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Are libertarians interested in Lessig's call for cross-partisan action (campaign reform and Constitutional amendment) to clean up Congress?

October 9th, 2010 No comments

As I have previously noted, renowed Harvard Law professor Lawrence Lessig is also seriously concerned about political corrpution and the Citizens United decision.

I recommend to readers his recent Washington Post op-ed, his related WaPo interview by Fred Hiatt and his August talk to TED Boston (which can be found here, though Lessig has yanked it because of an apparently spurious Lincoln quote about corporations).

In addition, as I think there is a role for libertarians to play in informing the discusssion, I copy here his September call for a non-partisan effort to reform Congress at Fix Congress First! (emphasis added): 

Where We Are, Where We’re Going

September 22, 2010

By: Lawrence Lessig

On Thursday, the House Committee on Administration will take a vote on the Fair Elections Now Act — the bill that we, along with many others, have been pushing for the past two years. The Committee will pass the bill. With a bit of luck, and a lot more pressure, the managers of the bill believe it could have the votes to pass the House as well. If they’re right, and if the Speaker allows the bill to come to the floor, then for the first time in a generation, the House will have ratified fundamental and effective campaign finance reform.

This optimism will surprise many of you. As I’ve travelled to talk about this issue, the overwhelming attitude of people who want better from our government is that our government is incapable of giving us better. The House ratifying Fair Elections would be the first, and best evidence, this skepticism might be wrong. It would also be a testament to the extraordinary work of organizations like Public Campaign and Common Cause (especially the campaign director, David Donnelly), as well as many others, including MoveOn, the Coffee Party, You Street (as in “not K Street”) and many of you. This victory would give American voters an idea worth fighting for. It would be a critical victory, at least if we can gather the final few votes needed in the House. (You can help in that by using our Whip Tool).

But we should recognize that this victory would also be just a first step. I don’t believe the Senate will pass this bill this session, which means the fight must begin again in January. So as we’ve been at this now for almost two years, I wanted to give you a sense of where we are and where we’re going. I also want to begin to share with you my own sense of how to get there.

This isn’t a short letter. But I hope you’ll take the time to read it. (Here’s a PDF if you want to print it). We all need to understand the kind of fight this will be. And after many sleepless nights thinking it through, I believe I have a sense of what victory will require.

Reform Movements, Past

The fight to win in the House has been a traditional legislative battle waged effectively and well. I joined this fight late, and I’ve been happy to help however I can. But the kudos here goes to those I’ve already mentioned. Fingers crossed, they will have done what the experts thought was impossible.

But as I’ve said many times before, we cannot rely upon this inside the beltway fight alone. The change that the Fair Elections Now Act would effect would change Washington fundamentally. There are too many inside DC who depend upon the system as it is — for their own wealth, and future. They are not about to permit this fundamental change, and they have not yet even begun the fight against it.

Instead, the battle to pass this reform will require something that none of us have seen in our lifetime — a broad based, cross-partisan, citizens movement that demands fundamental change in how our government works.

This movement must take aim at the core corruption that is our government. Not the corruption of bribery, or improper (as in illegal) influence. Instead, it must attack the in plain sight corruption of the current system of campaign finance. Our Congress has become dependent upon their Funders. Their attention is devoted to their Funders. And like a 5 year old watching his dad on his BlackBerry, we get that we’re no longer the most important souls in their lives. In a very precise sense of the term, this Congress has been corrupted by this competing dependency. We must change this.

The last best example of this sort of change is a movement that is as misunderstood as any in American history — the Progressive Movement. Most of us today think the “progressives” were liberals. No doubt many were. But as I described in a piece for the Huffington Post, Progressivism was actually a multiparty movement. It was a Republican, Wisconsin Senator Robert La Follette, who took up the Progressive cause for the Right, by challenging a sitting Republican President, William Howard Taft. La Follette lost, but he inspired Republican Teddy Roosevelt to return from the wilderness to wage a third-party campaign against Taft. In that election of 1912, America had an extraordinarily broad range of ideologies to choose among: Eugene Debs ran as a Socialist, Taft ran as a “standpat” Republican, and two Progressives ran between these two extremes: TR, a former Republican, and Woodrow Wilson, a new kind of Democrat. Almost 70% of Americans voted for these two leading Progressives, with Wilson — the more conservative, small government, pro-liberty Progressive — beating Roosevelt by almost 15 points.

Of course, the Liberal Progressives of 1912 wanted different things of government from the Conservative Progressives. But despite these differences, they shared a common recogniti All Progressives believed that government had become corrupted. That with its appointed Senate, and enormously powerful corporate funding of elections, our democracy, they all believed, was no longer a democracy. The government had become dependent not, as Federalist No. 52 puts it, “upon the People alone.” Instead, it was the People who were left alone, as the government did what ever it could to curry favor with the richest and most powerful in society.

Progressives of all stripes wanted to restore that democracy — again, not because they all agreed upon a single platform for government action, but because they all believed that the platform of democracy had to be restored if we were to be true to the best ideals of the founders.

Cross-partisanship was thus the first feature of that Progressive Movement. Headlessness was a second. Though there were many important Progressive leaders, the Progressives had no single leader. Every Progressive group did their own work in their own field. None tried (for long at least) to claim the authority of the movement as a whole. Everyone recognized a common need to reform a corrupted government, and worked with astonishing public commitment to achieve that reform in addition to the particular policy objectives that their wing of the Movement wanted to push.

Finally, there was one more critical element to the Movement’s success: citizens. This was not ultimately a movement controlled by politicians. Of course, we remember the movement for its politicians. TR, and Wilson, and perhaps now that I’ve mentioned him, La Follette. But politicians were not the lifeblood of that movement. Citizens were. There were thousands of leaders in hundreds of fields, from women’s suffrage to the temperance movement, to labor reform, to judicial and electoral accountability. These citizens were the giants. Yet the overwhelming majority of these people never dreamed of running for office. They had been awoken from a slumber by the repeated and grotesque excesses of a corrupted government. And they worked hard to end that corruption, not to become famous senators, or president. But so that they could go back to their private life, and do the private things they wanted to do.

It was this cross-partisan, headless, citizens movement of passion that changed the American government at the turn of the last century. Not in perfect ways. In some cases, not even in smart ways. But the point to remember is that this change happened in the only way real change ever does: From the many, putting aside key differences, to focus the swarm upon the key problem in government: corruption.

Reform Movements, Today

As hard as this might be to believe — given the way most of us are oriented by party leaders who want to keep us loyal to the way things are now — each of these elements of the old Progressive movement is returning to American politics.

Start with passionate citizens: We have not in our lifetimes seen as angry and frustrated a citizenry as we now have. That anger sometimes expresses itself poorly, but we need to get beyond this critique. From the Tea Party to the Coffee Party to the millions of Americans who call themselves “Independents,” America is filled with citizens who are desperate to end the corruption that is our government. Many of these citizens thought they had their reform leader in 2008. All of them are now looking for the leaders who can deliver the reform that 2008 didn’t.

“Leaders,” not “leader.” The key here is the plural. We are used to movements in the style of Mussolini: charismatic leaders, like FDR, Kennedy, Reagan, who unite millions to a cause. But that’s not what’s happening here. No doubt there are leaders, but none who can pretend to speak for the full breadth of this movement. Indeed, my heroes are people like Mark Meckler, and Jenny  Beth Martin, who however much I disagree with them on policy substance, conceive of the movement they are trying to build (the Tea Party Movement) as a swarm, not an army; as headless, not the borg. This is the model of real reform. It is the model that our reform too must make successful.

And finally, cross-partisanship: The Tea Party Movement has been framed as right wing. Its most successful candidates are on the far right of the Republican Party (localized at least: Scott Brown is no Rand Paul, but he is the Right of Massachusetts). But the most significant and important part of the Tea Party Movement is the demand for fundamental change, not just a change in parties. And in this respect, they are no different from many of us on the Left. No doubt, we don’t have common ends. But we do have a common enemy. And we need to find a way to push a common movement that defeats this common enemy, through the peaceful mode of revolution given to us by our framers: Democracy.

In the next two years, I want Change Congress to help this Neo-Progressive movement. That may well not be the right name, given how misunderstood the term “progressive” now is, but it is the right idea. We need to build a community of citizens, each taking the initiative to teach a message to Republicans, Democrats, and Independents alike: that regardless of your party, regardless of what you want government to do (or not do), the current system is the enemy. And regardless of what you want government to do (or not do), you won’t make progress to your ends until this system fundamentally changes.

This lesson won’t come from lectures by law professors. It won’t be taught by senators, or candidates for president. We will only spread it if we can get at first thousands, and then millions, to carry the word friend by friend. In house parties, over dinner, in Rotary Clubs, and in small meetings. We need to provide the tools, and build a platform to help spread the message. But the message here is not Read-Only. It is Read-Write. We must give citizens the resources to enter into this debate, and then encourage them to spread the message as broadly as they can.

This will make our work somewhat different from others in this movement. The standard form of digital advocacy today is clicktivism — finding ways to get people to react to messages, to push support (and of course, raise dollars) to one group and then another. The strategy is simple: Build a list of people who agree with you, and push their buttons so they click yours in return, and send you cash, and support.

We want to do something different. We want to build a conversation that engages a wider and wider community, focused on the single objective of fundamental reform. We want that community to spread the message. Not just our message, or my message, but their message, or at least a message remixed, hand-made, by them.

Here’s how are are going to do this.

We’re first going to build out more explicitly the cross-partisan character of Change Congress [now Fix Congress First]. Already our board has an extraordinary mix of talent. In the next 6 months, we will expand that mix more. All of these leaders are leaders in their own field. None of them intend to be leaders in government. Indeed, as I think about who to recruit to this list, the single question I ask myself is this: Can this person inspire others without others believing the inspiration is just the first step to their own political campaign?

Second, while we continue to build the board, we will also strengthen the communities that it supports. Today, many of you associate the work of Change Congress with me. If we are successful, next year, the vast majority of Change Congress followers will not even recognize me among the many who are pushing this message. None of us, me especially, will try to claim control of this movement. All of us, and me especially, believe there is only a movement when there are many cells of strength each pushing in its own way. Remember: A swarm, not an army; headless, not the borg.

Third, as we multiply the parties, and multiply the leaders, we will push to spread tools that anyone can use to learn, spread, and teach the message. Through SlideShare, we will make available the assets anyone needs to craft this story in the shape that makes most sense to them. Through our video channels on Vimeo, YouTube, and Blip.tv, we will make available as many of the telling of these stories as possible, for you to use however you can to do the same with your friends. The mission here is shared. The responsibility is all of ours. And through the work of all of us, we will build a recognition of the kind of change that is needed here.


Justice Louis Brandeis, perhaps the greatest, and certainly the most misunderstood, Progressive of the last century, warned “the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people,” and demanded “that public discussion is a political duty.” When I first read that quote, it sent a chill down my spine. For of course: We, as a People, have become “inert.” We have not lived up to our “political duty.” We have instead allowed the professionals to take over our politics.

But we have a chance to do something here. It will take an enormous effort to teach and then persuade. We don’t have easy anger to tap into here. But as I’ve found as I’ve given more than a hundred talks over the past few years, there is real anger and real commitment to this issue once the issue is understood. Our role in this must be this ground campaign — building a large and powerful base that recognizes the peculiar corruption of this Congress, and how it must change.

Here’s how you can help:

  1. Visit FixCongressFirst.org. Don’t simply sign up for the mailing list. Instead, read about the Fair Elections Now Act. Skim the blog to get a sense of the current conversations happening around election reform. Convince a friend, online or off, about the need for fair elections. If we can get one million people each to have a real conversation about corruption and campaign finance, we will have succeeded.
  2. Do join the Fix Congress First mailing list if you’d like to stay informed. Better yet, tell us if you’d like to volunteer, and we’ll let you know when opportunities arise.
  3. Visit the Fix Congress First whip tool to see which members of Congress haven’t yet supported the Fair Elections Now Act. Call your representative if he/she is not a supporter, or send your thanks if she/he is.
  4. Use your networks. Spread the word. Take things into your own hands. Tell us how we can help you and how we can do better.
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Robert Reich is Right … about "The Secret Big-Money Takeover of America"

October 9th, 2010 No comments

And since Robert Reich has invited readers to “send this post to your friends”, I’ve taken the liberty of cross-posting it below.

Before we start, let me remind my readers that I’ve done a fair bit commenting on what I regard as the profoundly mistaken and wrong-headed Citizens United decision. I post this not to aggravate, but to point to a possiblity of reaching a shared agreement on problems.

Here’s Reich (my emphasis and comments in brackets)

The Secret Big-Money Takeover of AmericaThursday, October 7, 2010

Not only is income and wealth in America more concentrated in fewer hands than it’s been in 80 years, but those hands are buying our democracy as never before – and they’re doing it behind closed doors.

Hundreds of millions of secret dollars are pouring into congressional and state races in this election cycle. The Koch brothers (whose personal fortunes grew by $5 billion last year) appear to be behind some of it, Karl Rove has rounded up other multi-millionaires to fund right-wing candidates, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is funneling corporate dollars from around the world into congressional races, and Rupert Murdoch is evidently spending heavily.

No one knows for sure where this flood of money is coming from because it’s all secret.

But you can safely assume its purpose is not to help America’s stranded middle class, working class, and poor. It’s to pad the nests of the rich, stop all reform, and deregulate big corporations and Wall Street – already more powerful than since the late 19th century when the lackeys of robber barons literally deposited sacks of cash on the desks of friendly legislators.

Credit the Supreme Court’s grotesque decision in Citizens United vs. the Federal Election Commission, which opened the floodgates. (Even though 8 of 9 members of the Court also held disclosure laws constitutional, the decision invited the creation of shadowy “nonprofits” that don’t have to reveal anything.)

According to FEC data, only 32 percent of groups paying for election ads are disclosing the names of their donors. By comparison, in the 2006 midterm, 97 percent disclosed; in 2008, almost half disclosed.

Last week, when the Senate considered a bill to force such disclosure, every single Republican voted against it – thereby revealing the GOP’s true colors, and presumed benefactors. (To understand how far the GOP has come, nearly ten years ago campaign disclosure was supported by 48 of 54 Republican senators.)

Maybe the Disclose Bill can get passed in lame-duck session. Maybe the IRS will make sure Karl Rove’s and other supposed nonprofits aren’t sham political units. Maybe pigs will learn to fly.

In the meantime we face an election that marks an even sharper turn toward plutocratic capitalism than before – a government by and for the rich and big corporations — and away from democratic capitalism.

As income and wealth has moved to the top, so has political power. That’s why, for example, it’s been impossible to close the absurd tax loophole that allows hedge-fund and private-equity managers to treat much of their income as capital gains, subject to a 15 percent tax (even though they’re earning tens or hundreds of millions a year, and the top 15 hedge-fund managers earned an average of $1 billion last year). Why it proved impossible to fund expanded health care by limiting the tax deductions of the very rich. Why it’s so difficult even to extend George Bush’s tax cuts for the bottom 98 percent of Americans without also extending them for the top 2 percent – even though the top won’t spend the money and create jobs, but will blow a $36 billion hole in the federal budget next year. [Not that I endorse all of Reich’s agenda.]

The good news is average Americans are beginning to understand that when the rich secretly flood our democracy with money, the rest of us drown. Wall Street executives and top CEOs get bailed out while under-water homeowners and jobless workers sink.

A Quinnipiac poll earlier this year found overwhelming support for a millionaire tax.

But what the public wants means nothing if our democracy is secretly corrupted by big money.

Right now we’re headed for a perfect storm: An unprecedented concentration of income and wealth at the top, a record amount of secret money flooding our democracy, and a public in the aftershock of the Great Recession becoming increasingly angry and cynical about government. The three are obviously related.

We must act. We need a movement to take back our democracy. (If tea partiers were true to their principles, they’d join it.) As Martin Luther King once said, the greatest tragedy is “not the strident clamor of the bad people, but the appalling silence of the good people.”

What can you do?

1. Read Justice Steven’s dissent in the Citizens United case, so you’re fully informed about the majority’s pernicious illogic. [link added]

2. Use every opportunity to speak out against this decision, and embarrass and condemn the right-wing Justices who supported it.

3.  In this and subsequent elections, back candidates for congress and president who vow to put Justices on the Court who will reverse it.

4. Demand that the IRS enforce the law and pull the plug on Karl Rove and other sham nonprofits.

5. If you have a Republican senator, insist that he or she support the Disclose Act. If they won’t, campaign against them.

6. Support public financing of elections.

7.  Join an organization like Common Cause, that’s committed to doing all this and getting big money out of politics. (Personal note: I’m so outraged at what’s happening that I just became chairman of Common Cause.)

8. Send this post to your friends (including any tea partiers you may know).

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Is Mises relevant on Copyrights? See article by Bettina Bien Greaves, his student, translator, editor and bibliographer

October 6th, 2010 No comments
Allow me to bring to the attention of readers who are following and/or participating in the growing discussion of IP and copyright (helpfully spearheaded by IP attorney Stephan Kinsella) a very interesting article by a student of Ludwig von Mises.
 
Bettina Bien Greaves, who was personally acquainted with Mises and is one of his most highly-cited annotaters, penned a 2004 arcticle entitled “Misese on Cpoyright” that, with the permission of the author, I reproduce in its entirety below.  The article was originally posed at The Freeman (the online site of The Foundation for Economic Eductation). FEE describes Mrs. Greaves as a Contributing editor and formerly “a longtime FEE staff member, resident scholar, and trustee. She attended Ludwig von Mises’s New York University seminar for many years and is a translator, editor, and bibliographer of his works.” 
 
A 1995  article at Capitalism Magazine introducing Ludwig von Mises’ Economic Policy: Thoughts for Today and Tomorrow (a book based on six lectures delivered by Mises in Buenos Aires in 1959) states that Mrs. Greaves “is regarded as ‘Mises’ Most Loyal Student’ and as the foremost authority on the works and ideas of Ludwig Von Mises. From 1951 to 1969, with her late husband, Percy L. Greaves, Jr., Bettina Bien Greaves attended Mises graduate seminar in economic theory at New York University.” According to a 2005 article by Greaves posted at LvMI (“To What Extent Was Rand a Misesian?“), Greaves compiled Mises: An Annotated Bibliography, and also edited several collections of articles. She received the Schlarbaum Prize in 2002, Further references to her at LvMI are here.
 
And now, without further ado, Mrs. Greaves’ article (emphasis and indenting added):

Mises on Copyrights 

The widespread reproduction and “sharing” of copyrighted music on the Internet led a friend to ask me what Ludwig von Mises would have thought about the situation. The more I pondered the question, the more I concluded that Mises would have considered this just another case where copyright law must play catch-up with new technology.

Many people believe they should be allowed to reproduce and “share” copyrighted material free of charge, some because they don’t want to pay for the privilege and others because they believe it is wrong to grant monopolies to authors, composers, musicians, or anyone at all for that matter. But there is more to the problem than monopoly.

Mises once said, more or less facetiously, that while he had known book authors who opposed patents because of the monopoly privilege they give inventors, he had never known a book author who opposed copyrights because of the monopoly privilege copyrights give authors. Mises may have had Murray Rothbard in mind, for in Man, Economy, and State and Power and Market, Rothbard defended copyrights and criticized patents. Rothbard said it was possible for an inventor independently to come up with precisely the same invention that someone else had developed earlier and had already patented. In that case, the earlier inventor would receive patent protection and the other would be out of luck. Rothbard considered that unfair.

However, Rothbard said it was inconceivable that a second author would ever succeed in arranging words in the same order as they had appeared in a previously published book without having knowledge of the earlier book. Being a unique production, a book is entitled to copyright protection.

Mises, of course, didn’t talk about monopoly itself as being “good” or “bad.” Monopolies could exist on a free market in the rare case when the owner of a factor of production controlled the total supply of that factor. And in the even rarer case that the demand for a monopolist’s product was such that buyers were willing to pay an above-market price for it, he might be in a position to reap a greater financial gain by restricting production and selling fewer units at a higher price per unit. Mises considered this perhaps the only instance in which producers could violate consumer sovereignty with impunity.

The case of government-created and/or government-protected monopolies was another matter. He didn’t discuss them from the point of view of their “morality” or “immorality,” however. He simply talked about their economic aspects, saying that government-granted monopoly privileges change the situation by introducing coercion into the picture. Such privileges make consumers pay higher prices for the monopolized good or service and force them to restrict their consumption of other things. Government grants of patent and copyright protection are examples.

However, it appears from what Mises wrote in Human Action that he wasn’t opposed to copyrights and patents as such. A patent or copyright is defined as an agreement on the part of the government to protect the property rights of an inventor or author to his creation for a certain period of time. The inventor or author pays a price for this protection: he agrees to turn his creation over to the public, at no cost, when the protection expires.

Now if the government is to protect property, it must define that property.

Technological development is nothing new, and when it affects the character of a form of property, it inevitably requires the refining and redefining of the rights of individuals to their private property. The copyright laws have had to be revised and adapted whenever new methods of production and reproduction were developed. The Encyclopedia Britannica says that according to Roman law, when a person wrote words on a parchment, the composition belonged to the owner of the blank materials. This definition of ownership must have arisen when monks copied manuscripts laboriously by hand, letter by letter, on valuable parchment sheets furnished by their monastery.

The Development of Printing

When printing came along and books could be copied more cheaply, the question of property rights became more urgent. However, William Blackstone (1723–1780), the authority on British law, said the rights of an author “being grounded on labor and invention” were “too subtle and unsubstantial a nature to become the subject of property and the common law, and only capable of being guarded by positive statutes and special provisions of the magistrate.”1 Copyright was looked on as “a doubtful exception to the general law regulating trade,” which at that time was generally opposed to monopoly.

Again according to the Britannica, British law began to protect intellectual property with copyrights in 1709 as “in the nature of personal property. . . . A man’s own work, in this view, is as much his as his house or his money, and should be protected by the state.”2 This, of course, puts the onus on the government to define what personal property is copyrightable.

James Madison, fourth president of the United States, had been a participant in the 1787 constitutional convention in Philadelphia. The U.S. Constitution that he helped to write gave Congress the power to secure “for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Several years later, Madison, when listing the various forms of property the government was “instituted to protect,” included a person’s intellectual property, his “opinions and the free communication of them . . . [their] enjoyment and communication.”3

By the nineteenth century, the idea that published books would be copyrighted was widely accepted. Washington Irving, after whom Irvington-on-Hudson, New York, was named, was one of the first American authors to earn a living from royalties received from his books, although not a handsome living—he was usually close to broke. Charles Dickens was another prolific author who relied on the royalties his books earned under British law. His attitude toward America turned somewhat negative when pirated versions of his books were published in the United States.

It may be impossible to describe all the changes that have been made in copyright law over the years in response to the different ways copyrighted material might be disseminated. Adjustments have been made from time to time. For instance, arrangements were worked out over several decades to compensate musicians whose works were played on mass-produced recordings, in movies, and on radio and TV broadcasts. And as photocopy machines proliferated, it was determined that copying excerpts from copyrighted works for reference, research and study fell within the law’s “fair use” principle.

The government’s protection of an author’s or an inventor’s creation makes it possible for the creator to ask a monopoly price. Although monopoly prices generally benefit sellers, harm buyers, and infringe the supremacy of the consumers’ interests, Mises saw copyrights and patents as an exception to this rule. He wrote in Human Action—and here I quote with some interpolation in brackets:

If on a competitive market one of the complementary factors, namely f [a recipe or invention], needed for the production of the consumers’ good g, does not attain any price at all, although the production of f requires various expenditures and consumers are ready to pay for the consumers’ good g a price which makes its production profitable on a competitive market, the monopoly price for f becomes a necessary requirement for the production of g. It is this idea that people advance in favor of patent and copyright legislation. If inventors and authors were not in a position to make money by inventing and writing, they would be prevented from devoting their time to these activities and from defraying the costs involved. The public would not derive any advantage from the absence of monopoly prices for f. It would, on the contrary, miss the satisfaction it could derive from the acquisition of g.4

External Economies

Later in the book Mises discussed patents and copyrights further, pointing out their “external economies,” that is, the benefits they furnish to persons other than those who produced the protected material.

The extreme case is shown in the “production” of the intellectual groundwork of every kind of processing and constructing. The characteristic mark of formulas, i.e., the mental devices directing the technological procedures, is the inexhaustibility of the services they render. These services are consequently not scarce, and there is no need to economize their employment. Those considerations that resulted in the establishment of the institution of private ownership of economic goods did not refer to them. They remained outside the sphere of private property not because they are immaterial, intangible, and impalpable, but because their serviceableness cannot be exhausted.

People began to realize only later that this state of affairs has its drawbacks too. It places the producers of such formulas—especially the inventors of technological procedures and authors and composers—in a peculiar position. They are burdened with the cost of production, while the services of the product they have created can be gratuitously enjoyed by everybody. What they produce is for them entirely or almost entirely external economies.

If there are neither copyrights nor patents, the inventors and authors are in the position of an entrepreneur. They have a temporary advantage as against other people. As they start sooner in utilizing their invention or their manuscript themselves or in making it available for use to other people (manufacturers or publishers), they have the chance to earn profits in the time interval until everybody can likewise utilize it. As soon as the invention or the content of the book are publicly known, they become “free goods” and the inventor or author has only his glory.5

Mises went on to say that this problem has nothing to do with the genius who creates out of the sheer urge to do so; he does not wait for encouragement. But:

It is different with the broad class of professional intellectuals whose services society cannot do without. . . . [I]t is obvious that handing down knowledge to the rising generation and familiarizing the acting individuals with the amount of knowledge they need for the realization of their plans require textbooks, manuals, handbooks, and other nonfiction works. It is unlikely that people would undertake the laborious task of writing such publications if everyone were free to reproduce them. This is still more manifest in the field of technological invention and discovery. The extensive experimentation necessary for such achievements is often very expensive. It is very probable that technological progress would be seriously retarded if, for the inventor and for those who defray the expenses incurred by his experimentation, the results obtained were nothing but external economies.6

Controversy Continues

Mises understood that patents and copyrights are controversial. “They are considered privileges, a vestige of the rudimentary period of their evolution when legal protection was accorded to authors and inventors only by virtue of an exceptional privilege granted by the authorities. They are suspect, as they are lucrative only if they make it possible to sell at monopoly prices. Moreover, the fairness of patent laws is contested on the ground that they reward only those who put the finishing touch leading to practical utilization of achievements of many predecessors. These precursors go empty-handed although their contribution to the final result was often much more weighty than that of the patentee. . . . [T]his is a problem of the delimitation of property rights. . . .”7

It should be noted that merely because copyright grants a monopoly privilege to the producer of intellectual property, there is no guarantee that buyers will pay a monopoly price should the producer choose to ask it. Many books, poems, and musical compositions don’t sell well, or may not sell at all, and their authors and publishers may suffer losses. As Mises wrote, “Under copyright law every rhymester enjoys a monopoly in the sale of his poetry. But…[it] may happen that . . . his stuff . . . can only be sold at their waste paper value.”8

Also, the producers of some copyrighted intellectual property, eager to spread their ideas, readily grant reprint permission for free. For instance, this is true of most articles in The Freeman.

With the new technological developments that now make it so easy to reproduce and “share” musical compositions, we are entering a whole new ball game. Without copyright protection, musicians, authors, and composers are in the position of having to bear all the costs of production while the benefits go to others. Thus the new technology calls for further refinement of the rights of private property owners.

Contributing editor Bettina Bien Greaves was a long-time FEE staff member, resident scholar, and trustee. She attended Ludwig von Mises’s New York University seminar for many years and is a translator, editor, and bibliographer of his works.


Notes

  1. Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed., 1910, vol. 7, p. 118.
  2. Ibid.
  3. James Madison, “Property,” March 27, 1792; http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch16s23.html.
  4. Ludwig von Mises, Human Action (Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Foundation for Economic Education, 1996 [1949]), pp. 385–86.
  5. Ibid., p. 661.
  6. Ibid., pp. 661–62.
  7. Ibid., p. 662.
  8. Ibid., p. 277.
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Some comic relief from politics as usual? Donald Duck meets Glen Beck in "Right Wing Radio Duck"!

October 4th, 2010 No comments

No wind-up needed: [View:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HfuwNU0jsk0:550:0]

The clip was conceived and edited by YouTube user “Rebelious Pixels” (Jonathan McIntosh), whose website notes:

This is a re-imagined Donald Duck cartoon remix constructed from dozens of classic Walt Disney cartoons from the 1930s to 1960s. Donald’s life is turned upside-down by the current economic crisis and he finds himself unemployed and falling behind on his house payments. As his frustration turns into despair Donald discovers a seemingly sympathetic voice coming from his radio named Glenn Beck.

This transformative remix work constitutes a fair-use of any copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US copyright law. “Right Wing Radio Duck” by Jonathan McIntosh is licensed under a Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 3.0 License – permitting non-commercial sharing with attribution.

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"Welcome to the Age of Seawalls" (or, getting ready for the climate change that ain't happening)

October 4th, 2010 No comments

Bradford Plumer, associate editor at New Republic, uses the quoted language above to grab our attention for a piece by Stevew Nash (largely behind a paywall) about how cities in the United States are preparing for sea-level rise.

Says Plumer: “The picture’s pretty bleak. Most states and localities aren’t doing much planning at all. And when they are taking action, they’re actually making things worse.”

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Criticism of US IP imperialism (and shallow WSJ support) by Reuters and foreign Left-Keynesians

October 4th, 2010 No comments

Says lefty Australian economist John Quiggin (whom I have referred to earlier in other contexts), in a piece titled “How the Americans stole the Ugg boot” (emphasis added):

The world would be a lot better off without intellectual property, or at least with a return to the more reasonable rules of the 19th century (14 years copyright, limited patents restricted to actual inventions, trademarks to identify products rather than to stifle competition) and the attempts of the US government to defend IP monopoly rights are one of the many reasons American “soft power” is such a perishable commodity.

Quiggin refers to a great piece in Reuters by Felix Salomon (“How the WSJ magazine fails its readers“) that responds to a WSJ puff piece on Deckers Outdoor Corporation, which, according to Quiggin, is an “American trademark troll company that has stolen the name ‘Ugg boot’ then used ‘intellectual property’ laws to impose the absurd claim that the only genuine Uggs are those made in China.”

Australians have apparently been making “Ugg boots” for decades, but now find themselves unable to promote such boots abroad; such is the ‘Uggly’ stuff that is fuelling a growing re-think of IP laws.

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Limited Liability, Part 4: Libertarians sidestep the gift of limited liability & the resulting wreckage by arguing it's now unfair to make irresponsible shareholders liable

September 25th, 2010 No comments

More follow-up comments regarding on limited liability, excerpted from the comment thread to Geoffrey Allan Plauche‘s post, “Ecofascism in the Name of Fending Off Ecofascism“. Here is my first postsecond post and third post.

TokyoTom September 21, 2010 at 8:40 am

Shay: “What limit is there to who all one can sue for damages? Owners, OK. Shareholders (if that term even applies to non-LLCs)? Employees? Customers?”

Your uncertainty here is a manifestation of the confused discussion over liability for “corporate torts”that Stephan Kinsella refers to. His position is that only humans act, and not corporations (though they are given “legal entity” status), so only particular persons who actually injured someone else (and those who directed/ordered their actions) should be liable for any tort – not the corporation itself (and certainly not shareholders, unless they were personally involved somehow). I agree that granting corporate status has greatly confused discussions over whom should be liable for corporate torts, and think Stephan too lightly brushes back the enormous and anonymous torts that our now massive corporations commit — precisely what individuals, for example, is responsible for the BP disaster, for the damage to health and property caused by pollution, or for injuries resulting from faulty products?

Rolling back limited liability should not mean that shareholders SHOULD be held liable for corporate torts in the same way that executives, managers and employees (the first two benefiting from company-purchased insurance policies) and sometimes lenders are; it would just mean that they would get no government-provided “get out of jail free” card. In this way, common shareholders would be put on a similar footing to partners in a partnership that acts through paid managers.

Jon Leckie September 21, 2010 at 9:10 am

Hello Tokyo, thanks for a powerful reply. …

You and I are not going to reach agreement in the short run, but it’s been interesting and you’ve given me a lot to think about. I don’t agree with you that all of the evils you identify can be laid at the feet of limited liability. I remain of the view that the abuses of the corporate form must be set against the benefits of allowing investors to mobilise capital in such a way that the downside is limited to the assets originally invested. It may ultimately be demonstrated that the abuses outweigh the upside, but from I have seen you don’t seem to acknowledge any benefits to limited liability. You also don’t seem to consider what the costs of the extra compliance and risk to investors with personal liability: I can tell you from personal experience that compliance and monitoring is not costless and that the burden can sink an otherwise profitable and socially beneficial project. You might say “Well too bad!”, but that’s lost jobs for people, that’s products that won’t be made, that’s wealth foregone.

Ultimately, extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. You put so much responsiblity at the feet of limited liability that I don’t think it’s unfair of me to ask for more evidence, better arguments (I may find them on further reading of your blog :-)). I think Stephan Kinsella’s request of you earlier on this page remains valid, to quote:

“Tom, when you say the state grant of limited liability is not justifiable, this is a… way of trying to reverse the burden of proof. This very statement is relevant ONLY if the grant changes what would be the case anyway. That is, if shareholders would be vicariously responsible under a libertarian theory of cause for torts of employees of corporations they owned shares in.”

I believe I understand your response: “no one else gets to avoid tortious liability to third parties based EITHER on the grant of limited liability of the state or by a private contract, so why should people who stand behind an LLC get to do so? The existence of limited liablity (at least vis a vis third parties) is not the default position, they’re a creation of the state.” (Is that right? I’ve tried to be fair, I’m not interested in strawmen). Nonetheless, I don’t think that is a satisfactory libertarian theory of cause for tortious liability for reasons I’ve tried to set out already (contractual liability can exist absent a state (and thus so can limited liability) how would tortious liability exist absent the state?) and so Kinsella’s request remains valid.

If you think that question is covered, my other objection remains: it must ultimately be demonstrated that the abuses outweigh the upside. The law of unintended consequences applies to every proposal for change, and I don’t think you give fair credit to the role that limited liablity entities play in an advanced economy.

I’ll come and see you at your site, or watch out for a reply here. You’ve helped me clarify my own thinking and I appreciate that a lot. Best, JL.

 

TokyoTom September 21, 2010 at 2:01 pm

Jon:

Thanks for your response. While my envirofascist skin remains somewhat thin, I am fine with your tone – even if I see you as exaggerating and not fully comprehending my position.

A few comments in response:

“I remain of the view that the abuses of the corporate form must be set against the benefits of allowing investors to mobilise capital in such a way that the downside is limited to the assets originally invested.”

What, if anything, is libertarian about your proposed cost-benefit calculation? In determining whether state-granted limited liability is justifiable, shall we engage in a utilitarian weighing of the advantages to investors against the disadvantages to others?

“you don’t seem to acknowledge any benefits to limited liability”

But I have; but I have also pointed out that most of the benefits could be achieved by contract. It’s the benefits that can ONLY be achieved by government fiat and at the cost of innocent third parties that I object to.

You seem to think that either the intrusion of government here is minor or the cost to innocent third parties is trivial, but I can assure you that it is not. Indeed, much of what is wrong with the US in particular and with the world more generally can be laid at the foot of wide-scale government-enabled risk-shifting and moral hazard of the type seen in grants of limited liability and the concomitant cycle of regulation (in which the losers are always a number of steps behind) that such grants have set off.

“compliance and monitoring is not costless and that the burden can sink an otherwise profitable and socially beneficial project.”

I’m quite aware that compliance and monitoring are not costless; you, however, see to think that shifting risks to others and thus easing compliance and monitoring costs IS costless and “socially beneficial”, while ignoring that there are clear winners and losers from such government favor. Did you miss the Gulf oil spill, the limits on liability, the poor planning and oversight, the lack of caution, and the costs being borne by quite a different class of people than BP’s shareholders? Of many cases of environment harms experienced throughout the US? Are you unaware of the massive and ongoing environmental damage similarly caused by “socially beneficial” oil and gas development in Nigeria and Ecuador?

You and Kinsella: “Tom, when you say the state grant of limited liability is not justifiable, this is a… way of trying to reverse the burden of proof. This very statement is relevant ONLY if the grant changes what would be the case anyway. That is, if shareholders would be vicariously responsible under a libertarian theory of cause for torts of employees of corporations they owned shares in.”

Au contraire; it’s you and Stephan who are shifting the burden of proof and trying to avoid yourselves to come up with any convincing libertarian arguments FOR the state grant of limited liability to corporate shareholders. Stephan has acknowledged elsewhere that the grant is NON-libertarian, could not be contracted for voluntarily, and that if it were not to exist that insurers would be offering to insure shareholders from downside risks, but like you stubbornly seeks to cling conservatively to a status quo that favors investors and the big government corporatism has produced.

Far from me having to make a libertarian case shareholders should be vicariously responsible under a libertarian theory of cause for torts of employees of corporations, I simply need to show that the grant of limited liability significantly CHANGES the structure of the market and the behavior of market participants. Clearly, limited liability MATTERS, as amply demonstrated not simply by looking at markets and cases where limited liability shields shareholders from damages in cases where partnerships would be liable, but also by your own deep reluctance (and Stephan’s) to do anything about it. Stephan makes a thin lawyerly dodge, while you offer utilitarian arguments.

Stephan’s desire for a libertarian theory of vicarious liability of shareholders in the case of “torts of employees” of corporations is commendable, but as I have already noted, such a desire is itself confused by the failure to recognize the state favors given to corporations and the massive scale at which they operate and can damage third persons. It appears that Kinsella would have us treat most damages caused by companies as “torts by [particular] employees”, thus denying any recourse by injured parties to corporate assets. Such an analysis may be appropriate in the case of small businesses where who acts and under what authority may be very clear (as in the case of partnerships and sole proprietorships), but hardly make any sense in the case of the large, anonymous and bureaucratized institutions that limited liability and legal entity status have directly led to.

Sorry, but it seems to me that your own approach to the issue of tort liability makes even less libertarian sense: you have concluded that in a stateless society institutions would arise only to enforce contracts, while individuals and firms would get away scot-free if they willfully or negligently harmed others. Surely a brief look at traditional societies would quickly inform you that such societies have very sophisticated and effective ways of controlling behavior that damages others.

“my other objection remains: it must ultimately be demonstrated that the abuses outweigh the upside. The law of unintended consequences applies to every proposal for change, and I don’t think you give fair credit to the role that limited liablity entities play in an advanced economy.”

Ahh, there’s your non-libertarian insistence on the need for cost-benefit analysis for a change in eliminating limited liability as to persons involuntarily injured by corporate acts again. Do I need to add up all of the people harmed in the BP spill and weigh them against the potential cost to BP shareholders?

“The law of unintended consequences” sounds suspiciously like the precautionary principle that enviros always argue for (precisely because corporations are risk-shifting machines); bravo! Actually, I’m very well aware, not only of the very central and valuable role that corporate entities play in our economy, but of all of the negative unintended consequences that the grant of limited liability (and other favors) has entailed. But far from throwing the baby out with the bath water, I see reform in this area as both a sine qua non for any meaningful effort to reduce statism and something that is eminently achievable and with a net benefit in efficiency, risk-management and, last but not least, justice.

TT

 

J. Murray September 21, 2010 at 9:17 am

There is no such thing as a libertarian state-granted limited liability.

TokyoTom September 22, 2010 at 12:00 am

Agreed; that’s MY point exactly.

Jon Leckie September 22, 2010 at 4:40 am

Well hang on now guys, there’s very much a thing as libertarian state-granted limited liability – aren’t you conflating liberatarianism with anarchism? The two are not the same and I can find no definition of libertarianisn that requires the abolishment of the state.

There very much is such a concept of state-granted limited liability, it’s just that Tokyo sees proponents as being obligated to justify its continuance PRECISELY because it is a gift from the state, whereas – on this point – I view it as also capable of existing absent the state through private contract. Tokyo then asks how private contract can exclude third party tortious liability, and I respond with how can tortious liability even EXIST in a stateless environment? (Which might be a stupid question, but no one’s yet said anything on it, it must be a question addressed in the literature somewhere).

Tokyo, one discrete question on your response above: you say it’s non-libertarian to weigh costs and benefits, summing this up as a crude utilitarianism. Why is that not an approach I can take? I mean, on the BP example, one might read your post and wonder whether BP merrily skipped town, having destroyed the gulf completely, taken no remedial action and paid no billions of dollars into a compensation fund, plus remaining exposed to private civil claims? Ask British pensioners whose payments are reliant on BP’s dividends whether they’ve suffered or not. Yes those living around the Gulf have had a hell of a time, but that’s not enough of an argument: accidents happen. BP is being punished. So it’s not a crude balancing act between (a) environment destroyed, people suffering and (b) callous shareholders laughing to the bank. I’m saying that limited liability may be responsible for a vast amount of economic activity that otherwise may not take place due to the unlimited risk of personal liability. Surely you need to take this into account, no?

Oh, and I need to ask you to do me a favour: please don’t accuse me of supporting big government corporatism. I may not be an anarchist, but I am as resolutely against corporate welfare and crony capitalism as anyone else who enjoys these pages. Supporting limited liability as a vehicle for mobilising investment is NOT the same thing as supporting GE or GM, please acknowledge this.

J. Murray September 22, 2010 at 5:30 am

I’m not really confusing libertarianism with anarchism here. A state-granted limited liability would be violating the life, liberty, and property angle. I don’t see libertarianism compatible with a state granting immunity to a party for any wrongdoing. The general argument between minarchism and anarchism in libertarian circles is whether the state should exist to punish those who violate those three key tennents, not whether the state exists to protect the wrongdoer against just punishment.

Jon Leckie September 22, 2010 at 6:24 am

Thanks, J. Murrary: that’s helpful. It’s probably apparent enough, but I’ve a lot more reading to do and am picking up a lot as I go along.

Does it affect your view at all to stress that limited liability does not preclude recovery? There’s no immunity: but recovery is limited to the assets held in the vehicle and if damages are in excess of the value of those assets, the entity is dead. There seems to be remedies available beyond banning limited liability to prevent/minimise undercapitalised entities engaging in behaviour likely to give rise to torious liability (contrast BP with Mom&Pop LLC running a local hardware store): I’m really struggling to get across the line on limited liability as ipso facto in breach of the life, liberty and property standard (thanks again for clarifying the perspective there though). Maybe one day I’ll end up in his camp, I’m keeping an open mind (as much as one can try!). Lots to think about.

PS. Without a state to impose liability for and punish tortious acts against the property rights of another, how would liability for the tortious act be enforced against the tortfeasor?

TokyoTom September 23, 2010 at 12:30 pm

Jon, as for “how can tortious liability even EXIST in a stateless environment?”, I clearly addressed this above where I said:

Sorry, but it seems to me that your own approach to the issue of tort liability makes even less libertarian sense: you have concluded that in a stateless society institutions would arise only to enforce contracts, while individuals and firms would get away scot-free if they willfully or negligently harmed others. Surely a brief look at traditional societies would quickly inform you that such societies have very sophisticated and effective ways of controlling behavior that damages others.

Maybe this post with Bruce Yandle’s thoughts on how humans manage commons might be a good start: http://bit.ly/8V2q6R

Utilitarianism presumes both that it is possible to measure and aggregate conflicting preferences and that it is acceptable for government to do so and to intentionally benefit particular groups of individuals at the expense of others. Austrians say that the first is impossible and libertarians say that the the second violates basic principles.

As for BP and other corporations, I have little sympathy for shareholders, who have the benefit of their bargain (including dividends in good times that cannot be clawed back when risks materialize and the company is unable to fulfill its obligation), while persons injured by corporate actions have little or no ability to bargaining in advance whatsoever, or to get ready to get harmed. (The case of BP is compounded by the fact that government, by claiming to own “public” resources, deprives the fishermen harmed of any control over their livelihoods including any property right that they can claimed was harmed.) This just scratches the surface; I have commented extensively on BP on my blog and on other pages here: http://bit.ly/crTbEA

Yes, I see that you are “saying that limited liability may be responsible for a vast amount of economic activity that otherwise may not take place due to the unlimited risk of personal liability.” I see we agree that limited liability is very important – great! – but you seem to think either that, somewhat magically, such limitations on liability make risks simply disappear, or that such a shifting of risks by investors in particular firms (and the investor class generally) to innocent third parties class leads to improved risk management, or that such shifting or risks by those who fund and benefit from them to innocent third parties is justified on utilitarian or some other unspecified principled grounds. Surely you can see that “the unlimited risk of personal liability” is the default situation without state intervention?

By the way, I completely accept your good faith; please accept my pokes simply as attempt to get you to reflect on the implications of your positions.

You might think that you don’t “support[] big government corporatism”, but surely you ought to realizing that limited liability is a key factor in the rise of statist corporations. Supporting limited liability as towards innocent third parties might be effective in creating a vehicle for mobilizing investment, but it is also clear a vehicle of massive risk-shifting, theft and at destroying community in favor of fundamentally amoral governments and corporations.

You suggest you don’t support GE or GM, but if you can accept and support limited liability, then surely also you must accept its consequences.

TT

TokyoTom September 23, 2010 at 12:48 pm

“Accidents happen”? So do systematic trainwrecks due to mismanagement of risks.

Could government interventions that enable risk-shifting in banks, securities firms and corporations (and subsequent bailouts) have anything to do with engendering such mismanagement?

Massive kleptocracy in the third world differs little from what we see at home.

 

Beefcake the Mighty September 22, 2010 at 9:51 pm

“I agree that granting corporate status has greatly confused discussions over whom should be liable for corporate torts, and think Stephan too lightly brushes back the enormous and anonymous torts that our now massive corporations commit – precisely what individuals, for example, is responsible for the BP disaster, for the damage to health and property caused by pollution, or for injuries resulting from faulty products?”

What does this question have to do with limited liability? Why should shareholders be any more responsible for the disaster than people who filled their tanks with BP’s gas? They both gave the the company money, after all.

I’m having a hard time seeing what point, exactly, you’re trying to make here (beyond anti-corporatist bromides).

TokyoTom September 23, 2010 at 11:20 am

Lord Bungulous Bringer of Beefcake:

What, those who simply buy a company’s products should be treated on the same basis as those who invest in the company’s business model? Are you trying to clarify, or obfuscate? One offers money in exchange for goods or services, the other offers money for the profits he expects to gain from the company’s business model.

I’m having a hard time seeing what point, exactly, you’re trying to make here (beyond pro-statist-corporatist bromides).

What does the question of whether corporations should have any vicarious liability for the actions of its employees and agents have to do with limited liability? Thanks for the opportunity for me to be a bringer of light, but it’s not that complicated: without limited liability and corporate “legal entity” status, investors and corporate managers would care to make sure that employees are careful. The limited liability shield makes it the interest of shareholders NOT TO CARE, and the interest of managers to obscure who is responsible. Because incorporations make possible large, impersonal businesses without a clear locus of responsibility, on the behest of victims seeking recompense for damages suffered, courts tend to hold “the company” responsible.

In short, the confusion that Stephan raises and professes to be concerned about is a product of the very state grant of limited liability that he – like you – thinks is too unimportant to question, but important enough to defend.

Why don’t you and Stephan start a libertarian fan club for essential government interventions? You can start with limited liability for corporate shareholders generally, add the specific caps on liability granted to the oil+gas industry and nuclear industry, and include the preemption of strict common law protection of property from pollution, in favor of federal preemption and rights to pollute.

Or you could think a little more seriously about how we could replace corporate risk-shifting machines and the whole mass of federal and state regulation that are purported intended to curtail such risks (but instead create barriers to entry and ensconce management from shareholders, thus introducing another layer of moral hazard) with internal risk control and risk control via insurers acting for shareholders.

A number of conservative commentators have made the radical suggestion that banks, securities firms and offshore oil+gas cos should be allowed to act only through partnerships (or other unlimited liability entities); they are thinking too modestly and have overlooked the limited liability for corporate shareholders that drives our whole regulatory edifice and has set off our escalating cycle of statist rent-seeking and corruption.

TT

Beefcake the Mighty September 23, 2010 at 11:26 am

“One offers money in exchange for goods or services, the other offers money for the profits he expects to gain from the company’s business model.”

Yeah, what a critical distinction. Shocking I didn’t see it previously; thanks so much!

TokyoTom September 23, 2010 at 1:09 pm

Not sure whether I should be pleased that my comments are so pedestrian, or disturbed that you are content with government interventions that help to erase moral distinctions.

Prior to the creation of corporations, it was clear who was doing what … thank goodness for anonymity and lack of personal responsibility!

TokyoTom September 23, 2010 at 9:39 pm

[I am]  thankful that you provide an opportunity for me to help others examine the growing rot set off by the very non-libertarian grant of limited liability to shareholders regarding injury to involuntary third parties:

http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/archive/2009/02/26/the-curse-of-limited-liability-wsj-com-executives-traders-of-big-financial-corporations-generate-risky-businesss-while-smaller-partnerships-are-much-more-risk-averse.aspx

http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/archive/2010/06/29/limited-liability-financial-crisis-and-bp-someone-else-sees-the-obvious-quot-black-swan-quot-of-executive-trader-moral-hazard-after-investment-banks-went-corporate.aspx

http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/archive/2010/04/22/finally-an-lvmi-commentator-points-out-the-elephant-in-the-room-effective-reform-to-rein-in-rampant-moral-hazard-at-banks-means-removing-limited-liability.aspx

http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/archive/2010/08/18/in-a-shocking-moment-of-honesty-conocophillips-ceo-says-offshore-oil-isn-t-economical-without-government-gifts-of-limited-liability.aspx

TT

 

The Kid Salami September 24, 2010 at 5:40 am

“One offers money in exchange for goods or services, the other offers money for the profits he expects to gain from the company’s business model.”

What about someone who hands his money to some third party to manage and this third party puts his money into BP? Is he more or less liable than someone who does it directly?

Your distinction is not helpful. “offers money for the profits he expects to gain from the company’s business model” – this is just having dividends stuck into your bank account. How is this different in your view from the “services” you mention in the first part?

TokyoTom September 24, 2010 at 11:43 am

TKS, thanks for your questions.

I am quite aware of the point that, as a consequence of the existing grant of limited liability, shareholders have little actual control over public companies in which they have shares of stock and thus – along with zero legal liability for corporate torts – very little moral responsibility for corporate behavior. But such observations of the status quo cannot serve to justify the state intervention that has so neatly divorced the supposed “owners” of a business from any such liability.

While the differences between shareholders and customers now may appear to be slight, this is a situation (where there re no human actually owning the business and any downside risks) created artificially by government; I can assure you that the differences between owners and customers is much more stark in partnerships and other forms of business enterprise where the owners are not given a liability shield by government and thus bear personal risk if things go wrong. While this largely as we think it should be, I have never heard a libertarian or legal argument that those who purchase products from an enterprise should have any legal liability for harms that the business causes to others (though it is not uncommon to see moral suasion pressure being put on customers as well as creditors and shareholders when an enterprise engages in harmful or objectionable activities).

..[You might have noted that I have remarked several times that I am NOT arguing FOR a general rule that shareholders SHOULD be liable for corporate torts; rather, I have:

(1) pointed out that limited liability itself has served to muddle the question of whom, exactly, should be responsible for the very real harms that corporatons frequently cause,

(2) noted that the limited-liability corporate form has enabled risk-generation and -shifting on a massive scale, with innocent third parties frequently being stuck holding the bag (not solely when liabilities exceed assets, but more generally since the cycle of escalating government interventions to rein in corporations perversely ends up raising barriers to entry and giving corporations “rights to pollute” that curtail recourse even when sufficient assets are available),

(3) argued that libertarians should reconsider the grant of limited liability for torts (as opposed to limited liability as to those who contract with the corporation on a voluntary basis) not simply because it is clearly non-libertarian to begin with, but because it has had profound consequences – consequences at a serious enough level that state-loving libertarians concede simply by troubling themselves to argue against curtailing limited liability,

(4) noted that the most efficiacious way to roll back the regulatory state lie in the direction of shifting ultimate responsibility for managing risks to enterprise owners (and ending the counterproductive regulatory risk-management experiment), and

(5) noted that a curtailment of limited liability for torts could be hedged by shareholders via insurance, and could be achieved by state governments and the federal government offering more lenient regulation to busness enterprises that operate as partnerships, unlimited liability corporations, or in cases where shares are not fully paid up so that calls for signifcant additional capital could be made against shareholders if needed to pay claims.

IOW, the insistence by Kinsella . . . that one must “provide a theory of liability that coherently distinguishes shareholders from any other patron of the company” BEFORE one can examine the justifications FOR and the consequences of the state grant of limited liability is both sadly non-libertarian and dangerously blind and shallow.

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Limited Liability, Part 3: limited liability for torts is a non-libertarian gift from the state that has done tremendous damage – both literally and in driving the growth of a massive regulatory state

September 25th, 2010 No comments

More follow-up comments regarding on limited liability excerpted from the comment thread to Geoffrey Allan Plauche‘s post, “Ecofascism in the Name of Fending Off Ecofascism“. Here is my first post and second post.

Jon Leckie September 18, 2010 at 5:08 am

Tokyo Tom, good morning. I’m willing to engage in a good dialogue with you on these interesting points.

I followed your links, and thought your two principal concerns were (1) limited liability allows the sponsors of corporate actors to avoid liability for the tortious acts of the company and (2) limited liability is inconsistent with anarchism because it’s only possible through state fiat.

It seems to me that tortious liability can’t exist without a state to impose the tortious duties by fiat, whereas limited liability can be created through contract (perhaps with initially high transaction costs, but standard contratual forms should emerge over time). Do you agree or disagree? What are your thoughts? It seems to me that if you think there’s any truth in this position, you have to engage in a rather deep rethink of the way you express your argument against limited liability.

And of course on top of that remains Stephan Kinsella’s absolutely proper request that you explain why equity investors should have additional duties imposed on them beyond other stakeholders.

Just for background, I have sympathy with your view, even though I no longer agree. When I was at school I applied for a scholarship for an LLM to explore the idea of piercing the corporate veil for companies that engage in human rights violations. The subset is small, mainly companies engaged in extractive industries in the developing world, and I thought that if you allow unlimited liability for such violations, you create incentives for companies engaged in such industries to implement and publish internal procedures designed to avoid such violations; otherwise no one will invest in them. So in preparing for the interview, I presented the idea to some colleagues at the research centre at which I was an assistant, one of them asked why shareholders should bear responsibility for the human rights violations of the company in which they invest. I did’t think I needed to consider that, it was obvious, right? Whatever it takes to prevent such violations should be considered.

I didn’t get the scholarship.

JUL

TokyoTom September 18, 2010 at 8:16 am

Jon, thanks for your comments.

I think the arguments about anarchism vs. minarchism are a distraction in the face of the enormous problem we currently face of corporate risk-shifting, compounded by escalating and counterproductive regulation. Our goal should be to MOVE toward freer societies, not ignore real problems resulting from grants of corporate status/limited liability by assuming a true free market without governments and statist corporations.

But to engage somewhat, let me note that in an anarchic society even the enforcement of contracts may require moral sanction and a possible threat of force. I don’t see that claims by non-contracting parties that they have been injured would not also be subject to very similar “voluntary” court systems, in which injured parties may be supported by community associations, consumer associations, retail stores and the like, which business enterprises (or associations to which they belong) may contract with in advance in order to do business. Other counterparties to a business that engages in risky activities might also insist that the business submit to some type of judicial process regarding any tort claims.

I believe that many traditional societies, precisely to deal with issues of potentially damaging activities, require that people of stature in the community guarantee their behavior.

Let me note that while of course some types of limited liability can be created through contract , NO type of contract lets you say you have no liability to third parties whom you injure but who have not contracted with you in advance.

Stephan hasn’t requested that I explain why equity investors should have additional duties imposed on them beyond other stakeholders; he’s simply noted that, given the status quo, in which shareholders purchase shares based on a legal promise that they will have no liability for corporate acts (other than those they personally direct), it hardly seems fair for the state to impose such liability on them. I would certainly agree; I’m not seeking to use the state to unwind limited liability overnight.

However, that does not at all obviate my concerns about the key role that limited liability plays in our perverse cycles of risk-shifting, increasing regulation and statist rent-seeking and efforts by outraged/concerned/ecofascist citizens groups to apply political pressure and moral suasion.

It seems to me we ought to recognize the negative features of limited liability and to recognize that we can pare back the damage by rolling back the regulatory state in the cases of business entities that do NOT have limited liability for their main investor class: sole proprietorships, partnerships, unlimited liability corporations, corporations whose shares are only 10% paid-in (so a call remains on the remaining 90%). As I have noted in various blog posts, several astute observers have made very similar suggestions regarding banks, securities companies and firms engaging in mineral exploitation on public lands.

Regarding the problem you mention of extractive industries in the developing world, too few people (and far too few libertarians) note that the chief dynamic is one of the theft of indigenous resources by elites via the state, using conveniently amoral Western corporations to complete the robbery and leave the natives with nothing but a mess. IOW, an “Avatar”-like problem, not at all dissimilar to the way our federal government claims ownership to marine resources, grants leases to BP and the like, and leaves fishermen with little to no control over their own livelihoods:

Too Many or Too Few People? Does the market provide an answer? – TT’s Lost in Tokyo http://bit.ly/8zlecI

My “Avatar” posts: TT’s Lost in Tokyo http://bit.ly/9s32uD

TT

 

 

TokyoTom September 18, 2010 at 10:45 am

Shay, since liability as to voluntary counterparties CAN be limited by mutual agreement, that is NOT at all what drives the use of the limited liability corporate form, but the ability of owners to shift risks to involuntary third parties. One of the KEY PURPOSES of using the corporate form is the promise to generate great returns to shareholders at the risk of great losses to involuntary third parties, who because of state action lose ANY right to claw back profits for the poor, innocent shareholders.

I suggest you look through my many other posts on limited liability, and that explore this and related topic in the context of the financial crisis and BP:

TT’s Lost in Tokyo http://bit.ly/4nr2Ay 

 

 Jon Leckie September 18, 2010 at 11:14 am

TokyoTom: You say “One of the KEY PURPOSES of using the corporate form is the promise to generate great returns to shareholders at the risk of great losses to involuntary third parties, who because of state action lose ANY right to claw back profits for the poor, innocent shareholders.”

That is a bald assertion, Tom. There’s nevier a guarantee of returns to shareholders, let alone great returns. There’s never any guarantee that a company will commit a tort, and there’s never a guarantee that any such tort will result in liability that exceeds the available assets of the company and thus leaves third parties bearing a great loss. These are all events that may happen, but are in no way guaranteed to happen. This is classic baby with the bathwater stuff.

You’ve identified a real problem, but you drastically overstate the extent of it and use it to support abolishing a very useful vehicle for mobilising and deploying capital for socially productive ends. There are other solutions that should be explored before abolishing limited liability should be considered.

TokyoTom September 21, 2010 at 8:13 am

Jon, you accuse me of exaggeration, but understatement is really more like it.

Since limited liability could otherwise be achieved by contract it is clear that the chief effect of that grant is to protect shareholders (and whatever dividends they make) from claims by injured third parties. This is a clear primary intention of many who incorporate and is why lawyers, accounts, doctors and professionals have all pushed to get out of partnerships and into professional corporations.

And sure there’s “never a guarantee of returns to shareholders”, “any guarantee that a company will commit a tort”, nor “a guarantee that any such tort will result in liability that exceeds the available assets of the company and thus leaves third parties bearing a great loss.” But corporations choose to ring-fence all of what they see as risky businesses in separate subsidiaries, precisely to limit the size of the bag if the business fails and/or third parties are injured.

And there have been MANY cases of risks being manifested and damages to innocent parties exceeding corporate assets (and of parent companies working feverishly to make sure those injured get as little as possible). Ever hear of “Superfund sites”, for example?

The history of the limited liability corporate form has been one of a continuing stream of abuses that has led steadily to the aggrandizement of federal power over the states that create corporations, to a continuing cycle regulation in the wake of undermining of strong common-law protection of property (see Block) to protect workers and citizens (regulating health, safety, and welfare, public companies, banks, etc.), and to a steady weakening of shareholder influence over ensconced management.

Far from throwing the baby out with the bathwater, people have to start recognizing that the ‘babies’ have nearly totally slipped our control and, with the government that they have much greater influence over than any of us do, are destroying our communities and freedom.

Anybody who wants to pare back the regulatory state has to strike at the root of regulation and corporate statism – the grant of limited liability that motivates demands from citizens for the mirage of state control.

Contrary to your suggestion, trying to rein in limited liability would NOT mean an end to the corporate form; corporations with uncapped shareholder liability would simply mean shareholders that have far greater incentives to oversee managers and who would be motivated to purchase insurance to cover potential claims against shareholders – which insurers would be well-positioned to help shareholders in oversight. States (and the federal govt) could offer incentives to move in the right direction by reducing regulatory burdens on unlimited liability corps, which would also be in a position to market themselves as more careful and conservative than their competitors. Another way to pare back limited liability would be to provide that companies ensure that common shares are only 10% paid in (so that a call on the remaining 90% remains).

A related step would be to end the counterproductive and risk-shifting federal and state grants of limited liability for particular risky activities, such as nuclear power plants and offshore oil and gas drilling; some commentators, both here at LvMI and elsewhere, have called for a requirement that banks and securities companies be partnerships, precisely because partners have greater incentives to control risk (moral hazard ran rampant in Wall Street as soon as the securities firm went public, and so were playing at making high bonuses while shifting risks to shareholders and US taxpayers, via the “Greenspan-Burbank put”).

I encourage you to investigate further at my blog.

TT

 

TokyoTom September 21, 2010 at 9:04 am

Geoffrey and Stephan, cat got your tongue?

I’m waiting to hear more about the libertarian wonders of state-granted limited liability (and the evil nature of those citizens groups who have started to figure out not only that our good-willed statist corporations are way ahead of them in the struggle to use government, but are catching on to the idea that Mises explored of laws that enable the externalization of costs).

Your friendly neighborhood envirofascist,

TT

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Limited liability, Part 2: Is limited liability for torts a simple codification of what companies and their counterparties could agree to voluntarily?

September 25th, 2010 No comments

The comments regarding on limited liability at Geoffrey Allan Plauche‘s post, “Ecofascism in the Name of Fending Off Ecofascism” – which I’ve been copying to an earlier post in relevant part – have been running long, so to improve readability thought I’d break up the comments of interest into several posts.

[Here are links to my secondthird.and fourth posts.]. 

 

panika2008 September 17, 2010 at 12:24 pm

“Limited liability is as bogus as pretending all your debts are really owed by your invisible friend.”

Nah. Limited liability is just a simple juristic construct to make default what would otherwise result in a substantial growth of legal homeorrhage, namely specifying in all and every contract of the company the exact limits and conditions of liability. This is impractical, especially for small firms, so they are given the option to incorporate using the “default” set of rules. It’s a part – quite sensible at that – of our common (sense) law tradition – make good/popular practices into codex’s. If only all legislation would proceed basing on this pattern!

TokyoTom September 18, 2010 at 7:21 am

Panika, the libertarian issue is not about default rules for what could otherwise be voluntarily contracted for – namely, agreements between firms, their shareholders and their voluntary creditors or customers to limit the liability of the firm to its certain assets.

Rather, it is about whether governments should be gifting shareholders with limitations on liability vis-a-vis persons who become INVOLUNTARY creditors of the firm because of corporate actions (via managers, employees or agents) that damage them.

TT

 

panika2008 September 19, 2010 at 10:08 am

How can anyone become an involuntary creditor of anyone otherwise than by criminal action (extortion?) or government subsidy? I don’t quite understand what you mean.

TokyoTom September 20, 2010 at 10:40 am

Panika, “involuntary ” creditors is fancy legalese designed to distinguish (1) those who VOLUNTARILY to do business with a corporation (or other company, person or association) and to which the business owes money, and (2) those who have not contracted with the business, but have a claim because they have been INVOLUNTARILY injured by it.

Because of ability of parties to freely negotiate contracts, the parties in category (1) do not need a state grant of limited liaibility; rather, the chief effect of limited liability is to allow corporations to make profits for shareholders, lenders and managers, while passing risks on to those who made NO choice to be injured.

 

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Nice short clip by CEI's RJ Smith, explaining government's role in the destructive exploitation of wildlife resources

September 24th, 2010 No comments

I attach for the benefit of readers a short video explaining the “Tragedy of the Commons” by author and environmental historian Robert J. Smith, founder and director of the Center for Private Conservation (a former CEI project), an adjunct scholar in environmental policy at CEI. Smith is also a Senior Fellow at the National Center for Public Policy Research and Distinguished Adjunct Scholar at the Competitive Enterprise Institute. 

Read more by Robert J. Smith here http://cei.org/publications/studies/5811.

I note that I have commented extensively on various commons issues: e.g., bisonfish, whales, “public” lands, oil & gas, and indigenous resources

[View:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qAXcvnNqYeM:550:0]

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