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Margo Thorning / ACCF to WVa. Conservative Foundation: we need a carbon tax and other policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions

August 28th, 2009 No comments

Margo Thorning, Chief Economist and SVP at the influential American Council for Capital Formation (and director of research for its tax and environmental policy think tank (ACCF Center for
Policy Research) and managing director of its new international affiliate, the International Council for Capital Formation) has been a persistent and vocal long-term opponent of most climate change policy, so much so that she`s got her own “ExxonSecrets FactSheet” (alongside similar ones for ACCF). 

She`s also the author of widely-quoted studies of the costs of climate change legislation, and has been busy explaining the study jointly released earlier this month by ACCF and the National Association of Manufacturers that assesses the potential impact of the Waxman-Markey Bill on manufacturing, jobs, energy prices and our overall economy,

(The rollout of the study, executive summary, etc. are here; criticisms of the study`s assumption are here, here, here, here, here and here.)

All of which makes her remarks on August 25 at a “Cap and
Trade Town Hall meeting”
sponsored by the West Virginia Conservative Foundation (and reportedly the West Virginia Manufacturers Association as well) – to the effect that we DO need federal and global policies to reduce GHG emissions and to prepare to adapt to changes that we will be unable to forestall – even the more remarkable. 

I quote below from an August 27 report of Thorning`s remarks in the online version of The State Journal (emphasis added):

Thorning believes that climate change is happening, that it is at least
in part caused by human activity and that some type of policy to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions is warranted.


But while climate scientists recommend keeping atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases below 450 parts per million to avoid
the very worst effects of climate change, Thorning said it’s too late
for that.


“We’re probably, because of China and India and developing countries,
going to have to adapt to a higher level of CO2 concentrations in the
atmosphere,” Thorning said in an interview before the event. “We might
be able to keep it to 550, but I think we better focus on adapting to a
changing environment.”

There is no rush in Thorning’s mind.


“CO2 stays in the atmosphere 100 years,” she said. “I think we can afford to take a thoughtful approach.”

Congress currently is considering a cap-and-trade program that would
place a cap on carbon emissions, issue permits that companies could
trade in an emissions market and then ratchet the cap down over time to
ensure emissions reductions.


Rather than a cap-and-trade program, Thorning advocates a carbon tax
that would put a price directly on greenhouse gas emissions and would
rise over time.

Now this might have startled her audience and readers here, but close observers might have noted that Thorning made a similar statement two years ago when, as I previously reported, she said in an interview that “Senator Lieberman and Warner are to be commended for their
efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, because I think we’re all
united that that’s a goal we need to put a lot of resources into.

Thorning spoke further in West Virginia about why a carbon tax is preferable to cap and trade:

In general, economists say, a cap on greenhouse gas emissions gives
certainty about emissions but uncertainty about the price of emissions,
while a tax on the emissions gives certainty about the price but not
about the quantity.


Companies need that price certainty, Thorning said, so they can make investment decisions.

A study sponsored in part by the ACCF and released earlier this month
found that the program Congress is considering could reduce U.S. Gross
Domestic Product between 1.8 and 2.4 percent from a baseline projection
in 2030.

It did not compare the effects of a carbon tax.

Thorning also spoke of the need for revenue.

President Barack Obama initially planned to auction the cap-and-trade
emissions permits and to direct some of the proceeds to the development
of renewable energy sources and carbon capture and storage technology.

However, as the program has come to be structured, the permits would be
given for free to emitters in at least the first decade of the program.

A tax, Thorning said, would bring in those revenues and enable the
government to support the development and deployment of important
technologies.

From a broader perspective, Thorning underlined the growth of emissions
in China, India and other emerging economies. She champions the
exchange in both directions of the most effective technologies to
reduce greenhouse gas intensiveness.


She pointed to the Major Economies Initiative housed in the U.S.
Department of State to foster cooperation among 17 countries that
represent 85 percent of greenhouse gas emissions.


The initiative can help promote business-to-business transactions like
one in which Caterpillar Inc. is turning methane captured at 60 Chinese
coal mines into electricity,
she said.

“So Caterpillar is making money on that, and we’re suppressing a gas
that’s even more harmful than CO2 — and the Chinese are getting
electricity,” she said. “There are about eight key areas like that that
have been identified in this Major Economies Initiative.”

Thorning believes that a gradually increasing U.S. carbon tax combined
with international cooperation on best practices is the least
economically disruptive approach to reducing greenhouse gas emissions
over time.


“Remember that economic growth and stronger economies allow people to
adapt to a changing environment,”
she said. “We have to keep our eye on
the bigger picture.”

h/t http://www.carbontax.org/

What else does Thorning want to see done on climate policy?  In a presentation in June to the Midwest Energy and Climate Policy Conference in St. Louis, Thorning argued that practical strategies for reducing global greenhouse growth would include the following steps:

  • Use cost / benefit analysis before adopting policies
  • If U.S. puts a price on carbon emissions, a carbon tax is preferable to cap and trade
  • Reduce cost of U.S. energy investment through tax code improvement and incentives for non profits
  • Remove barriers to developing world’s access to more energy and
    cleaner technology by promoting economic freedom and market reforms
  • Increase R&D  for new technologies to reduce energy intensity, capture and store carbon, and develop new energy sources 
  • Promote nuclear power for electricity
  • Promote truly global solutions and consider expanding the Asia
    Pacific Partnership on Development with its focus on economic growth
    and technology transfer to other major emitters

These prescriptions expand on her November 2007 interview:

Q:So, if you were given the opportunity
to sort of write your own proposal of how the U.S. should reduce
emissions and not hurt itself economically, you’d go with the carbon
tax?

Margo Thorning: I would go with the
carbon tax and more incentives for new technology development. And I
would change the U.S. tax code, because we have the slowest
depreciation allowances for new energy investment of 12 countries that
we compared recently. We have very high capital costs for new
investment because depreciation is so slow and our effective tax rate
is very high, because our corporate tax rate is the highest in the
industrial world. So our companies are disadvantaged vis-à-vis our
trading partners because of our tax system.

This would seem to align Thorning`s views fairly closely with those of the still-villified Exxon, which has been a generous supporter of ACCF, and whose CEO Rex Tillerson is an express advocate of carbon taxes.  The nail-biting question is whether these voices are too little and too late in the game to steer the cap and trade pork train on to a more productive track.

Categories: ACCF, carbon pricing, Exxon, Thorning, Tillerson Tags:

Thorough defense by Joe Romm of Waxman-Markey against "carbon tax + dividend" James Hansen; where is "Principled Entrepreneurship" Bradley on fat subsidies for coal?

July 12th, 2009 No comments

Joe Romm`s defense of Waxman-Markey against climate scientist James Hansen (who prefers rebated carbon taxes and a faster phase-out of coal) is effective and worth a read.

Notably, however, Romm makes no attempt to justify all of the pork now in the bill, including the huge subsidies to coal (Congressman Ed Markey: “We have in huge subsidies for clean coal. Huge. Much more than we have in for renewables.”), which are one of the reasons why Greenpeace has wtihdrawn its support for the bill.

Hope springs eternal that Rob Bradley, in his “free-market” MasterResource energy blog, his Institute for Energy Research or their more blatant PR arms like “grass roots” American Energy Alliance (or side-kick Bob Murphy) will criticize past or ongoing rent-seeking  (“political capitalism”) by King Coal, but so far it looks very much like the piper is calling the tune – to the extent that Rob Bradley bans commentators who note the lack of balance in the application of “Principled Entrepreneurship” (which Bradley has trademarked!).

 

Rent-seekers at the Core: Rob Bradley is anxious to defend his role at Enron, but is uninterested in balance, open debate or correcting his own misstatements about EXXON's support for carbon taxes

May 10th, 2009 No comments

Apparently Rob Bradley`s self-proclaimed “free-market” energy blog, “MasterResource”, has experienced a recent increased flow of traffic, so Rob is busy patting himself on the back and spinning his blog to his new readers.

But what`s the reason for the increased traffic?  Is MasterResource finding more success at putting out a message of “free-market” energy and “principled entrepreneurship“?*

* This is a purportedly trademarked(!) phrase that encapsulates Bradley`s laudable professed beliefs that (i) “businesses, big or small, should not seek special favors from government but create private wealth via the economic means rather than the political means” and that (ii) “government activism, not consumer choice in a free society, is the major threat to energy sustainability”.

Far from it – in the face of the growing stream of unbalanced (pro-fossil fuels and “clean” coal), partisan, thinly argued, and some surprisingly not pro-free-market posts from MasterResource and its related sites, the Institute for Energy Research (of which Bradley is founder and CEO) and IER`s “independent grassroots affiliate”, the newly re-founded energy front group American Energy Alliance (which calls IER its “partner”), these groups and blogs have basically simply been earning negative attention from those they see as their opposition in a classic rent-seekers` battle over using government (via public opinion tools) to achieve economic and other ends.  IER has been busy pushing for greater energy production on “public” lands, while AEA, with the help of Burston-Marsteller, has created affliliates in every state, and is running a large “integrated education and advocacy campaign” against the Waxman-Markey cap and trade bill (which AEA prefers to misleadingly call simply an “energy tax bill”).

As I noted in another post and in comments regarding a puzzled reaction by Bob Murphy (who has found himself the target of attacks as a result of speaking on behalf of IER against Obama`s green jobs program), this is too bad, not only because one of the first casualties in a war of words is truth and reason.  MasterResource and the folks Bradley runs with at IER and AEA are assembling their own “Baptists and Bootleggers” coalition, where market principles are given lip service (along with patriotism, energy independence and the like), but the funders appear to all have rather more common-place and less lofty motives.  The descent into partisan bickering (while Bradley tries to maintain a lofty tone, it`s easily seen elsewhere by those who pick up posts from his blog, IER and AEA) is too bad, but the natural consequence when one acts as a spokesman for particular classes of rent-seekers.

That this state of affairs – professing the high ground while fronting for rent-seekers (or “political capitalists”, to use a term that Bradley prefers) – is what Rob Bradley actually desires, seems to be attested to:

– (1) by the alacrity by which Bradley has rushed to defend himself and IER against criticisms that were generated in response to commentary from Master Resource and IER, while deliberately obfuscating and refusing to correct the record about ExxonMobil`s fairly dramatic change in position – from opposition to government action on climate financial support to cutting off funding for IER and to actively supporting carbon taxes (Exxon CEO Rex Tillerson: “It is rare that a business lends its support to new taxes. But in this case, given the risk-management challenges we face and the alternatives under consideration, it is my judgment that a carbon tax is the best course of public policy action. And it is a judgment I hope others in the business community and beyond will come to share.”); and

– (2) of course, by the fact that, despite Bradley`s professed call to “Let the analysis and debate continue–and assume the best of intentions and civil discourse from all of us at MasterResource,” he banned me from the site, without explanation, and without the knowledge or consent of his “volunteer” co-bloggers in mid-conversations (Tom Tanton carried the conversation to my blog, while Chip Knappenberger responded by email, and I just discovered that Marlo Lewis, weeks after I was banned, posted a rejoinder).

Sure, Rob, let the “high-level” discourse continue, with nary an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of others`s preferences, of the role of government in frustrating such preferences so far, and of the firms and investors that continue to benefit from government interventions at the expense of consumers and the public weal. 

Heaven forbid anyone call for greater competition in power markets, for finding ways to rein in the mismanagement of the federal lands that your friends are itching to drill/mine, or for a frank acknowledgment that the world faces a number of “environmental” problems as a result of a lack of clear or enforceable private or communal property rights in important shared resources.

It`s the Austrian/libertarian/Objectivist way, after all.

Do actions speak louder than words?

[Fixed] Exxon/Rex Tillerson: No longer willing to be "conservative" on climate risks, advocates carbon taxes and invests in carbon-lite tech

March 7th, 2009 No comments

[Somehow
most of my excerpts of Tillerson`s speech weren`t included in my first try; there`re here
this time.]

It may still seem novel to some, but Exxon
Mobil Corporation
began throwing its weight behind carbon pricing
policies
more
than two years ago

Subsequently, Rex
Tillerson,
Exxon`s Chairman and CEO, has
given
a
number of speeches
on
Exxon`s actions (and cost savings) in reducing its own GHG emissions, its
investments in energy technologies that further improve energy efficiency and
GHG efficiency, and Exxon`s views on climate risks and preferred policy
options.  Why is this worth mentioning?  Simply, Exxon is an
excellent, well-run company that knows the energy business and climate risks
well (its scientists have been sitting on the IPCC panels fromtheir inception),
so it has some credibility (in this vein, Rob Bradley`s MasterResource
“free-market” energy blog has a post up toda,
similarly remarking on Exxon`s credibility
as well-run, principled and
“the consumer’s friend and the taxpayer’s friend;” Rob just
conveniently fails to mention Exxon`s pro carbon-tax stance).

Tillerson made another such speech on February 17, on the occasion
of a visit to the Stanford
University
-centered
Global
Climate and Energy Project (GCEP)
, the world`s largest privately-funded
effort to conduct basic research on energy technologies that will further
reduce GHG emissions.  Exxon has has committed $100 million to
GCEP over ten years and has been the lead funder of GCEP since its
establishment in December 2002.  The punchline of Tillerson’s remarks?

“It
is rare that a business lends its support to new taxes. But in this
case, given the risk-management challenges we face and the alternatives
under consideration, it is my judgment that a carbon tax is the best
course of public policy action. And it is a judgment I hope others in
the business community and beyond will come to share.”

Tillerson`s
full speech here
is worth a look; I excerpt a few portions below – climate
policy comments are largely at the end (emphasis added):

GCEP’s research program, like ExxonMobil’s, is shaped to fit the contours of what has been termed the “grand challenge” before us. It is, in fact, a dual challenge — supplying the energy essential to global economic growth, while at the same time reducing greenhouse gas emissions and managing the risks of climate change. …


However, the world economy will recover. History shows that human ingenuity and productivity cannot long be suppressed. And when the world economy recovers, so will world energy demand.


Growing populations in developing countries who are seeking higher standards of living will drive this increased energy demand, which is expected to be 35 percent higher in the year 2030 than it was in the year 2005, despite the current and temporary economic conditions.


Meeting this growing long-term societal demand requires that we develop all economic and environmentally sound sources of energy. This includes hydrocarbon energy sources like oil and natural gas, which are abundant, available, versatile and affordable.


Huge investments over many decades have enabled oil and natural gas to meet close to 60 percent of the world’s enormous energy needs today, and projections are that oil and natural gas will account for a majority of the world energy demand through at least the year 2030. They are simply indispensable and irreplaceable at scale.


This global energy demand challenge is matched by a global environmental challenge — curbing greenhouse-gas emissions and addressing the risks of climate change. Thanks to greater energy efficiency and growing use of cleaner energy such as natural gas for power generation, greenhouse-gas emissions levels are expected to decline in some developed economies. …


The challenge for developing economies is more daunting, where energy demand is increasing as growing populations strive for higher standards of living. For example, by the year 2030, China’s carbon-dioxide emissions will be comparable to those of the United States and Europe combined — even recognizing that China’s energy use and emissions will be much lower on a per-capita basis — rising from 4 metric tons per capita in 2005 to 5.8 metric tons per capita in 2030.


Nonetheless, the net effect of these countervailing trends will be a sizeable increase in greenhouse-gas emissions worldwide. Even with dramatic gains in efficiency, rising demand for energy will continue to push related carbon-dioxide emissions higher through the year 2030 — an increase of 28 percent from the year 2005. …

 

To develop these integrated solutions, we will need to find the best ways to unlock new technology. Energy innovation — led by private enterprise, furthered by independent research, spread by free markets, and supported by sensible and stable public policy — will be essential to enabling us to achieve each of these aims. It is the key to a more prosperous, more secure, and more sustainable energy and environmental future.


It is important to remember, however, that gains in efficiency and technology occur over time.


The most dramatic changes will not happen overnight, due to the sheer complexity of the technologies we develop and the enormous scale of the global energy market. Technological transformation takes time.


The history of energy over the last century helps put such transformation into perspective. For example, it is estimated that at the beginning of the 20th century, coal and wood provided more than 95 percent of the world’s energy needs. From that point, it took more than half a century for petroleum — a cleaner and more versatile alternative — to surpass coal as the world’s largest energy source. It took nearly 50 years more to develop the technologies and build the global infrastructure so that natural gas, an even cleaner-burning source, could play a sizable role in the world’s energy mix.


This reality about timeframes is another reason why we need energy policies that allow for long-term planning and consistent, disciplined investments that lead to technological advances.


National and state governments can play a helpful role in this vital enterprise.


By creating a stable, long-term policy framework for investment in academic and commercial research efforts, government can be a partner in the short-, medium-, and long-term technological transformations we need.


One of the areas where government can provide needed stability is by implementing simple, transparent, and predictable policies to mitigate greenhouse-gas emissions. Throughout the world, policymakers are considering a variety of legislative and regulatory options. In our view, assessing these policy options requires an understanding of their likely effectiveness, scale and cost, as well as their implications for economic growth and quality of life.


Consistent with that view, we believe that a carbon tax would be a more effective policy option to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions than alternatives such as cap-and-trade. Pricing carbon through a direct and transparent tax could incentivize the search for lower-emissions energy solutions while also providing the stability and predictability industrial companies need to make long-term, capital-intensive investments in equipment and research.


To ensure revenues raised from this tax are indeed directed to investment, and to assist those on lower incomes who spend a higher proportion of their income on energy, a carbon tax should be offset by tax reductions in other areas to become revenue neutral for government.

It is rare that a business lends its support to new taxes. But in this case, given the risk-management challenges we face and the alternatives under consideration, it is my judgment that a carbon tax is the best course of public policy action. And it is a judgment I hope others in the business community and beyond will come to share.

Categories: Bradley, carbon pricing, Exxon, Tillerson Tags:

Marlo Lewis/CEI at MasterResource: why a massive cap & trade program is much, much better than Jim Hansen’s simple rebated carbon tax idea. Or not.

March 3rd, 2009 2 comments

Marlo Lewis of CEI has a rather schizophrenic post up at Rob Bradley‘s MasterResource blog – one of my favorite “free market” fossil-fuel industry-funded sites (unlike the NRO’s “Planet Gore”, MasterResource actually allows comments!) – regarding the proposal by leading “alarmist” climate scientist Dr. James Hansen (of NASA and Columbia U.’s Earth Institute) that the federal government adopt a “tax and dividend” climate policy instead of a “cap and trade” approach.

Lewis notes that Hansen recently testified in front of the U.S. House Ways and Means Committee about Hansen’s “tax and dividend” proposal, but while Lewis calls Hansen’s per capita rebated carbon tax proposal “clever”, Lewis puzzlingly fails to compare Hansen’s proposal with the cap and trade alternative that the Obama administration supports and that Congress (and industry) appears to favor.  Instead we get some poorly grounded speculation about the effects of a carbon tax and complaints about the political viability of a transparent carbon tax – all of which points not only ignore the more opaque, rent-seeking prone and heavy-handed cap and trade alternative, but by implication suggests that those who prefer an opaque and back-room deal prone cap and trade approach have made the correct political calculation.

Nor does Lewis make any mention of all of the support that carbon taxes have received, not only from economists, but from a wide range of others, including Exxon`s Rex Tillerson and various neocons, conservatives and libertarians (George Will, Congressman Bob Inglis, Jon Adler, Barbara Thoring, etc.), at least in comparison to cap and trade.

As a result, one is forced to wonder just whati it is that Lewis is trying to achieve – is he trying to sabotage a government-lite carbon policy, so that government-heavy policy is more likely to prevail?  If so, why?  Or does he really think that opposing EVERY carbon pricing policy is the most effective way to delay and/or influence ultimate policy outcomes?  I for one am confused.

My more extensive (and less high-level) comments to Marlo Lewis on his comment thread are copied below:

Marlo,
first, I’m afraid I don’t follow you on the science. We can’t stop our
still growing GHG releases on a dime, much less the short- to
medium-term feedbacks from water, methane and albedo changes, and
long-term will persist for centuries, and the water cycles, the oceans’
pH and world’s biota are changing noticeably and fairly rapidly, even
without significant further increases during the past decade – yet what
is it, precisely, about our ability to change our influence on the
system or to control responses that gives you comfort? Why do you seem
to think it is “conservative” for our nation and others to do nothing
in light of our remarkable and uncontrolled global climate experiment?

BTW, surely you are aware that Hansen has earlier offered extensive
information that paleoclimate records indicate that long-range climate
rsponse to a CO2 doubling is on the scale of 3 degrees C. Did you miss
that? Or were you more eager to say that Hansen’s reference to more
recent studies about facts some how implies that Hansen is “dissing”
models? What’s the point anyway, other than point-scoring – if facts
appear to indicate that long-term sensitivity is relatively high,
should we be ignoring that and placing our faith in models instead?
Should facts not further inform models, or policy-makers?

Second, while you note Hansen’s attack on cap & trade and his
“tax and dividend” proposal “quite clever”, you fail to offer any
opinion on the realative merits of these quite different proposals.
Instead, you offer some sniping criticisms of tax and dividend, as if
you are hoping that the consequence will be that the Obama
administration, Dems and rent-seekers generally will turn away from
climate policy altogether. But isn’t that nothing but wishful thinking,
and shouldn’t libertarians and others who prefer to avoid the
monstrosity of cap & trade be trying to encourage the efforts of
those whose proposals would be much less economically damaging? Isn’t
Hansen’s proposal far preferable over cap & trade, and the kind of
industrial planning that Jon Adler says is inevitable from the EPA
under EPA vs. Massachusetts without legislative action?

Exxon and a host of others (as noted at the blog posts linked at my
name) have come clearly down in favor of carbon taxes over cap &
trade; perhaps you may at some point care to favor us with your own
comparative views.

It seems to me that Hansen’s proposal is clearly preferable; it
could be easily implemented and monitored, would not involve large new
bureaucracies, would be much more transparent and less susceptible to
rent-seeking, would provide market signals on GHGs while having no
fiscal impact, would be grounded in the principle that the atmosphere
is owned by citizens and not government (or by corporations that are
given or purchase rights to emit GHGs), and, by being refunded per
capita to citizens would be generally progressive.

Third, as for your criticisms of Hansen’s proposal:

– carbon taxes will hit coal use more heavily than petroluem or
natural gas, so focussing first on “pain at the pump” smacks of
pandering, especially as revenue recycling may eliminate the pain
completely;

– older, dirtier coal plants are already uneconomic and generate
tremendous costs to health and property that are not costed to
producers or consumers; taxing carbon is a great way to end some of the
nonsense incentivized by the CAA. Your speculation about power supply
and electricity prices is nothing more than speculation, but oil and
gas-fired plants could be brought on line relatively quickly;

– as for the “green stimulus” effect, it is ironic that you fail to
see that the fact that “There is no guarantee people will use their
dividends to buy hybrid cars, energy-efficient appliances, or green
energy” is in fact an argument IN FAVOR of rebated carbon taxes as
opposed to cap and trade, as the first allows much greater economic
freedom and is thus more conducive to wealth creation. Further, not
only is dividending the tax proceeds a great way to make sure that the
government doesn’t have an even larger pot to dole out mandates,
subsidies and other goodies to favored industries, but the right could
trade its acceptance for such a tax for elimination of existing
subsidies to ethanol and solar.

– your point about labor productivity is fair, but it ignores the
social cost of carbon. Has forcing polluting industries for the ’60s on
benefitted society and improved productivity as a whole the whole? Or
is it simply more important to allow certain classes of producers and
consumers to profit while continuing to shift costs to others?

– as for “massive” transfers, this is all “would” and “could”
without any backing, and it completely ignores all of the massive
wealth transfers involved in the way we presently regulate power
generation and energy (and have refused to regulate GHGs). I’m happy to
have more information, but let’s not forget that the whole purpose is
to have a closer alignment between profits/benefits and social costs.

 

Libertarian law prof. Jonathan Adler warns of CO2 regulatory runaway train that Bush bequeathed to Obama; recommends rebated carbon taxes

January 28th, 2009 No comments

Libertarian law professor Jonathan H. Adler, of Case University, The Volokk Conspiracy law blog and NRO contributing editor,  has a post up at NRO explaining why conservatives ought to be pushing for  a “revenue-neutral carbon tax” as the best way to head off what he sees as a looming train wreck of damaging regulatory actions by the EPA, that he argues are mandated by a recent Supreme Court ruling that. 

Here is Jon’s summary of his post:

I have an article up today explaining how the EPA is required to begin regulating greenhouse gases as a consequence of Massachusetts v. EPA.  Of potential note, the new EPA Administrator agrees, telling EPA staff in a memo that she will fulfill the agency’s “obligation” to regulate GHGs under the Clean Air Act while the Obama Administration develops new climate legislation.

Regulating greenhouse gases under existing law will be a disaster, but what’s the alternative?  I’ve endorsed the idea of a revenue-neutral carbon tax.  My friend Chris Horner thinks this is preemptive surrender, but what’s his alternative?  Absent new legislation, EPA is poised to regulate cars, trucks, factories, power plants, and much, much more.  The number of facilities covered by the PSD program alone will increase ten-fold or more without a legislative fix.  I know Horner would like a clean Clean Air Act revision, simply excising greenhouse gases.  But assumig that’s impossible — or, perhaps, once that measure fails — what is his Plan B?

Adler has posted slightly longer summary at The Volokh Conspiracy.

Categories: adler, carbon pricing, EPA Tags:

[Update 2] Neocons, conservatives, libertarians and Exxon join Jim Hansen in calling for rebated carbon taxes in lieu of massive cap/trade rent-seeking and industrial planning

January 10th, 2009 No comments

[Update at bottom.]

Neocons, conservatives, libertarians and Exxon`s Rex Tillerson have recently joined arch-warmer Jim Hansen in calling for rebated carbon taxes in lieu of massive cap/trade rent-seeking and industrial planning.

I`ve blogged extensively on the reasons why I and others view carbon taxes – particularly if rebated to citizens – as a far better alternative to a domestic cap and trade program.

With the Obama inauguration looming, starting late last month a wide range of voices on the right have started to weigh in – each with their own reasons – in support of carbon or similar taxes, in order to shift the debate away from cap and trade and other extensive industrial policy.  Is it too late?  In any case, it`s worth taking a look at what people are saying recently:

Climate scientist Jim Hansen, who with his wife rather boldly sent to Barack and Michelle Obama a personal letter and background paper (with a discussion draft first made public in November).

Neocon Charles Krauthammer proposed a substantial “net-zero” gas tax in the December 27 (now updated to January 5) Weekly Standard, with intentions in part to cut off the flow of oil money to unfriendly (and Muslim) regimes abroad.

Republican Congressman Bob Inglis and economist Arthur Laffer argued in the December 28 New York Times  for a carbon tax coupled with tax-cut stimulus.

On January 9, the Wall Street Journal reported on ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson`s recent speech in DC calling explicitly for Congress to enact a tax on greenhouse-gas emissions as a “more direct, a more transparent and a more effective approach” than cap and trade.  This is not as new as the WSJ would have it; as I note on an earlier post, ExxonMobil came out rather explicitly in favor of carbon taxes a year ago.

Libertarian and natural resources law prof – and NRO and Volokh Conspiracy blooger – Jonathan Adler applauds and explains these developments for various reasons, noting particularly that a train wreck seems headed our way, and that Congressional action is needed to avoid having the Obama EPA attempt to implement climate change policy via the Clean Air Act (for which a Supreme Court case last year paves the way).

Of course there is reasoned (both reasonable and passionate) disagreement, such as from businessman Jim Manzi at NRO on December 30 and blogger Tony Quain in response to Krauthammer, and by Chris Horner of the Competitve Enterprise Institute on January 7.

All are worth a look.

 

[Update:  Although liberal economists and commentators have tended to diss a carbon tax as a political non-starter, I note that in a December 27 New York Times op-ed, Thomas Friedman voiced support for a revenue-neutral carbon tax or gas tax on roughly the same grounds as Krauthammer.

Friedman and the others noted above join a long list of economists and political commentators on both sides of the political spectrum (including AEIGeorge Will and Barbara Thoring on the right) who strongly prefer carbon taxes over cap and trade.

I note that I do not buy all of the arguments for a carbon tax, particularly the argument that a gas tax would be an effective foreign policy tool.  However, I summarized previously some economists’s discussions of using a domestic tax to limit the flow of revenues to oil-exporting countries.

Dan Rosenblum of the Carbon Tax Center (which is a great complier of information on carbon taxes vs. cap and trade policies) has an excellent summary on recent developments in the December 30 Huffington Post.

My view is that a carbon tax would be much preferable to a cap and trade system and, if rebated or offset by reductions in income or other taxes, may improve incentives for savings and investment.  Further, it would undercut arguments and justifications for other obviously counterproductive market inverventions like the CAFE standards and subsidies for supposedly “green” sources of energy (including ethanol). 

Of course the fact that a carbon tax is much more transparent than a cap and trade and other policies interventions is one of the chief reasons that politicians and rent-seekers prefer more complex and obscure ways to provide favors to various industries and interest groups.]

[Further update: I note that Cato devoted its August 2008 edition of Cato Unbound to a debate over climate change, anchored by an essay by Jim Manzi that specifically advocated substantial government in improved global climate prediction, carbon capture and storage, and  geo-engineering
projects.

In addition, libertarians Ed Dolan, Gene Callahan and Sheldon Richman all feel that climate change deserves serious consideration, Reason online`s Ron Bailey and libertarian/energy expert Lynne Kielsing supports climate change actions,  Bruce Yandle, CEI`s Iain Murray, Cato`s Indur Goklany has advanced a specific climate change-targeted proposal, and AEI`s Steven Hayward and Ken Green have provided relatively balanced analyses.]

Categories: carbon pricing Tags:

255 Canadian economists say rebated carbon taxes are preferrable to cap and trade and to no action

October 15th, 2008 No comments

More here.

The signatories agreed to the following 10 principles:

  1. Canada needs to act on climate change now.
  2. Any substantive action will involve economic costs.
  3. These economic impacts cannot be an excuse for inaction.
  4. Pricing carbon is the best approach from an economic perspective.
    1. Pricing allows each business and family to choose the response that is best and most efficient for them.
    2. Pricing induces innovation.
    3. Carbon is almost certainly under-priced right now.
  5. Regulation is the most expensive way to meet a given climate change goal.
  6. A carbon tax has the advantage of providing certainty in the price of carbon.
  7. A cap and trade system provides certainty on the quantity of carbon
    emitted, but not on the price of carbon and can be a highly complex
    policy to implement.
  8. Although carbon taxes have
    the most obvious effects on consumers, all carbon reduction policies
    increase the prices individuals face.
  9. Price mechanisms can be regressive and our policy should address this.
  10. A pricing mechanism can allow other taxes to be reduced and provide an opportunity to improve the tax system.

Too bad they didn’t take any initiative in discussing other helpful policy measures, such as eliminating corporate income taxes (or allowing immediate write-off of new investments), deregulating the power industry and eliminating subsidies for particular technologies.

h/t James Calder

 

Categories: Canada, carbon pricing, climate change Tags:

More carbon tax advocacy, this time from Jerry Taylor/Cato, in a piece criticizing Pickens’ plan

July 30th, 2008 3 comments

Jerry Taylor, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, published a pithy criticism in last week’s Financial Post of T. Boone Pickens’ plan to get wind subsidies and other favors from Congress;  said Taylor:  “Virtually every claim made by T. Boone Pickens to justify the lavish subsidies he is seeking for his wind energy investments is flat wrong.”

Jerry also had a few interesting things to say about about carbon taxes:

Fourth, if reducing our carbon footprint is the goal, then the most direct and efficient means of reducing that footprint is to impose a tax on carbon emissions and then leave it to the market to sort out how to most efficiently order affairs under those new prices. Maybe it will mean windmills and CNG [compressed natural gas], but maybe not. Perhaps it will mean more nuclear power, new hydrogen-powered fuel cells, “clean” coal, the emergence of cellulosic ethanol, battery-powered cars or hybrids — or a continuation of the existing energy base but less consumption as a consequence.

(emphasis added)

I agree with Jerry, but note that Jerry he has not explicitly accepted that reducing our carbon footprint SHOULD be a goal.  Rather, he has simply concluded that, should such a goal be adopted,  that carbon taxes are the best policy tool.  And that might be as much as we can expect, from the time being, from a long-time advocate of limited government such as Jerry.

Jerry Taylor joins Ron Bailey (Reason), George Will, AEI and a long list of others in favoring carbon taxes over any other AGW-directed policies.

 

Why top demagogues (Jim Hansen, Florida Power, RAND, Exxon, AEI, Margo Thorning, major economists, George Will) prefer rebated carbon taxes

June 27th, 2008 2 comments

[Note to first-time readers: the title is tongue-in-cheek.]

I have previously blogged on libertarian, non-state approaches to climate change; allow me to use this post to pull together for diligent readers various recent sources of opinion and information on carbon taxes – which are much more transparent, easier to implement and, if rebated, are much more likely to both be ethically fairer to citizens (and thus more poltically sustainable) and involve much less pork than cap and trade policy proposals:

–  Dr. James (“PublicTrials”) Hansen “Carbon Tax and 100% Dividend” proposal (dated June 6, 2008) (be sure to check out his many lucid posts on scientific aspects of climate change as well):

“Carbon tax and 100% dividend” is spurred by the recent “carbon cap” discussion of Peter Barnes and others. Principles must be crystal clear and adhered to rigorously. A tax on coal, oil and gas is simple. It can be collected at the first point of sale within the country or at the last (e.g., at the gas pump), but it can be collected easily and reliably. … The entire carbon tax should be returned to the public, with a monthly deposit to their
bank accounts ….

The worst thing about the present inadequate political approach [cap and trade] is that it will generate public backlash. Taxes will increase, with no apparent benefit. The reaction would likely delay effective emission reductions, so as to practically guarantee that climate would pass tipping points with devastating consequences for nature and humanity.

Carbon tax and 100% dividend, on the contrary, will be a breath of fresh air, a boon and boom for the economy. The tax is progressive, the poorest benefitting most, with profligate energy users forced to pay for their excesses. …

Special interests and their lobbyists … will fight carbon tax and 100% dividend tooth and nail. They want to determine who gets your tax money in the usual Washington way, Congress allocating money program-by-program, substituting their judgment for that of the market place. …  Helping Washington figure out how to spend your money is a very lucrative business.

I note that Hansen has drawn on Peter Barnes, who has long advocated the “Sky Trust” concept, which asserts that citizens are the owners of the atmospheric commons and involves the state in charging and collecting revenues.  Barnes has more recently backed similar proposals, such as Hansen’s “Carbon Tax and 100% Dividend” and the “Cap and Dividend” approach floated last winter by James Royce and Matt Riddle.

Spin analyst George Lakoff has recently examined and compared the moral and cognitive footings of the Warner-Lieberman-style cap and and trade and the Cap and Dividend approaches in “Comparing Climate Proposals: A Case Study in Cognitive Policy”

–  Lewis Hay, III, Chairman and CEO of FPL Group, Inc. – speech to the 2008 Florida Summit on Global Climate Change in Miami (June 25, 2008):

[It is] an undeniable reality … that global climate change is real, that human activity is one of the causes, and that we must take action to slow, stop, and reverse the emission of greenhouse gases into the Earth’s atmosphere. …
The United States has been debating climate change at least since the first congressional hearings on the topic were held in the mid-1980s by a little-known Representative from Tennessee named Al Gore. More than 20 years later, it is time for the country to take meaningful action. Every day we delay, another 18 million tons of CO2 are released into the atmosphere, most of which will remain there for close to a century. And with every year of inaction, the carbon reductions needed to deal successfully with climate change become larger and harder to achieve.

There are still a few global warming skeptics left in the world – often big emitters of CO2 – who continue to hope that the science is wrong and advocate taking little or no action toward reducing carbon. They want to keep freely emitting CO2 like there is no tomorrow. We cannot let these people have their way, or there might not be a tomorrow.

So how do we go about reducing the amount of carbon that our economy pumps into the atmosphere? … In the process of producing various goods and services – including electricity – carbon dioxide is released with potentially huge costs on society. But the producers and consumers of goods and services don’t pay those costs. They are external to the transaction, which is to say that society pays them. The goal of public policy toward climate change must be to push those costs back onto the parties responsible for carbon emissions. In short, we must “put a price” on carbon, which will create powerful incentives to emit less of it.

Will that price impose an undue burden on the U.S. economy? The global warming skeptics say yes, but I disagree. If we do nothing to reduce the amount of CO2 pouring into the atmosphere, we are not avoiding the cost. We are simply pushing both the cost associated with the growing consequences of global warming and the future cost of CO2 reductions down the road, onto our children and grandchildren. And if we do take action, I am confident the cost will be far lower than projected. America’s economy is driven by a fierce entrepreneurial spirit. Tell a capitalist there’s money to be made in finding cost-effective CO2 reductions, and watch the market burst with cost-effective solutions.

Now I happen to believe that the simplest and most effective way to start putting a price on carbon is with a continuously escalating fee – or a “tax” as the big carbon emitters like to call it. Under a carbon fee that starts modestly and rises steadily over time, companies will find it more and more expensive to use dirty fuels. And if there’s one way to get the attention of America’s CEOs and their boards of directors, it’s to hit them in the bottom line. Equally important, if there’s one way to get Americans to consume less high-carbon energy, it’s to steadily raise the price of goods and services produced with high-carbon fuels. Eventually, everyone will embrace conservation and switch to low-carbon energy alternatives. …

Under any cap-and-trade program that would give away most of the allowances to emit carbon based on historical emissions, the biggest emitters – the very same companies that have seriously harmed our environment and done nothing to reduce their carbon footprint – could reap unearned windfall profits, just as has happened in parts of Europe. To put it bluntly: They would be paid to pollute, turning cap-and-trade into what I call “cap-and-evade.” …

When carbon carries a cost, power companies will also work a lot harder to clean up their fossil fuel fleets. … Of course, the real gains are to be had by shutting down old, inefficient coal plants across the country. Those dinosaurs, which have operated way beyond their intended useful life, account for more than 480 million tons of the CO2 pumped into the atmosphere every year and should be taken offline. And if carbon is priced appropriately, they will be.

I refuse to believe that we are powerless to change the future. On the contrary, I believe that through commitment, effort and intelligence, we will not only come up with the right policy response to climate change, but that our innovation-driven economy will find the best technological solution to climate change – one that curbs emissions even as it controls costs. Some of us in the electric power industry are ready to lead the charge into a clean energy future. To those who stubbornly cling to a carbon-based past that cannot last, we kindly ask that you step out of the way.

Keith Crane, senior economist and James Bartis, senior policy researcher at the RAND Corporation, On Carbon Dioxide, a Better Alternative (Washington Post, November 29, 2007):

The only effective way to begin reducing greenhouse gas emissions and slow global climate change is to make it more expensive to emit carbon dioxide. Unless businesses and consumers pay a price for carbon dioxide, neither will make the investments in technology and changes in energy use needed to dramatically reduce emissions.

Most of the climate change legislation currently before Congress proposes a complicated “cap-and-trade” system. This would set a limit on emissions below current levels and then allocate permits to pollute that could be bought and sold. The alternative would be to impose a direct tax on carbon dioxide emissions. …

The attraction of cap and trade for its supporters is that the cap sets a limit on emissions of carbon dioxide. But it’s difficult to get the limit right. The cap may be set too high to induce firms to make the large investments needed to reduce emissions. Or it may be set so low that costs skyrocket and political support to combat climate change falters.

The major disadvantage to cap and trade is that the price tag for reaching the target is highly uncertain. In contrast, a tax on emissions provides businesses and consumers with certainty about costs, while leaving the size of the reduction less certain. …

Instead, we suggest a tax on carbon dioxide in which all the proceeds collected by the government would be returned to Americans each year when they file income taxes. In contrast to current congressional proposals for cap and trade, a tax on carbon dioxide refunded directly to individuals would cut emissions while cushioning the impact on the pocketbooks of American families. ...

A carbon dioxide tax with refund is fair because the people responsible for the most emissions would pay the most. The tax would also be progressive. Many Americans with lower incomes would find the refund would more than defray the higher costs of gasoline and electric power.

A tax is simple and can be phased in quickly. It encourages individuals and businesses to make long-term decisions with confidence, rather than trying to guess what the future price of permits will be. With a tax and refund, consumers would only pay the extra costs associated with carbon abatement measures.

A carbon dioxide tax with refund can be implemented easily. It can be collected at a few key links in the supply chain: refineries, power plants or pipelines. …

A carbon dioxide tax can be easily adjusted as lower-cost means of reducing emissions are tapped and new technologies become available to tackle more difficult sources. The tax could be started low, but with a clear schedule of increases so that individuals, local governments and businesses will begin now to make the changes and investments required to dramatically reduce emissions within 15 years. …

U.S. consumers and industry need to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. A refunded carbon dioxide tax is the best way to achieve reductions. It is simple, good for the planet, and imposes the least additional costs on the American economy as compared to any other policy alternative. Most importantly it can be crafted to ease the burden on families and protect industries from unfair competition in the global marketplace.

–  Ken Cohen, vice-president for public affairs, ExxonMobil“ExxonMobil’s top executives on climate-change policy” (February 14, 2007):

[T]here are two debates that one can be participating in right now. One is: is climate change real? What is the cause? Call it the blame game or whatever you want. And the other discussion is: what we do about it?

We prefer to be involved in the second discussion, which is what do we do about climate change – what policies make sense to both produce the energy which the world absolutely has to have and do it in a way that starts us on a path to reduce emissions associated with the production and use of energy. …

Some have said for instance that we need to stabilise CO2 emissions at 550 parts per million. But that is more of a political conclusion than a scientific conclusion. It may be that we’ll learn that 550 ppm is not an aggressive enough target. It may be that science will tell us that the target needs to be something lower than 550 ppm. …

So yes, the policies need to be adjusted. Or conversely, it could be that the anthropogenic contribution can be mitigated somehow by sinks or what have you as we learn more. So, what we are trying to convey is: we know enough now to say that we need to be on a path to start addressing anthropogenic emissions. But we also need to keep the science effort going and we need to keep in mind the economic impacts of the policies. …

We are believers in the market system as the most efficient allocator of resources. We believe for example that markets do a much better job of picking winners and losers on the technology side than governments. So we believe that when we design policies we need to harness the power of the market system as best as we can within the policy that we are designing. … We are not saying, ‘laissez-faire’, just let the market operate. …

Politicians know this very well, one of the elements on our first principles is not political attractiveness. You don’t hear much discussion for example about a carbon tax. Yet most economists who look at this issue say that the most effective way to address carbon emissions would be with a carbon tax.

In fact, from an efficiency standpoint, from spreading the cost of carbon across the economy in an efficient and uniform and predictable way, as a way to maximize the use of markets, as someone who studied economics, yes I think that a carbon tax ought to be looked at with equal force as the other options.

Now, as we said before, the devil is in the details and there are a number of questions. Whether it is going to be a regressive tax? What would the rate of the tax be and making sure you don’t exclude people from it; what is the revenue going to be used for; are we going to take out another regressive tax? Or are we going to take that money and use it for some other purpose? So there are major issues that would need to be addressed, but from an economist’s standpoint and in fact, this is the favored option.

Ken Green, Steven Hayward and Kevin Hassett of AEI (The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research ), “Climate Change: Caps vs. Taxes” (June 2007):

Most economists believe a carbon tax (a tax on the quantity of CO2 emitted when using energy) would be a superior policy alternative to an emissions-trading regime. In fact, the irony is that there is a broad consensus in favor of a carbon tax everywhere except on Capitol Hill, where the “T word” is anathema. Former vice president Al Gore supports the concept, as does James Connaughton, head of the White House Council on Environmental Quality during the George W. Bush administration. Lester Brown of the Earth Policy Institute supports such an initiative, but so does Paul Anderson, the CEO of Duke Energy. Crossing the two disciplines most relevant to the discussion of climate policy— science and economics—both NASA scientist James Hansen and Harvard University economist N. Gregory Mankiw give the thumbs up to a carbon tax swap.

There are many reasons for preferring a revenue neutral carbon tax regime (in which taxes are placed on the carbon emissions of fuel use, with revenues used to reduce other taxes) to emissions trading. Among them are: [the following are paragraph headings only]:

–        Effectiveness and Efficiency
–        Incentive Creation
–        Less Corruption
–        Elimination of Superfluous Regulations
–        Price-Stabilization 
–        Adjustability and Certainty
–        Preexisting Collection Mechanisms
–        Keeping Revenue In-Country 
–        Mitigation of General Economic Damages

A cap-and-trade approach to controlling GHG emissions would be highly problematic. A lack of international binding authority would render enforcement nearly impossible, while the incentives for cheating would be extremely high. The upfront costs of creating institutions to administer trading are significant and likely to produce entrenched bureaucracies that clamor for ever-tighter controls on carbon emissions. …

A program of carbon-centered tax reform, by contrast, lacks most of the negative attributes of cap-and-trade, and could convey significant benefits unrelated to GHG reductions or avoidance of potential climate harms, making this a no-regrets policy. A tax swap would create economy-wide incentives for energy efficiency and lower carbon energy, and by raising the price of energy would also reduce energy use. At the same time, revenues generated would allow the mitigation of the economic impact of higher energy prices, both on the general economy and on the lower-income earners who might be disproportionately affected by such a change. Carbon taxes would be more difficult to avoid, and existing institutions quite adept at tax collection could step up immediately.  Revenues would remain in-country, removing international incentives for cheating or insincere participation in carbon-reduction programs. Most of these effects would remain beneficial even if science should determine that reducing GHG emissions has only a negligible effect on mitigating global warming. …

Coal-based energy prices would be affected more strongly, which is to be expected in any plan genuinely intended to reduce GHG emissions. A number of possible mechanisms are available to refund the revenues raised by this tax. On net, these tools could significantly reduce the economic costs of the tax and quite possibly provide economic benefits.

Margo Thorning, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist at the American Council for Capital Formation (November 1, 2007 interview on E&E TV):

Margo Thorning: I think Senator Lieberman and Warner are to be commended for their efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, because I think we’re all united that that’s a goal we need to put a lot of resources into.

Q: One of the bill’s ideas is to set up a financial board of sorts that would oversee the new greenhouse gas market. What’s your take on setting up a board of regulators?

Margo Thorning: I think the idea of expecting regulators to know what the price of carbon should be is probably not very well grounded. It does serve as a backstop in that I assume if prices got so high that producers and households were experiencing severe economic pain they could say, well, just go ahead and emit. But it creates uncertainty, because for someone trying to invest in new equipment, if they don’t know what the price of carbon will be, that adds to the risk of the investment. That’s the problem with a cap-and-trade system and that’s what’s happening in Europe. Investors don’t know what the price of carbon will be from one month to the next or one year to the next and it’s been very volatile. So that makes the cost of capital higher, investment more uncertain, and produces less investment. An advantage of a carbon tax, if you want to impose some sort of penalty on carbon use, is that an investor knows, given the projected say set of increases in carbon prices from one year to the next, he knows what the carbon price will be and he can factor that in to what kind of capital equipment he buys, what sort of transport fleet he puts in place, and it provides more certainty. And it also, a carbon tax, provides a stream of revenue for the government to spend on new technology or to pay for offsetting the burden on low income individuals of higher energy prrevenue-neutralices.

Q:So, if you were given the opportunity to sort of write your own proposal of how the U.S. should reduce emissions and not hurt itself economically, you’d go with the carbon tax?

Margo Thorning: I would go with the carbon tax and more incentives for new technology development. And I would change the U.S. tax code, because we have the slowest depreciation allowances for new energy investment of 12 countries that we compared recently. We have very high capital costs for new investment because depreciation is so slow and our effective tax rate is very high, because our corporate tax rate is the highest in the industrial world. So our companies are disadvantaged vis-à-vis our trading partners because of our tax system.

Q: So, if a cap and trade is not the way to go as you’re saying, why has the business community come out in support of a cap and trade?

Margo Thorning: Well, a significant portion of the business community would prefer a carbon tax and there’s beginning to be more discussion about that. So I think one reason some in the business community have supported a cap and trade is they expect to make money on it. They’ve maybe made emission reductions or expect to be able to make emission reductions. They expect to be winners. On the other hand, new companies or companies that are expanding that need more credits will be losers. So the winners under a cap-and-trade system, as is for example in Europe, the big electric utilities have been winners because they’ve been able to pass forward to consumers the price of the carbon credit even though they were given those credits by the government. So people who expect to make money on it naturally are supportive.

– major economists:

• Terry Dinan of the Congressional Budget Office’s Microeconomic Studies Division – “Policy Options for Reducing CO2 Emissions” (outside reviewers were Billy Pizer (Resources for the Future) and Martin Weitzman (Harvard)(Feb. 2008):

Given the gradual nature of climate change, the uncertainty that exists about the cost of reducing emissions, and the potential variability of the cost of meeting a particular cap on emissions at different points in time, a tax could offer significant advantages. If policymakers chose to specify a long-term target for cutting emissions, a tax could be set at a rate that could meet that target at a lower cost than a comparable cap. In addition, if policymakers set the tax rate at a level that reflected the expected benefits of reducing a ton of emissions (which would rise over time), a tax would keep the costs of emission reductions in balance with the anticipated benefits, whereas a cap would not. …

CBO draws the following conclusions:
A tax on emissions would be the most efficient incentive-based option for reducing emissions and could be relatively easy to implement.

Analysts generally conclude that a tax would be a more efficient method of reducing CO2 emissions than an inflexible cap. The efficiency advantage of a tax stems from the contrast between the long-term cumulative nature of climate change and the short-term sensitivity of the cost of emission reductions. Climate change results from the buildup of CO2 in the atmosphere over several decades; emissions in any given year are only a small portion of that total. As a result, limiting climate change would require making substantial reductions in those emissions over many years, but ensuring that any particular limit was met in any particular year would result in little, if any, additional benefit (avoided damage). In contrast, the cost of cutting emissions by a particular amount in a given year could vary significantly depending on a host of factors, including the weather, disruptions in energy markets, the level of economic activity, and the availability of new low-carbon technologies (such as improvements in wind-power technology).

Relative to a cap-and-trade program with prespecified emission limits each year, a steadily rising tax could better accommodate cost fluctuations while simultaneously achieving a long-term target for emissions. Such a tax would provide firms with an incentive to undertake more emission reductions when the cost of doing so was relatively low and allow them to reduce emissions less when the cost of doing so was particularly high. In contrast, an inflexible cap-and-trade program would require that annual caps were met regardless of the cost, thereby failing to take advantage of low-cost opportunities to cut more emissions than were required by the cap and failing to provide firms with leeway in years when costs were higher.

The efficiency advantage of a tax over an inflexible cap depends on how likely it is that actual costs will differ from what policymakers anticipated when they set the level of the cap. Given the uncertainties involved, such differences are likely to be large—and, therefore, analysts generally conclude that the efficiency advantage of a tax is likely to be quite large. Specifically, available research suggests that in the near term, the net benefits (benefits minus costs) of a tax could be roughly five times greater than the net benefits of an inflexible cap. Put another way, a given long-term emission-reduction target could be met by a tax at a fraction of the cost of an inflexible cap-and-trade program. …

Administering an “upstream” tax or cap-and-trade program for CO2 emissions would involve taxing or regulating the suppliers of fossil fuels—such as coal producers, petroleum refiners, and natural gas processors. Compared with a “downstream” design, which would tax or regulate users of fossil fuels, an upstream approach would have two administrative advantages. It would involve regulating a limited number of entities, and it would not require firms to monitor actual emissions. Rather, each firm’s tax payment or allowance requirement could be based on the carbon content of its fuel and the amount it sold.

An upstream tax may be somewhat easier to implement than an upstream cap-and-trade program because many of the entities that would be covered by either policy are already subject to excise taxes. A CO2 tax could build on that existing structure. …

With harmonized taxes, lax monitoring or enforcement by any one country could reduce the incentives for emission reductions in that country. But with linked cap and-trade programs, laxity in one area could undermine the integrity of allowances throughout the entire system. …

A tax would have significantly lower start-up costs than a cap-and-trade program with grandfathering provided that policymakers did not decide to grant exemptions based on historical production or emissions data. Further, implementing a tax would not require the government to set up a process for auctioning allowances.

• CLIMATE CHANGE: Expert Opinion on the Economics of Policy Options to Address Climate Change, US GAO (Government Accounting Office) (May 2008)

• Greg Mankiw, “One Answer to Global Warming: A New Tax” (September 16, 2007) (Mankiw also keeps a list of other economists who are in his pro-tax “Pigou Club”, for which the anti-statist “No Pigou Club” is a useful counter-tonic):

Using a Pigovian tax to address global warming is also an old idea. It was proposed as far back as 1992 by Martin S. Feldstein on the editorial page of The Wall Street Journal. Once chief economist to Ronald Reagan ….

Those vying for elected office, however, are reluctant to sign on to this agenda. Their political consultants are no fans of taxes, Pigovian or otherwise. Republican consultants advise using the word “tax” only if followed immediately by the word “cut.” Democratic consultants recommend the word “tax” be followed by “on the rich.”

Yet this natural aversion to carbon taxes can be overcome if the revenue from the tax is used to reduce other taxes. By itself, a carbon tax would raise the tax burden on anyone who drives a car or uses electricity produced with fossil fuels, which means just about everybody. Some might fear this would be particularly hard on the poor and middle class.

But Gilbert Metcalf, a professor of economics at Tufts, has shown how revenue from a carbon tax could be used to reduce payroll taxes in a way that would leave the distribution of total tax burden approximately unchanged. …
The case for a carbon tax looks even stronger after an examination of the other options on the table. … [T]he history of cap-and-trade systems suggests that the allowances would probably be handed out to power companies and other carbon emitters, which would then be free to use them or sell them at market prices. In this case, the prices of energy products would rise as they would under a carbon tax, but the government would collect no revenue to reduce other taxes and compensate consumers.

The international dimension of the problem also suggests the superiority of a carbon tax over cap-and-trade.

Robert J. Shapiro, chairman of Sonecon, LLC, “Addressing Climate Change Without Impairing the U.S. Economy: The Economics and Environmental Science of Combining a Carbon-Based Tax and Tax Relief” (June 2008):

This study examines one such approach: Apply a tax or charge to fuels based on their carbon content, at the levels required to reduce emissions sufficiently to move to a path that over time would stabilize GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at sustainable levels; and use most of the revenues to reduce other taxes for people and businesses. This strategy would change the relative price of different forms of energy based on their carbon content, so that people and businesses have strong incentives to shift to alternative and less carbon-intensive fuels, and more energy-efficient technologies. The consequent economic burden on individuals and businesses would be largely offset by reductions in payroll taxes or in their effective burden, increasing the public’s willingness to accept a carbon-based tax.

Our analysis found that this strategy can reduce GHG emissions in the United States to levels consistent with substantially lowering the risks and threats of climate change, without slowing economic growth or reducing gains in people’s incomes to a significant degree, or imposing a regressive burden on low- and moderate-income Americans. …

Many economists support this approach to climate change, because it would directly and predictably raise the relative price of goods and services based on their carbon intensity, and so directly encourage consumers to prefer less carbon-intensive fuels, and products and businesses to adopt or develop less carbon or energy-intensive materials, technologies, production processes and fuels. Economists and governance experts also note that a carbon tax would not create the new price volatilities, administrative burdens, and large opportunities for evasion and fraud that could characterize a cap-and-trade program. By setting a predictable price for carbon emissions, it also creates clear and known incentives to develop and deploy more climate-friendly technologies and fuels.

Critics argue that it would raise costs and prices, and would dampen economic growth. They further note that no one favors higher taxes or the economic distortions they can cause, and consequently voters will resist paying a substantial new tax simply to avert unknown, adverse effects decades from now. We propose to address these shortcomings by returning the revenues from a carbon-based tax to households and businesses through other forms of tax relief, so that economic growth and the incomes of most households would be much less affected.

This carbon-based tax policy design should be preferable economically and politically to top-down regulation or cap-and-trade programs. To begin, traditional regulation and cap-and-trade programs treat a plant or industry’s initial carbon emissions as effectively “free,” up to the point of the regulatory ceiling or cap, while a carbon-based tax extracts a cost for emissions from the first part per million. In addition to the economic costs of introducing new volatility in energy prices, cap-and-trade programs and regulatory caps would impose other administrative and monitoring costs on consumers and businesses that would be generally comparable to a carbon-based tax, only in less obvious ways and in many cases with no additional revenues that could be rebated to offset their effects. … [C]onsumers and businesses also will end up paying the billions of additional dollars required to administer, monitor and enforce a cap and trade or regulatory system. … Moreover, much as voters would likely oppose significant new, climate-related taxes without offsetting tax relief, they will likely resist climate change regulation or a cap-and-trade program when they recognize the actual costs. …

Using the NEMS modeling system, we test the proposition that applying a new tax package on energy sources based on their carbon content, and using 90 percent of the revenues to reduce payroll taxes or their equivalent could bring down projected CO2 emissions to a path that should stabilize their atmospheric concentrations at levels safe for the global climate, and without materially affecting most people’s incomes or the economy’s capacity to grow and create jobs. 

• others, as summarized by The Wall Street Journal(Feb. 9, 2007),

George Will (as previously blogged)