here: http://de.scientificcommons.org/elinor_ostrom

and here: http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/browse?value=Ostrom%2C+Elinor&type=author

[She is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the National Academy of Sciences, and the American Philosophical Society,
and a recipient of a number of prestigious awards. Her other books include Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (1994); The Commons in the New Millennium: Challenges and Adaptations (2003); The Samaritan’s Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid (2005); Understanding Institutional Diversity (2005); and Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice (2007).]

Here is one link to get readers started:

Elinor Ostrom et al.,
Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges, Science 9
April 1999: http://conservationcommons.org/media/document/docu-wyycyz.pdf

Here is one general bibliography on commons research: http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/wsl/tragedy.htm

1.  Here are the statements from the 2009 Nobel Prize committee:

a.  From the press release:

Elinor Ostrom has demonstrated how common property can be successfully managed by user associations. Oliver Williamson has
developed a theory where business firms serve as structures for
conflict resolution. Over the last three decades these seminal
contributions have advanced economic governance research from the
fringe to the forefront of scientific attention.

Economic transactions take place not
only in markets, but also within firms, associations, households, and
agencies. Whereas economic theory has comprehensively illuminated the
virtues and limitations of markets, it has traditionally paid less
attention to other institutional arrangements. The research of Elinor
Ostrom and Oliver Williamson demonstrates that economic analysis can
shed light on most forms of social organization.

Elinor Ostrom has challenged
the conventional wisdom that common property is poorly managed and
should be either regulated by central authorities or privatized.

Based on numerous studies of user-managed fish stocks, pastures, woods,
lakes, and groundwater basins, Ostrom concludes that the outcomes are,
more often than not, better than predicted by standard theories. She
observes that resource users frequently develop sophisticated
mechanisms for decision-making and rule enforcement to handle conflicts
of interest, and she characterizes the rules that promote successful
outcomes.

b.  The background explanation is useful and contains a pointed criticism of many centrally-directed approaches to common pool resources (emphasis added):

If we want to halt the degradation of our natural environment and prevent a repetition of the many collapses
of natural-resource stocks experienced in the past, we should learn
from the successes and failures of common-property regimes. Ostrom’s
work teaches us novel lessons about the deep mechanisms that sustain
cooperation in human societies.

It has frequently been suggested that common ownership entails excessive resource utilization, and that it is
advisable to reduce utilization either by imposing government
regulations, such as taxes or quotas, or by privatizing the resource.
The
theoretical argument is simple: each user weighs private benefits
against private costs, thereby neglecting the negative impact on others.

However, based on numerous empirical studies of natural-resource management, Elinor Ostrom has concluded that common
property is often surprisingly well managed. Thus, the standard
theoretical argument against common property is overly simplistic.
It neglects the fact that users themselves can both create and enforce rules that mitigate overexploitation.
The standard argument also neglects the practical difficulties associated with privatization and government regulation. …

There are many …. examples which indicate that user-management of local resources has been more
successful than management by outsiders. …

[T]he main lesson is that common
property is often managed on the basis of rules and procedures that
have evolved over long periods of time.
As a result they are more
adequate and subtle than outsiders – both politicians and social
scientists – have tended to realize. Beyond showing that
self-governance can be feasible and successful, Ostrom also elucidates
the key features of successful governance. One instance is that active
participation of users in creating and enforcing rules appears to be
essential. Rules that are imposed from the outside or unilaterally
dictated by powerful insiders have less legitimacy and are more likely
to be violated. Likewise, monitoring and enforcement work better when
conducted by insiders than by outsiders. These principles are in stark
contrast to the common view that monitoring and sanctioning are the
responsibility of the state and should be conducted by public employees.

2.   Miscellaneous recent materials

On December 16, Spiegel Online ran the following interview with Elinor Ostrom

NPR’s Planet Money: Podcast: Elinor Ostrom Checks In (October 23, 2009)

Lecture at Cornell University: “Collective Action and the Commons: What Have We Learned?” (September 17, 2009)

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3.  These following earlier posts:

Elinor Ostrom? Austrians praise the Nobel laureate’s work on how human communities successfully manage resource conflicts

by TokyoTom

Elinor Ostrom awarded the Nobel prize in economics? Who? no doubt some
of you are wondering. Well, sharp-eyed readers will have noted that I
have referred to her any number of times (which I will reprise later,
as this post has gotten too lengthy). I excerpt below some of the
praise Elinor Ostrom has…

Positive
sum games: Get yer Elinor Ostrom here! A reprise of posts on rolling up
our sleeves to address real problems that “markets” (& govt.) now
aggravate

by TokyoTom

I excerpt below, in chronological order, portions of my prior posts
here that refer to Elinor Ostrom (the political scientist who recently
was awarded the Nobel prize in economics) and are indebted to her
thinking. Perhaps items 3 and 10 are most accessible for readers in a
hurry to find links to her…

Elinor Ostrom: Another Nobel Laureate jumps the climate shark (Proceed at Own Risk)

by TokyoTom

On December 16, Spiegel Online ran the following interview with Elinor
Ostrom , whose 2009 Nobel prize in economics (shared with Oliver
Williamson ), was widely applauded by Austrian economists (and whose
work I have referred to any number of time previously ). Der Spiegel
asked some good questions,…

Tragedy of the panicked enviro III: learning from Elinor Ostrom about cooperative action

by TokyoTom

This is the second follow-up to my post ” Grist and the tragedy of the
panicked enviro “, where I try to clarify the institutional frameworks
for understanding and addressing resource problems, in response to
confusion in comments by others. T Worstall Posted 5:27 pm 27 Aug 2009
TokyoTom makes…

John Quiggin plays Pin-the-tail-on-the-Donkey with “Libertarians and delusionism”

by TokyoTom

John Quiggin , a left-leaning Australian economist and professor at the
University of Queensland, has noted my recent post on the penchant for
bloggers and readers at the Mises Blog to attack climate science – are
” almost universally committed to delusional views on climate science
“, as he…

Not Climate Change Welfare, But Capitalism and Free Markets

by TokyoTom

… is what poor countries need. So corrrectly argues Keith Lockitch of
the Ayn Rand Institute , in a new article that responds to the
agreement, by the delegates of industrialized nations at the December
climate change conference in Bali, to activate an “adaptation fund”
that would help…

Libertarians to lefty-enviros: without community-based property rights, sustainable fisheries are impossible

by TokyoTom

Readers from RealClimate , thanks for your visit. Here`s my comment
with embedded links: #188 / 245: Neal & Jim, thanks for the
references to the successful experiments in Iceland, NZ and the Alaskan
pollock fishery to replace the tragedy of the government commons with
property rights approaches…

Ron Bailey of Reason congratulates Al Gore

by TokyoTom

[updated] A great new post by libertarian Ron Bailey of Reason here:
Congratulations to Al Gore But be wary of the man’s proposed solutions
for global warming. Ronald Bailey | October 12, 2007
http://www.reason.com/news/show/122960.html 1. Here are some excerpts
(emphasis added), followed by a copy…

Using the State to solve common resource problems?

by TokyoTom

How exactly do you transfer commons into private ownership in a fair
way, even for easily divided up stuff like land? That’s the trillion
dollar question that someone asked me on a recent thread (
http://blog.mises.org/archives/007152.asp#comments ) regarding my
suggestion that better definition…

Jon Bostwick agrees on another post that “Man is clever but not wise
(“homo sapiens” is a misnomer)”, but further comments (emphasis added):
“True. But humanity is wise. Men create cultures, economies and law.
“Man’s flaw is that he is over confident of his own intelligence…
Categories: Uncategorized Tags:

A few more "delusional" thoughts to John Quiggin on partisan perceptions & libertarian opposition to collective action

November 5th, 2009 No comments

Further to my preceding posts regarding John Quiggin`s post on “Libertarians and delusionism“, I copy below a few of the comments that I left there:

November 4th, 2009 at 08:13 | #3

John,
thanks for raising the topic more widely. However, I think you`ve
wandered a bit astray yourself by missing the problem of cognitive
traps, as well as missing a libertarian point or two.

I respond more fully here: http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/archive/2009/11/04/john-quiggin-plays-pin-the-tail-on-the-donkey-with-quot-libertarians-and-delusionism-quot.aspx

Tom

November 4th, 2009 at 18:09 | #33

John,
I note that I have made a few additional comments, chiefly in an effort
to clarify my understanding of libertarian views on property:

http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/archive/2009/11/04/a-few-more-comments-to-john-quiggin-on-climate-and-libertarian-principles.aspx

I look forward to your further thoughts.

Tom

TokyoTom

November 5th, 2009 at 00:43 | #48

John, obviously my own experience at Mises (and at the libertarian law
blog Volokh Conspiracy) is that while decidedly irrational “skepticism”
and wishful thinking predominates, it is not universal. But those like
me who believe that climate concerns are justified and want to analyze
policy (and who are critical of ad homs directed toward “enviros”)
always face challenges and criticism from those who feel too threaded
to venture out into a discussion of policy.

However, outside of boards like that, it seems to me that there is a
general swing by libertarian commenters on climate to an acceptance of
a rather mainstream science view, though there remains natural policy
disagreements. Ron Bailey, science correspondence at Reason and Jon
Adler, a resources law prof at Case Western, Lynne Kiesling at
Knowledge Problem blog, David Zetland, who blogs on water issues, come
to mind. Others, at AEI, CEI, IER and Master Resource are partly in the
business of running cover for fossil fuel interests, and so frequently
challenge both science and policy.

There have been several open disputes, where Bailey, Kiesling and
others have challenged skepticism at CEI and elsewhere, as I noted on
my recent “libertarian views” summary post. Readers might also find
this upbraiding of Penn & Teller to be interesting: http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/archive/2008/07/05/penn-amp-teller-quot-bull-quot-artists-get-ready-to-change-their-quot-skeptical-quot-stance-on-climate-change.aspx

BTW, I note that one self-described libertarian group in California
has specifically proposed carbon taxes, though this is a rather obscure
group and their “Pay Your Air Share” proposal appears to be
little-discussed: http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/archive/2008/02/13/quot-pay-your-air-share-quot-libertarian-think-tank-advocates-carbon-taxes.aspx

  1. November 5th, 2009 at 17:08 | #36

    @Freelander
    “It is the collective action that is required that extreme libertarians hate so much. ”

    Libertarians don`t oppose collective action per se, but are opposed
    to “collective” actions that are dictated by the state -because it
    hampers the ability of communities to respond to problems on their own,
    weakens links between resource users and the relevant resource,
    frequently locks in benefits for powerful insiders (viz., the big firms
    that profess to love markets but really love their deals from
    government that lock in their advantageous position) – thereby setting
    up enduring fights over the wheel of government -and because the
    “knowledge problem” generally ensures that solutions will be ham-handed
    and generate a need for further interventions.

    You, John and others might not have noticed, but these are some of
    the chief conclusions of the empirical research by “tragedy of the
    commons” expert Elinor Ostrom, and her writings about how
    counter-productive stated-led “development” and commons-management
    efforts have been is precisely the reason why the Swedes awarded her
    the Nobel Prize in economics.

  2. November 5th, 2009 at 17:19 | #37

    @Alice
    Alice, on the topic of “watermelons”, surely the libertarians have a
    point that many environmentalists really do not understand how markets
    or free societies function, but typically this term is used not to
    explain, but as an ad hom, both to dismiss concerns over climate
    science and to avoid the heavy work of arguing over policy, as I`ve
    noted here:

    http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/archive/2009/11/05/the-road-not-taken-v-libertarian-hatred-of-misanthropic-quot-watermelons-quot-and-the-productive-love-of-aloof-ad-homs.aspx

  3. November 5th, 2009 at 17:33 | #39

    John,
    to sum up, while clearly many libertarians are guilty of wishful
    thinking as to the climate science, by the same token many
    environmentalists and leftists seem to blithely ignore all of the
    problems that are associated with state/bureaucratic responses.

    Yes, there are self-deluded on both sides, but to seek to explain
    away (or dispense with considering) the opposition of others is itself
    a flight from reason and responsibility.

    That this is understandable , human and a common phenomenon in the
    case of tribal or partisan conflict – as Nick Kristof points out: http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/archive/2008/04/17/nick-kristof-on-politics-why-we-conclude-that-i-m-right-and-you-re-evil.aspx
    – makes it something that we should all the more try to avoid, rather
    than indulge in, which seems to be the drift of this post and many of
    your commenters.

    On this point, I would recommend that you and others take a look at
    some of the opposition to cap-and-trade now springing up on the left in
    the US; see the comments of two EPA lawyers and of Dr. Janese Hansen
    here:
    http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/11/02/epa-lawyers-challenge-cap-and-trade-for-climate/

    Says Hansen: “I hope that Williams and Zabel give decision makers
    pause. This is no time to be rushing into costly ineffectual
    legislation. It is time to call a halt on any legislation this year,
    and take time to understand the matter. It would take 20 years to fix
    the mess that Congress, with the help of special interests, seems
    intent on creating.”

    Regards,

    Tom

A libertarian immodestly summarizes a few modest climate policy proposals

November 3rd, 2009 No comments

[Folks, I hope you do a better job than I do at saving draft posts before they`re finalized; I just lost alot of work. This will necessarily be shorter.]

I have on numerous occasions tried to point out, to posters on the Mises
Blog who have addressed climate issues, the stunning unproductive approach. Rather than simply reiterating my criticisms, let me get started with a
list of policy changes that I think libertarians can and should be
championing in response to the climate policy proposals of others.

The incessant calls for – and criticism of –
government climate change policies and government subsidies and mandates for “green/clean power” both ignore root
causes and potential common ground.  As a result, both sides of the
debate are largely talking past each other, one talking about why there
is a pressing need for government policy to address climate change
concerns,
while the other is concerned chiefly about the likelihood of
heavy-handed mis-regulation and wasted resources. This leaves the
middle ground unexplored.

There are plenty of root causes for the calls for legislative
and regulatory mandates in favor of climate policies and clean / green / renewable power,
such as:

  • concerns about climate change,
  • the political deal in favor of dirty coal and older power plants under the Clean Air Act, 
  • the enduring role of the federal and state governments in owning
    vast coal and oil & gas fields and relying on the royalties, which it do not go to
    citizens but into the General Pork Pool, with an unhealthy cut to states), 
  • the unwillingness of state courts, in the face of the political
    power of the energy and power industries, to protect persons and private property from
    pollution and environmental disruption created by federally-licensed energy and power projects,
  • the deep involvement of the government in developing, encouraging and regulating nuclear power, and
  • the
    frustration of consumer demand for green energy, and the inefficient
    and inaccurate pricing and supply of electricity
    , resulting from the
    grant by states of public utility monopolies and the regulation of the pricing
    and investments by utilities, which greatly restricts the freedom of power
    markets, from the ability of consumers to choose their provider, to the
    freedom of utilities to determine what infrastructure to invest in, to
    even simple information as to the cost of power as it varies by time of day and season, and the amount of electricity that consumers use by time of day or appliance.

So what is a good libertarian to suggest? This seems rather straight-forward, once one doffs his partisan, do-battle-with-evil-green-fascist-commies armor and puts on his thinking cap.

From my earlier comment to Stephan Kinsella:

As Rob Bradley once reluctantly acknowledged to me, in the halcyon days before he banned me from the “free-market” Master Resource blog, “a
free-market approach is not about “do nothing” but implementing a whole
new energy approach to remove myriad regulation and subsidies that have
built up over a century or more.”
But unfortunately the wheels of this principled concern have never hit the ground at MR [my persistence in
pointing this out it, and in questioning whether his blog was a front for
fossil fuel interests, apparently earned me the boot
].

As I have noted in a litany of posts at my blog, pro-freedom regulatory changes might include:

  • accelerating cleaner power investments by eliminating corporate
    income taxes or allowing immediate depreciation of capital investment
    (which would make new investments more attractive),
  • eliminating antitrust immunity for public utility monopolies (to
    increase competition, allow consumer choice, peak pricing and “smart metering” that will
    rapidly push efficiency gains),
  • ending Clean Air Act handouts to the worst utilities (or otherwise
    unwinding burdensome regulations and moving to lighter and more
    common-law dependent approaches),
  • ending energy subsidies generally (including federal liability caps for nuclear power (and allowing states to license),
  • speeding economic growth and adaptation in the poorer countries
    most threatened by climate change by rolling back domestic agricultural
    corporate welfare programs
    (ethanol and sugar), and
  • if there is to be any type of carbon pricing at all, insisting that it is a per capita, fully-rebated carbon tax
    (puts the revenues in the hands of those with the best claim to it,
    eliminates regressive impact and price volatility, least new
    bureaucracy, most transparent, and least susceptible to pork).

Other policy changes could also be put
on the table, such as an insistence that government resource management
be improved by requiring that half of all royalties be rebated to
citizens
(with a slice to the administering agency).

I`m not the only one – other libertarian climate proposals are here:

Several libertarians have recently been urging constructive libertarian approaches to climate change:

These discussions and exchanges of view are also worthy of note:

  • The Cato Institute has dedicated its entire August 2008 monthly issue of Cato Unbound, its online forum, to discussing policy responses to ongoing climate change.  The issue, entitled “Keeping Our Cool: What to Do about Global Warming“, contains essays from and several rounds of discussion between Cato Institute author Indur Goklany; climate scientist Joseph J. Romm, a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress; and Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus, the co-founders of The Breakthrough Institute.  My extended comments are here.

  • Debate at Reason, October 2007, Ron Bailey, Science Correspondent at Reason, Fred L. Smith, Jr., President and Founder of
    CEI, and Lynne Kiesling, Senior Lecturer in Economics at
    Northwestern University, and former director of economic policy at the
    Reason Foundation.
  • Reason Foundation, Global Warming and Potential Policy Solutions September 7th, 2006 (Reason’s Shikha Dalmia, George Mason University Department of Economics
    Chair Don Boudreaux, and the International Policy Network’s
    Julian Morris)

Finally, I have collected here some Austrian-based papers on environmental issues that are worthy of note:

Environmental Markets?  Links to Austrians

One such paper is the following: Terry L. Anderson and J. Bishop Grewell, Property Rights Solutions for the Global Commons: Bottom-Up or Top-Down?

Positive sum games: Get yer Elinor Ostrom here! A reprise of posts on rolling up our sleeves to address real problems that "markets" (& govt.) now aggravate

October 16th, 2009 No comments

I excerpt below, in chronological order, portions of my prior posts here that refer to Elinor Ostrom (the political scientist who recently was awarded the Nobel prize in economics) and are indebted to her thinking.

Perhaps items 3 and 10 are most accessible for readers in a hurry to find links to her own work.

1.   Too Many or Too Few People? Does the market provide an answer?, Sep 28 2007:

Too many or too few? Good question, Dan.
I agree with you that the population question is like any other aspect
of the social order: best addressed by the market and by free societies.

There are just a few small problems – even within the developed
world (and very clearly outside of it), there are many important
resources that are unowned and thus not fully priced in the “market” economy.

Unowned resources include almost all of Nature.  Primary
productivity (the amount of vegetation produced from photosynthesis)
has changed little, so as we use technology and our organizational
abilities to divert more and more of it to feed us, this is an
inevitable cost to other species, either directly or in the form of
altered environments that support less life (and less diversity of
life).

In altering our environments to suit us, we are of course no
different from other life forms that compete for resources to live and
propagate, but with our technical and organizational abilities, mankind
has clearly triumphed over the rest of nature (except perhaps evolving
microbes, to whom we represent an increasingly large and relatively
untapped food source). But at what cost?

Through the centuries we have wiped out many wild systems of food
and other resources – because they were never owned, and because our
improving technology enabled us to race each other to take the
resources before others (or from others, in the case of many native
peoples). Not only Jared Diamond`s “guns, germs and steel”, but
also forms of social organization have played deciding roles in the
competition between human societies for survival, growth and
dominance.  In this regard, societies that recognize and protect
property rights and utilize free markets have proven clearly superior
in the competition with other societies to obtain and utilize available
resources.

But our struggle has been not only to capture resources and to use
them before others do, but also to manage and protect them
effectively.  Evolving ownership systems have been a key means of
limiting wasteful “tragedy of the commons” struggles (see Yandle; von Mises),
but even where ownership systems have been implemented, we have
generally replaced complex natural systems with simpler systems
designed solely to feed us (and particularly so where, due to higher
consumptive demand, we have replaced common property systems with
private property systems (Ostrom)).

Meanwhile, virtually all of the natural world – the world’s oceans,
atmosphere, tropical reefs, tropical forests and other great commons –
remain unowned and thus unmanaged and unregulated (or indigenous
occupants have been forced aside).  For example, the great cod fishery
off of the Grand Banks that fed Europe for centuries has now
disappeared, and other fishery stocks worldwide are crashing – to be
“replaced” by “farmed” fish that are fed to a substantial degree by
catching and grinding up fish stocks that humans prefer not to consume
directly, and in part by fish firms that are established by destroying
the mangroves that are estuaries to various fisheries.  The same is
true of the replacement of vast tracts of tropical forests with
soybeans or oil palm plantations, with the rapid increase in
atmospheric CO2 (and attendant risks to climate) and with the
correspondingly geolologically rapid increases in ocean acidification (and
threats to plankton, corals and shellfish).

While populations in the developed economies are now relatively
stable, demand from our markets (as well as the burgeoning developing
markets) continues to strip out unowned (or mismanaged “public”)
resources from the oceans or undeveloped countries, aided by
kleptocratic elites who are happy to steal from the peoples they
supposedly represent in order to line their own pockets.  

As Dan points out, property rights failures in poorer nations
contributes to population growth there by delaying the demographic
transitions that we have experienced.  Developed economies face similar
problems with respect to “public”, state-owned lands, for which
rent-seeking by and sweet deals to insiders are enduring problems and
sources of politcal conflict (as markets cannot work to allocate
resources).

Dan states that the stunningly rapid growth of human populations
from the Renaissance to the present (6+ billion now expected to nearly
double again soon) “actually represents the rise of capitalism and
capital development … [and]  shows … the stunning capacity of
freedom to provide for the whole world.”  While partly correct, this
misses completely the question of our massive impact, within a very
short period of geological time, on the environment in which we evolved
over millions of years, the fact this has occurred because clear and
enforceable property rights have not been created in many of the
resources that have been consumed, and the corollary fact that
we continue to lack the ability to manage our impact on our endowment
of natural resources.

The market clearly does NOT send accurate pricing signals with
respect to goods that are unowned or ineffectively owned; these goods
are either unpriced or underpriced, so the effect is overconsumption
until the point that the resource is greatly degraded, at which point
attention is turned to the next unowned resource.
Thus, human
populations are responding to rather imperfect market signals.  And
where resources are unowned, individuals and groups with differing
values and desires cannot adjust or realize those desires by means of
private, market transactions.  As a result, we are seeing a recourse to
the public and political arenas – and the inevitable discordant debates
– as various parties seek to use either moral suasion or the levers of
government (locally, nationally and internationally) to advance what
they consider to be their own interests.
  (Of course, in a “tragedy of
the commons” situation, all resource users share an interest is the
future availability of a resource; the difficulty is in the prisoners’
dilemma negotiations at the primary user level about how to allocate
short-term pain in the interest of long-term gains, compounded in the
case of multinational resources by rent-seeking with each national
participant.)

A cynic may say that our ongoing assault on nature is only
“natural”, presents no moral or philosophical issues and that we hardly
owe any responsibilities to “nature” or even “future generations” –  so
let’s just all keep on partying, consuming for today, and patting
ourselves on the back at how marvelous our market systems are.  And
that we should keep on hurling invective at those evil “enviros” who
want to crash the party and drag us all back to the Stone Age.

Perhaps I suffer from a want of sufficient cynicism.

2.    Using the State to solve common resource problems?, Oct 12 2007:

How exactly do you transfer commons into private ownership in a fair way, even for easily divided up stuff like land?

Libertarians do not insist that open-access resources (or common
property resources/CPR) be divided up by creating individual property
rights; cooperative ownership  via formal agreements or informally
developed practices and customs (such those developed by Maine
lobstermen, English angling clubs, indigenous peoples and Wikipedia and
online communities) may work better at solving the prisoners’ dilemma
issues and are just as acceptable
.

But technological advances and greater demand often swamp CPR
regimes, so such regimes remain vulnerable if they are not accorded
legal protection. My understanding of the UK enclosures in this regard
is that they were actually a legislative theft of common property by
the powerful.

Can states play positive roles in solving problems? At least
internally, it is rather clear that the answer is that the state works
best by allowing, and providing judicial mechanisms to enforce, private
transactions, and works least well when it tries to specify detailed
and rigid “solutions” itself – since the government itself never has
perfect information, often plays favorites and once a regulatory regime
is put in place, parties have no ability to work out their differences
directly with each other, but are forever in the position of trying to
influence the state and in adversarial positions vis-a-vis each other. 
But states can also play a positive role by disseminating information
and by acting to facilitate deals between various resources users,
particularly in cross-border/multi-state problems.

Elinor Ostrom is the guru of CPR regimes; anyone interested
should look into her fascinating and highly-regarded work, particularly
her seminal Governing the Commons (1990).

[She is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the
National Academy of Sciences, and the American Philosophical Society,
and a recipient of a number of prestigious awards. Her other books
include Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (1994); The Commons in the New Millennium: Challenges and Adaptations (2003); The Samaritan’s Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid (2005); Understanding Institutional Diversity (2005); and Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice (2007).]

Here is one link to get readers started:  Elinor Ostrom et al.,
Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges, Science 9
April 1999: http://conservationcommons.org/media/document/docu-wyycyz.pdf

Technology seems to provide us ability to create property rights regimes in ocean fisheries.

The
stickiest problems are those where the resource is located in a country
where we cannot ourselves create or enforce legal rights and in the
atmosphere, which no one owns and to which all have access.
 
Unfortunately, many libertarians don’t even want to acknowledge, much
less discuss, these problems. Since they are not confined to any one
country, clearly we need to coordinate with others – for which
purposes our state apparatus cannot be avoided.

Reaching any kind of effective solution for problems of this type
will require much more focussed attention and bridge-building (abroad
and at home), and if libertarians do not want to be part of the
discussion, clearly they will have little influence on the results.

3.    Sophomoric optimism?, Oct 16 2007:

Our states are merely one subset of the wide universe of formal and
informal institutions through which we cooperate with one another. 
States are not a market, to be sure, but then neither are corporations,
and there is a spectrum of ownership types between the two.  We can
study all of these institutions and use that knowledge to direct how we
make use of them.  Such study has informed, for example, the deliberate
shifts in policy that have led to the ongoing (yet incomplete)
privatization of the former USSR and of China. 

A study of institutions governing common pool resources by guru Elinor Ostrom makes the following point:

 “Whether people are able to self-organize and manage CPRs also depends on the broader social setting within which they work. National governments can help or hinder local self-organization. “Higher”
levels of government can facilitate the assembly of users of a CPR in
organizational meetings, provide information that helps identify the
problem and possible solutions, and legitimize and help enforce
agreements reached by local users. National governments can at times,
however, hinder local self-organization by defending rights that lead
to overuse or maintaining that the state has ultimate control over
resources without actually monitoring and enforcing existing
regulations.

“Participants are more likely to adopt effective rules in
macro-regimes that facilitate their efforts than in regimes that ignore
resource problems entirely or that presume that central authorities
must make all decisions.
If local authority is not formally recognized by larger regimes, it is difficult for users to establish enforceable rules.

Elinor Ostrom et al., Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges, Science, 04/09/99 http://conservationcommons.org/media/document/docu-wyycyz.pdf

Was von Mises foolish to suggest we can use the state to reform our institutions?

“It is true that where a considerable part of the costs incurred are
external costs from the point of view of the acting individuals or
firms, the economic calculation established by them is manifestly
defective and their results deceptive. But this is not the outcome of
alleged deficiencies inherent in the system of private ownership of the
means of production. It is on the contrary a consequence of
loopholes left in this system. It could be removed by a reform of the
laws concerning liability for damages inflicted and by rescinding the
institutional barriers preventing the full operation of private
ownership.

http://mises.org/humanaction/chap23sec6.asp

And Cordato, for suggesting that Austrians take particular policy approaches to environmental issues?

“For Austrians then, public policy in the area of the
environment must focus on resolving these conflicts over the use of
resources that define pollution, not on obtaining an ultimately
unobtainable “efficient” allocation of resources. …
For Austrians, whose goal is to resolve conflicts, the focus is on clarifying titles to property and rights enforcement.

http://mises.org/daily/1760

Sorry, but I cannot believe that we are condemned always to repeat
all mistakes, despite our rather constant human nature.  Rather, as Yandle notes, our very history as a species is about our success in evolving, devising and adopting ways to manage shared problems.   http://www.fee.org/publications/the-freeman/article.asp?aid=4064

This is a message of profound optimism, not cynicism — said the fool.

4.    Ron Bailey of Reason congratulates Al Gore , Oct 15 2007:

1.  You were right last year when you
said that “In the end, the debate over global warming and its obverse,
humanity’s energy future, is a moral issue.”
http://www.reason.com/blog/show/113924.html

2.  I share your understanding of the
economics and institutional problem and agree that a straightforward
explanation of these is important for very many.

3.  However, you forget what
evolutionary psychology, Ostrom and Yandle have explained to us so well
about how our innate moral sense drives and underpins mankind’s success
as a species by enhancing our ability to cooperate and to overcome
commons issues.

Ostrom: http://conservationcommons.org/media/document/docu-wyycyz.pdf
Yandle: http://www.fee.org/publications/the-freeman/article.asp?aid=4064

Our long history of developed rules and
institutions (informal and formal now overlapping) are based on our
moral sense and the effectiveness of these rules depends critically on
our moral investment in accepting their legitimacy – witness our views
on murder, theft, lying and “not playing by the rules” – and in
voluntarily complying with them.

Our moral sense reinforces our judgments
about when rules/institutions are not working and the need to develop
new ones in response to changing circumstances and new problems.  When
we see a problem that we think requires change, it is unavoidable that
we respond the the status quo, the behavior of people within it and the
need for change with a moral sense. 

This is simply a part of our
evolutionary endowment.  (Of course, other parts of our endowment
accentuate our suspicions of smooth talkers and help us catch free
riders and looters and to guard against threats from outsiders.)

4.  Accordingly, while it’s unclear how
deliberate Gore’s talk of “a moral and spiritual challenge” and
“lifting the global consciousness” is or whether this is a
productive approach for some people, I think it is fairly clear that,
in order to build consensus for a solution to the climate commons
problem (and other difficult commons problems) and to ensure that any
agreed solutions are actually implemented, we will need to bring our
moral senses to bear.

In other words, it is RIGHT to worry
about climate change, but no meaningful/effective “solution” can be
reached or implemented unless it is FAIR and the parties involved have
sufficient TRUST (backed by information) in each other.

5.    Not Climate Change Welfare, But Capitalism and Free Markets, Jan 22 2008:

[F]ar from “forc[ing] rich countries to become poor”,
figuring out how to manage a global commons like the atmosphere, while
it may have the effect of imposing a cost on the release of carbon, is
basically aimed at privatising externalities, with the intention of
increasing the efficiency of private transactions and net wealth.
  Climate
change is, of course, just one of a broad range of pervasive problems
that occur when markets encounter resources that are not clearly or
effectively owned or managed.  http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/archive/2007/09/28/too-many-or-too-few-people-does-the-market-provide-an-answer.aspx

3.  Most importantly, while Lockitch correctly diagnoses the illness
– poor countries need to “embrace free markets and private property
rights and attract the investment of profit-seeking entrepreneurs to
create wealth and drive economic growth” – he simply fails to address what wealthy nations SHOULD be doing, if anything, to assist the cure.  This,
of course, is the main dodge, because Lockitch fails to own up to the
true difficulties involved in trying to help the developing nations.
 

Trying to build “soft” infrastructure in the form of rule of
law and property rights (ending kleptocracy and theft of “public”
resources) is tremendously difficult – perhaps a problem that is even
more difficult than the wealthy nations deciding how to share the pain
of GHG reductions
(as I noted in comments to a post on Amazonian deforestation here: http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/prometheus/archives/climate_change/001043lahsen_and_nobre_20.htmlHeck,
the wealthy nations have a hard enough time doing the easiest things to
speed development of poorer nations, which is simply to open import
markets by removing domestic tariffs, import restrictions and subsidies.
 
Rather, it seems that the richer nations have to feed their more
powerful elites first, while hamstringing competition from poorer
nations in products for which they should be able to exploit a
comparative advantage.  If Lockitch was truly interested in
helping the poor of developing nations, you’d think he’d note how
enduring rent-seeking at home serves to keep the poorer nations down.

And if the wealthy nations should do something to help
poorer nations, which seems implicit in Lockitch’s analysis (if not
conventional aid, then aid to build soft, governance infrastructure),
then can’t some of those efforts easily dovetail with efforts to
establish carbon pricing in the wealthy countries?  Why couldn’t aid
budgets be funded by carbon taxes at home, for example?  And can’t
demand for “carbon credits” help to establish incentives to improve
governance infrastructure in poorer nations?  In other words,
“mitigation” (efforts to limit climate change) in developed
nations need not conflict with any efforts to help poorer
nations “adapt” to climate change or otherwise become wealthier.

4.  Lockitch asserts that the concern of enviros for the world’s
poor is “feigned”, but this is a cheap and unproductive ad hominem –
and one that can easily be turned around.  While some enviros may not
understand the institutional sicknesses that hinder development, this
illness has been fed much more by governments and corporations at home
than by enviros, many of who have been involved in the long,
hard effort to build local infrastructure and to protect traditional
private and community property rights.
 

On the other hand, just what is it that evidences that
Lockitch himself – or other skeptics – have any “real” concern for the
world’s poor?  Does the wheel of this concern ever hit the road, or is
it simply spinning noisily, to welcoming nods from  domestic special
interests who benefit from the continuation of climate externalities?

A key insight of Austrian economics relating to the environment is that man does not harm the environment per se, but that social
welfare or efficiency problems arise because of interpersonal conflict
associated with irresolvable inefficiencies – inefficiencies that
cannot find a solution in the entrepreneurial workings of the market
process
 because of institutional defects associated with the
lack of clearly defined or well enforced property rights.  (See Roy
Cordato
, http://mises.org/daily/1760). 
It is both ironic and disappointing that many Austrians and others
similarly minded, rather than focussing on the difficult task of
conflict resolution in the case of the climate, seem to prefer the
emotional rush of conflict itself over analysis and bridge- and
consensus-building.  But this is nothing new (and is certainly
tempting, given our tribal nature)(http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/archive/2007/12/17/holiday-joy-quot-watermelons-quot-roasting-on-an-open-pyre.aspx). 

No one owns the world’s atmosphere, so all are entitled to
their opinions about managing it.  And clearly the world continues to
struggle with the rapid exploitation of other unowned, “public” or
poorly defined or protected physical resources, in the face of growing
populations, growing markets and technological advances that lower the
costs of access to the commons.  I suggest that rather than ad
hominems, we would be better served by frankly acknowledging problems
of this nature and starting to build shared understandings.
  The writings of Elinor Ostrom are a good place to start:  http://www.conservationcommons.org/media/document/docu-7e8akm.pdf

In honestly engaging on these issues, it is perfectly
appropriate – nay, essential – to be aware of the self-interests of
various participants and to caution against the problems of
rent-seeking, “rent-farming” by politicians, and frequently unaligned
incentives of bureaucracies
.

5.  Finally, this is a quibble, but Lockitch is wrong to assert thay developing nations need to “industrialize”.  What they need to do is to better govern themselves by protecting investments, markets and human rights, and then getting out of the way of their people. 
What results will be these countries’ own path, which will naturally
differ from Western industrialization (leapfrogging it in some ways).

6.   Rob Bradley cheers on coal, but are all those who want to better manage commons and environmental impacts “Malthusian” idiots, or only in the case of coal?, Feb 5 2009:

Rob Bradley has a new post up at MasterResource, cheering on big (and now “clean”) coal, which has apparently received assurances from the Obama administration – after being bad-mouthed by NASA scientist Jim Hansen, Steven Chu and Obama himself – that, despite pressures from the “Malthusian anti-energy crusade” regarding climate change impacts, the recent massive TVA fly-ash spill and opposition to destructive mountaintop removal practices in Appalachia, coal will remain profitable during Obama’s term and central to US energy supplies.  Hooray!

But I wasn’t quite clear on all of Rob’s message, so I asked him a few questions in the comment thread:

Rob, are the John Badens, Terry Andersons, Bruce Yandles, Elinor Ostroms
and others who want to find ways to manage our commons better – by
improving ownership, incentives and pricing signals – also part of a[n
evil] “Malthusian crusade”?

I just wanna make sure I know who to hate.

As for that big fly-ash breach/spill in
Tennessee, I’m glad that you didn’t point out how this was a result of
government ownership of TVA, with the added benefit that costs will be
borne not only by direct and indirect victims, but by taxpayers as
well. No sense in pointing out how government is so often in the way,
particularly if it detracts from our “we hate enviros!” message. Last
thing we ever want to do is to reach a shared understanding with
enviros of the institutional underpinnings of problems, since that
means our funders might lose some of their fairly purchased,
government-given special privileges.

While it’s clear that “free-market” Rob cares little about whether the coal industry continues
commercial activities that shift the environmental costs and risks
(including potential costs arising from GHG emissions) to others
,
I forgot to ask Rob whether, as a hearty cheerleader for those poor
coal underdogs, he also supports their position that the government
should subsidize their change in business model by (a) having Uncle Sam pay the bulk of capital costs for IGCC (integrated gas combined cycle plant) [something like $1 billion for the first one with CCS], (b) giving them a further break (reduced royalties) on the sweet deals they already have
for stripping coal from public lands and (c) – now that the federal
government is getting into the busy of running the financial sector –
making sure that power producers that want to use coal have easy access
to credit, by twisting the arms of those uppity Wall Street financiers
who with their fancy new “Carbon Principles” and “Enhanced Due Diligence” seem a bit too reluctant to extend credit for coal-fired power plants.

Here’s hoping Rob weighs in further.  I want to make sure I’m not
messing up when I try to distinguish the “white hats” from the “black
hats”.   From what I can tell so far, seeking to manipulate government
policy for your own benefit is evil – as long as you’re not a coal
firm – and we call the evil ones “Malthusians”.  Right?

7.     More stupid from Tierney; this time on “Kuznets curve” and the dynamics of “wealthier and greener”, May 12 2009:

Tierney seems to believe that the Kuznets curve means that greater
wealth magically makes for a cleaner environment.  To the contrary, it
is the hard work of people, expressing their desires to protect their
own property and to realize other preferences regarding shared
resources, to increase wealth by finding means (property rights
institutions, litigation and government regulation) to end tragedy of
the commons-type situtations, who improve their environment.
 That is, working to close externalities leads to both wealthier and greener societies.  

(I`ve remarked on the Kuznets curve before; interestingly, conservatives seem to misunderstand it more than liberals.)

So
I tried to offer a more libertarian understanding, which I`ve taken the
liberty of memorializing here (with typo correction and emphasis and
further links added):

Andrew, food for thought on enviro Kuznets:

http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/search.aspx?q=kuznets
http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/archive/2008/01/22/poor-countries-need-capitalism-not-climate-change-welfare.aspx
http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/archive/2007/09/27/too-many-or-too-few-people-does-the-market-provide-an-answer.aspx

Unfortunately, Tierney simply fails to understand that the enviro
Kuznets curve does not tell us that problems relating to environmental
cost-shifting or to the over-exploitation of unowned commons are best
resolved by ignoring them and simply hoping for the best. Rather, it
affirms that as people become more wealthy, they care more about
protecting the environment and put more elbow grease into achieving
improvements – via improved property rights protection, improved
information disclosure, greater consumer pressure and even through
greater regulation (which is the path the West has largely followed),
and reaching agreements with others sharing the relevant resource).

In other words, the work relating to global, regional and various
national commons (atmosphere, seas, forests, water, etc.) is still
ahead of us. Libertarians can advocate for property rights (and
privatization of public lands) as ways to have a more efficient (and
just) path on the curve, or they provide implicit support for powerful
and dirty industries by standing by and waiting until citizen pressure
groups force government to act in heavy-handed ways.

  •  
    • Andrew. I suggest that you start with this short article by Yandle.

      I have plenty more links on my blog to him, Terry Anderson, Mises, Cordato, Block, Rothbard and others on Austrian approaches to environmental issues, fisheries, and climate. Ron Bailey (at Reason) has good posts on fisheries; leading enviro groups all agree that more privatization is desirable:http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/archive/2009/01/15/for-crashing-fisheries-coalition-of-mainline-us-enviro-groups-calls-for-property-rights.aspx

      Commons remain commons either because government ownership
      prevents privatization (as in the Amazon, US public lands and most
      fisheries management) or because full privatization is difficult. There
      are many examples of the latter case that involve semi-privatization
      and commons management,
      like traditional forestries, fisheries and water rights. Elinor Ostrom is the expert on commons; I have plenty of links to her too. …


    • People and firms invest all the time in doing
      things in response to incentives, both positive and negative; viz. they
      also try to reduce costs, including the costs their activities impose
      on others if those they injured have rights of recourse. The effort to
      reduce costs is one of the chief factors driving technological advances.

      Surely you`re not suggesting that the best way to encourage
      wealthier societies is to free people from responsibility for the
      damages they cause others? That`s hardly a Lockean or libertarian view.
      A “Laissez Faire approach” leaves government out, in favor of voluntary
      transactions and enforecment of property rights, including rights not
      to be injured. The regulatory state has in fact been a boon to the most
      powerful producers, by giving them rights to pollute, often
      grandfafthering dirty plants, while forcing the highest costs on more
      nimble and cleaner producers.
      If you^re interested in learning
      about libertarian approaches to the environment, again, I suggest you
      look at Rothbard, Cordato, Block and others, whom I link to on my blog.

      You seem to make reference to the enviro Kuznets curve, and how
      wealthier societies bring pollution dow, while completely missing the
      dynamics. Wealthier societies clean up because they insist on
      bringing an end to tragedy of the commons-type exploitation of
      resources. A society that focusses on property rights typically has a
      lower curve than societies that fail to enforce property rights (needed
      for Coasean bargaining) in favor of government regulatory approaches.
      Our own curve remains too high, because wealthier investors prefer to
      use regulation to shift costs to the rest of society.

8.   Libertarians to lefty-enviros: without community-based property rights, sustainable fisheries are impossible, May 11 2009:

Elinor Ostrom has
also been a leader in documenting the ways that a community of users
(NOT the dread and sloppily misused “soc-ial-ism”) may effectively
manage a shared resource.

Readers might be interested in the World Bank`s Oct 2008 report, “The Sunken Billions; The Economic Justification for Fisheries Reform”.

With support from the World Bank, PERC is in the middle of hosting a conference
on approaches to sustainable fisheries (and on ending the massive
over-harvesting and wasted subsidies and mal-investment under current
regulatory approaches).

I also urge readers to look at what the organization Defying Ocean’s End (co-founded by Conservation International, The Nature Conservancy, Natural Resources Defense Council, The Ocean Conservancy, Wildlife Conservation Society, The World Conservation Union, and World Wildlife Fundhas to say about protecting fish:

“Most of the solutions that have been
implemented or proposed to fix the world’s fisheries center on
command-and-control measures: regulators or courts telling fishermen
how to fish through the imposition of controls on effort (e.g., fishing
vessel length, engine horsepower, gear restrictions, etc.).
Prescriptions like these work against strong economic incentives for
maximizing catch, which are not addressed by such measures, and are of
course usually resisted by fishermen. Often, prescriptions create
incentives for “work-arounds” and set up a cat-and-mouse game between
fishermen and regulators – for example, if regulators impose a
restriction on vessel size, fishermen may purchase two vessels to
maintain high catch levels.

“As in most natural resource
problems, more effective solutions will address the fundamental drivers
of unsustainable fisheries. In this case, the key necessary reform will
be to designate secure catch privileges. It is important to understand
that such privileges can be allocated to different kinds of entities in
different ways, and indeed, they should be tailored to specific
fisheries and communities to fit with local customs, traditions,
values, and social structure.”

I`ve linked a number of my other posts on fisheries here.

9.   The tragedy of the panicked enviro II; understanding the “tragedy of the commons”, Aug 29 2009:

Sure,
the Western
world has managed to create many environmental problems, but we`ve
largely cleaned up our own messes, haven`t we?  While it by no means
excuses our own faults, far worse environmental problems have been
created and are still stewing in Russia and other state-directed
economies, and it`s no coincidence that the vast pollution being
created in China and India are tied to governement-owned enterprise and
an inability of injured people to sue for damages or to stop harmful
activities.
  And the great waves of extinctions created as man spread
around the globe tens of thousands of years ago can hardly be laid at
the foot of either the Western world or of private property rights (nor
can the collapse of earlier civilizations).

The
“tragedy of the commons” is NOT a “simplistic market morality”, but a
description of cooperation problems and incentives relating to shared,
open-access resources.  The tragedy of the commons and problems of
cooperation – and theft – are not even limited to mankind, but permeate
nature.
  This perceptive article by Bruce Yandle touches on competition
in nature, and links the ascendance of man to our evolution of
relatively enhanced cooperation
:
http://www.thefreemanonline.org/featured/the-commons-tragedy-or-triumph/

The
“tragedy of the commons” paradigm is useful to analyze, but the
paradigm doesn`t “seek to moderate” anything, and is just as useful in
looking at the ways Western nations still contribute to environmental
problems around the world (as I point out here:
http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/archive/2007/09/28/too-many-or-too-few-people-does-the-market-provide-an-answer.aspx) as it is in examining:

– environmental devastation in Haiti (which has little or no property rights, and vast free-for-all “government” holdings),


deforestation in Indonesia and the Amazon:
http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/archive/2009/05/24/capitalism-the-destructive-exploitation-of-the-amazon-and-the-tragedy-of-the-government-owned-commons.aspx,

– pollution in China: http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/search.aspx?q=china, and


crashing fisheries around the world as a result of government of marine
resources (producing free-for-alls and fleet subsidies) and a
free-for-all for other unowned or unprotected resources:
http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/search.aspx?q=fish.

You
say: “The rate of exploitation and the decline
of resources, water, energy, fisheries, soil, minerals, etc., all
occured under a free market, private property paradigm.”  This is
clearly demonstrably wrong, and draws entirely the wrong lessons. While
private property is certainly no panacea, neither are they what is
wrong.  Very often, is is governments that have been and are wrong,
though there is certainly some learning going on.

While
Garrett Hardin`s “The Tragedy of the Commons” certainly represents a
hypothetical situation, it is actually a very powerful analytical tool
for understanding and fashioning solutions to countless “real life”
problems. See Elinor Ostrom et al., Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges, Science, 04/09/99 http://conservationcommons.org/media/document/docu-wyycyz.pdf

“In real life,
corporations own, or vie to own, resources or access to them for the
purpose of extraction and profit and they seek to maximize profits
through economies of scale, that is industrial extraction methods,
drift netting, blowing up mountains, tossing mining waste into clear,
pristine lakes.

What
you describe here is a conflict between preferences over how resources
are used.  Do you prefer a free-for-all, or a situation where those who
use a resource can protect it, negotiate with others who wish to see
other values preserved, and who are responsible for negative
consequences caused to others (not always a part of some property
rights systems), or perhaps a situation where governments make all
resource exploitation decisions?”

“The money is in the resource and when the resource is
exhausted they will move on to the next one.”

The
money is never in the “resource”, but in the ways that people can use
it or otherwise value it (and of course people also value pristine
environments).

10.  Tragedy of the panicked enviro III: learning from Elinor Ostrom about cooperative action, Aug 29 2009:

Let me add some further nuance to Mr. Worstall`s comment by saying
that Hardin`s fertile observations have fuelled extensive further
research on common property problems, with Elinor Ostrom being recognized as a leading light.

Here is one general bibliography on commons research: http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/wsl/tragedy.htm

Ostrom
has refined Hardin`s work in the following way (quoting from a review
of Ostrom`s 1990 ground-breaking and extensively researched book
, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action):

Ostrom uses the term “common pool resources” to denote natural
resources used by many individuals in common, such as fisheries,
groundwater basins, and irrigation systems. Such resources have long
been subject to overexploitation and misuse by individuals acting in
their own best interests. Conventional solutions typically involve
either centralized governmental regulation or privatization of the
resource. But, according to Ostrom, there is a third approach to
resolving the problem of the commons: the design of durable cooperative
institutions that are organized and governed by the resource users
themselves.

“The central question in this
study,” she writes, “is how a group of principals who are in an
interdependent situation can organize and govern themselves to obtain
continuing joint benefits when all face temptations to free-ride,
shirk, or otherwise act opportunistically.”

The
heart of this study is an in-depth analysis of several long-standing
and viable common property regimes, including Swiss grazing pastures,
Japanese forests, and irrigation systems in Spain and the Philippines.
Although Ostrom insists that each of these situations must be evaluated
on its own terms, she delineates a set of eight “design principles”
common to each of the cases. These include clearly defined boundaries,
monitors who are either resource users or accountable to them,
graduated sanctions, and mechanisms dominated by the users themselves
to resolve conflicts and to alter the rules. The challenge, she
observes, is to foster contingent self-commitment among the members
….

Throughout the book, she stresses the dangers of overly
generalized theories of collective action, particularly when used
“metaphorically” as the foundation for public policy. The three
dominant models — the tragedy of the commons, the prisoners’s dilemma,
and the logic of collective action — are all inadequate,
she says, for
they are based on the free-rider problem where individual, rational,
resource users act against the best interest of the users collectively.
These models are not necessarily wrong, Ostrom states, rather the
conditions under which they hold are very particular. They apply only
when the many, independently acting individuals involved have high
discount rates and little mutual trust, no capacity to communicate or
to enter into binding agreements, and when they do not arrange for
monitoring and enforcing mechanisms to avoid overinvestment and overuse.

Ostrom
concludes that “if this study does nothing more than shatter the
convictions of many policy analysts that the only way to solve common
pool resource problems is for external authorities to impose full
private property rights or centralized regulation, it will have
accomplished one major purpose.”

A
profile of Ostrom, who is a member of the National Academies of Science
and and Editor of its Proceedings, is here:
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1748208

Her work can be found here: http://scholar.google.co.jp/scholar?q=Ostrom,+Elinor&hl=en&btnG=Search and

here: http://de.scientificcommons.org/elinor_ostrom

One
thing worth noting is that the historical and ongoing records are rife
with examples – such as our crashing local fisheries – where government
intervention has done more harm than good.
  In these cases and in
others, Ostrom introduces an analytical approach that is acceptable
widely across the political spectrum, even if differences in opinion
will remain.  See, for example, this discussion at libertarian-leaning
George Mason U:  http://www.theihs.org/bunnygame/

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