TT's Lost in Tokyo — by TokyoTom

Marlo Lewis of CEI has a rather schizophrenic post up at Rob Bradley‘s MasterResource blog – one of my favorite “free market” fossil-fuel industry-funded sites (unlike the NRO’s “Planet Gore”, MasterResource actually allows comments!) – regarding the proposal by leading “alarmist” climate scientist Dr. James Hansen (of NASA and Columbia U.’s Earth Institute) that the federal government adopt a “tax and dividend” climate policy instead of a “cap and trade” approach.

Lewis notes that Hansen recently testified in front of the U.S. House Ways and Means Committee about Hansen’s “tax and dividend” proposal, but while Lewis calls Hansen’s per capita rebated carbon tax proposal “clever”, Lewis puzzlingly fails to compare Hansen’s proposal with the cap and trade alternative that the Obama administration supports and that Congress (and industry) appears to favor.  Instead we get some poorly grounded speculation about the effects of a carbon tax and complaints about the political viability of a transparent carbon tax – all of which points not only ignore the more opaque, rent-seeking prone and heavy-handed cap and trade alternative, but by implication suggests that those who prefer an opaque and back-room deal prone cap and trade approach have made the correct political calculation.

Nor does Lewis make any mention of all of the support that carbon taxes have received, not only from economists, but from a wide range of others, including Exxon`s Rex Tillerson and various neocons, conservatives and libertarians (George Will, Congressman Bob Inglis, Jon Adler, Barbara Thoring, etc.), at least in comparison to cap and trade.

As a result, one is forced to wonder just whati it is that Lewis is trying to achieve – is he trying to sabotage a government-lite carbon policy, so that government-heavy policy is more likely to prevail?  If so, why?  Or does he really think that opposing EVERY carbon pricing policy is the most effective way to delay and/or influence ultimate policy outcomes?  I for one am confused.

My more extensive (and less high-level) comments to Marlo Lewis on his comment thread are copied below:

Marlo,
first, I’m afraid I don’t follow you on the science. We can’t stop our
still growing GHG releases on a dime, much less the short- to
medium-term feedbacks from water, methane and albedo changes, and
long-term will persist for centuries, and the water cycles, the oceans’
pH and world’s biota are changing noticeably and fairly rapidly, even
without significant further increases during the past decade – yet what
is it, precisely, about our ability to change our influence on the
system or to control responses that gives you comfort? Why do you seem
to think it is “conservative” for our nation and others to do nothing
in light of our remarkable and uncontrolled global climate experiment?

BTW, surely you are aware that Hansen has earlier offered extensive
information that paleoclimate records indicate that long-range climate
rsponse to a CO2 doubling is on the scale of 3 degrees C. Did you miss
that? Or were you more eager to say that Hansen’s reference to more
recent studies about facts some how implies that Hansen is “dissing”
models? What’s the point anyway, other than point-scoring – if facts
appear to indicate that long-term sensitivity is relatively high,
should we be ignoring that and placing our faith in models instead?
Should facts not further inform models, or policy-makers?

Second, while you note Hansen’s attack on cap & trade and his
“tax and dividend” proposal “quite clever”, you fail to offer any
opinion on the realative merits of these quite different proposals.
Instead, you offer some sniping criticisms of tax and dividend, as if
you are hoping that the consequence will be that the Obama
administration, Dems and rent-seekers generally will turn away from
climate policy altogether. But isn’t that nothing but wishful thinking,
and shouldn’t libertarians and others who prefer to avoid the
monstrosity of cap & trade be trying to encourage the efforts of
those whose proposals would be much less economically damaging? Isn’t
Hansen’s proposal far preferable over cap & trade, and the kind of
industrial planning that Jon Adler says is inevitable from the EPA
under EPA vs. Massachusetts without legislative action?

Exxon and a host of others (as noted at the blog posts linked at my
name) have come clearly down in favor of carbon taxes over cap &
trade; perhaps you may at some point care to favor us with your own
comparative views.

It seems to me that Hansen’s proposal is clearly preferable; it
could be easily implemented and monitored, would not involve large new
bureaucracies, would be much more transparent and less susceptible to
rent-seeking, would provide market signals on GHGs while having no
fiscal impact, would be grounded in the principle that the atmosphere
is owned by citizens and not government (or by corporations that are
given or purchase rights to emit GHGs), and, by being refunded per
capita to citizens would be generally progressive.

Third, as for your criticisms of Hansen’s proposal:

– carbon taxes will hit coal use more heavily than petroluem or
natural gas, so focussing first on “pain at the pump” smacks of
pandering, especially as revenue recycling may eliminate the pain
completely;

– older, dirtier coal plants are already uneconomic and generate
tremendous costs to health and property that are not costed to
producers or consumers; taxing carbon is a great way to end some of the
nonsense incentivized by the CAA. Your speculation about power supply
and electricity prices is nothing more than speculation, but oil and
gas-fired plants could be brought on line relatively quickly;

– as for the “green stimulus” effect, it is ironic that you fail to
see that the fact that “There is no guarantee people will use their
dividends to buy hybrid cars, energy-efficient appliances, or green
energy” is in fact an argument IN FAVOR of rebated carbon taxes as
opposed to cap and trade, as the first allows much greater economic
freedom and is thus more conducive to wealth creation. Further, not
only is dividending the tax proceeds a great way to make sure that the
government doesn’t have an even larger pot to dole out mandates,
subsidies and other goodies to favored industries, but the right could
trade its acceptance for such a tax for elimination of existing
subsidies to ethanol and solar.

– your point about labor productivity is fair, but it ignores the
social cost of carbon. Has forcing polluting industries for the ’60s on
benefitted society and improved productivity as a whole the whole? Or
is it simply more important to allow certain classes of producers and
consumers to profit while continuing to shift costs to others?

– as for “massive” transfers, this is all “would” and “could”
without any backing, and it completely ignores all of the massive
wealth transfers involved in the way we presently regulate power
generation and energy (and have refused to regulate GHGs). I’m happy to
have more information, but let’s not forget that the whole purpose is
to have a closer alignment between profits/benefits and social costs.

Henry Payne (cartoonist at the Detroit News and commentator at NRO) has a interesting post up on Feb. 18 at NRO’s enviro-bashing “Planet Gore” website: “Obama’s Washington Is the Enemy of Auto-Industry Reform“.  In it, Payne does a remarkable job of side-stepping the long history of the auto mess (poor governance, intransigent labor, counterproductive Washington meddling and competition from foreign automakers) and focussing on the blame that the Obama administration and “Washington Democrats” are likely to earn from further counterproductive policy.  In particular, he seems exercised that Dems are unlikely to eliminate the inefficient and costly CAFE standards.

Well, this seemed a little more myopic than I could stand, so I sent Mr. Payne the following note:

Henry, what did you expect to happen?  You can blame Dems for the mistakes that they will make, but Republicans are no better at governing, and it’s the car cos and the unions that are responsible for their current predicaments and unwillingness to budge.

“there will be no elimination of costly CAFE laws. It is shocking, in fact, that Washington Democrats are unwilling to even consider this fundamental, multi-billion-dollar reform. “

As for this, you are probably right – not the least because the Bush administration failed to act on climate change so enviro won the Supreme Court case that Jon Adler says essentially forces the EPA to do more of the same – but is anyone actually making a proposal that would include eliminating CAFE? 

But in this vein, back in the Bush heyday when Republicans had both houses of Congress, I’m sure Dems/enviros would have loved to trade away CAFE for rebated carbon taxes, or for improving power competition/smart grid a la Paul Joskow/Lynne Kiesling.  They might have even given up corporate income taxes entirely for such alternate revenues.  It is shocking, in fact, that Washington Republicans were unwilling to even consider this fundamental, multi-billion-dollar reform, that would have eliminated CAFE and avoided C&T pork and subsidies of the type that Obama and guys like Pickens wants.

But instead of even-handedness and looking for win-win deals, you can keep bashing Dems.  Good luck with that now, after Bush strong-armed Greenspan into creating this bubble, did a bunch of other nonsense and thus empowered Dems to finish off the job wrecking the economy – in order to “save” it.

While thinking creatively might not be easy, it’s a start at actually succeeding.

Best,

Tom

[Note:  Although the giant snakes I mentioned in my preceding post may have fat tails, I didn’t want my description of the discussion between Harvard`s Martin Weitzman and Yale`s William Nordhaus of the limits of cost-benefit analysis to be overlooked, so I have largely copied it below.  I’ve added an introduction, as well as a few links.]

“Fat tails” seem to be the rage these days, as Bill Safire noted last week in the NYT.  But what are “fat tails”?  Notes Safire,

To comprehend what fat tail is in
today’s media wringer, think of a bell curve, the line on a
statistician’s chart that reflects “normal distribution.” It is tall
and wide in the middle — where most people and things being studied
almost always tend to be — and drops and flattens out at the bottom,
where fewer are, making a shape on a graph resembling a bell. The
extremities at the bottom left and right are called the tails; when
they balloon instead of nearly vanishing as expected, the tails have
been designated “heavy” and, more recently, the more pejorative “fat.”
To a credit-agency statistician now living in a world of chagrin, the
alliterative definition of a fat tail is “an abnormal agglomeration of angst.”

In
an eye-popping Times Magazine article last month titled “Risk
Mismanagement,” Joe Nocera, a business columnist for The Times, focused
on the passionate, prescient warnings of the former options trader
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, author of “The Black Swan” and “Fooled by
Randomness,” who popularized the phrase now in vogue in its
financial-­statistics sense. Nocera wrote: “What will cause you to lose
billions instead of millions? Something rare, something you’ve never
considered a possibility. Taleb calls these events ‘fat tails’
or ‘black swans,’ and he is convinced that they take place far more
frequently than most human beings are willing to contemplate.”

If I make quibble with Safire’s description; “fat” refers not to the probabilty distribution ballooning on either tail, but refers to the case that the tail probability does not decline quickly to zero (viz., probability approaches zero more slowly than exponentially).

*   *   *

The size of the giant snakes and the much higher temperatures (and GHG levels) at their time (60 million years ago) and shortly after during the PETM (a perod 56 million years ago temperatures shot up by 5° Celsius / 9° F in less than 10,000 years) tell us no simply that climate is sensitive
(on geological scales, sometimes rather short-term) to atmospheric
levels of carbon and methane, but  remind us that there is a “fat tail” of uncertain climate change risks
posed by mankind`s ramped up efforts to release as much as possible of
the CO2 that has been stored up in the form of fossil fuels, methane
and limestone over millions years.  

I have mentioned the issue of “fat tails” previously,
in connection with attempts at applying cost – benefit analysis (CBA)
to determine whether to tax CO2 emissions.  While economists like
Yale`s William Nordhaus who have applied CBA to climate policy have been saying for decades that taxing carbon makes sense on a net basis, our own Bob Murphy has criticized Nordhaus`s approach on rather narrow (and decidedly non-Austrian) grounds.

But Nordhaus has also been strongly criticized by economists such as Harvard`s Martin Weitzman,
who basically argue that Nordhaus has UNDERSOLD the case for carbon
pricing or that the results of such CBA imply a greater certainty of
knowledge (and complacency) than is deserved.  Weitzman points out
basic difficulties inherent in applying CBA to policies addressing
climate change, particularly where there seems to be a grave
possibility that we do not understand how drastically the climate might
respond to our influences.  Weitzman`s comments (scheduled to appear in
the February issue of The Review of Economics and Statistics) were the focus of the lead essay by Jim Manzi in Cato Unbound`s August 2008 issue, which I reviewed.

Nordhaus has since responded to Weitzman in a comment that became available in January; this time with Bob Murphy stepped in as a defender of CBA!  I note that Ron Bailey, science correspondent at Reason online, has just published a piece examining Weitzman’s paper last year and Nordhaus’s recent comments.

Weitzman has now replied to Nordhaus, and has kindly permitted me to
quote from a draft of his reply (which he has out for review).  It seems that Weitzman
provides a compelling statement of some the limits of CBA, as applied
to climate change.  (NB:  Weitzman`s draft response is a .pdf file that I cannot upload, though I have uploaded a version converted to .txt format.  I am happy to forward the .pdf to any interested readers.)

Weitzman`s criticisms of the limits of CBA ought to resonate with Austrian concerns about complexity, limits of knowledge and the difficulty of prediction — even as Weitzman (and Nordhaus and, indeed, Bob Murphy) completely fail to consider the fundamental problems of conflicting preferences in the absence of property rights and of the likelihood that rent-seeking with corrupt governmental policy responses.

The rest of the post sets those of Weitzman`s key points that I consider most salient to a discussion among laymen:

“there is enormous structural uncertainty about the economics of extreme climate change,
which, if not unique, is pretty rare. I will argue on intuitive grounds
that the way in which this deep structural uncertainty is
conceptualized and formalized should influence substantially the
outcomes of any reasonable CBA (or IAM) of climate change. Further, I
will argue that the seeming fact that this deep structural
uncertainty does not influence substantially outcomes from the
“standard” CBA hints at an implausible treatment of uncertainty.”

“The
pre-industrial-revolution level of atmospheric CO2 (about two centuries
ago) was

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about280 parts per million (ppm). The ice-core data show that
carbon dioxide was within a range roughly between

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≈180 and

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≈280 ppm
during the last 800,000 years. Currently, CO2 is at

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≈385 ppm, and
climbing steeply. Methane was never higher than

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≈750 parts per billion
(ppb) in 800,000 years, but now this extremely potent GHG, which is
thirty times more powerful than CO2, is at

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≈1,780 ppb. The sum total of
all carbon-dioxide-equivalent (CO2-e) GHGs is currently at

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≈435 ppm.
Even more alarming in the 800,000-year record is the rate of change of
GHGs, with increases in CO2 being below (and typically well below)

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≈40
ppm within any past sub-period of ten thousand years, while now CO2 has
risen by

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≈40 ppm in just the last quarter century.

Thus, anthropogenic
activity has elevated atmospheric CO2 and CH4 to levels extraordinarily
far outside their natural range – and at a stupendously rapid rate. The
scale and speed of recent GHG increases makes predictions of future
climate change highly uncertain.  There is no analogue for anything
like this happening in the past geological record. Therefore, we do not
really know with much confidence what will happen next.”

“To keep atmospheric CO2 levels at twice pre-industrial-revolution levels would require not just stable but sharply declining emissions within a few decades from now. Forecasting
ahead a century or two, the levels of atmospheric GHGs that may
ultimately be attained (unless drastic measures are undertaken) have
likely not existed for tens of millions of years and the rate of change
will likely be unique on a time scale of hundreds of millions of years.

Remarkably,
the “standard”CBA of climate change takes essentially no account of the
extraordinary magnitude of the scale and speed of these unprecedented
changes in GHGs – and the extraordinary uncertainties they create for
any believable economic analysis of climate change. Perhaps even
more astonishing is the fact that the “policy ramp” of gradually
tightening emissions, which emerges from the “standard” CBA, attains
stabilization at levels of CO2-e GHGs that approach

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≈700 ppm. The
“standard” CBA [of Nordhaus] thus recommends imposing an impulse or
shock to the Earth’s system by geologically-instantaneously jolting
atmospheric stocks of GHGs up to

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≈21/2 times their highest past level
over the last 800,000 years – without even mentioning what an
unprecedented planetary experiment such an “optimal” policy would
entail.”

“So-called
“climate sensitivity” (hereafter denoted S1) is a key macro-indicator
of the eventual temperature response to GHG changes. Climate
sensitivity is defi…ned as the global average surface warming following
a doubling of carbon dioxide concentrations. … the median upper 5%
probability level over all 22 climate-sensitivity studies cited in
IPCC-AR4 (2007) is 6.4° C – and this stylized fact alone is telling.
Glancing at Table 9.3 and Box 10.2 of IPCC-AR4, it is apparent that the
upper tails of these 22 PDFs tend to be sufficiently long and heavy
with probability that one is allowed from a simplistically-aggregated
PDF of these 22 studies the rough approximation P[S1>10° C]

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≈1%. The
actual empirical reason why these upper tails are long and heavy with
probability dovetails nicely with the theory of my paper: inductive
knowledge is always useful, of course, but simultaneously it is limited
in what it can tell us about extreme events outside the range of
experience – in which case one is forced back onto depending more than
one might wish upon the prior PDF, which of necessity is largely
subjective and relatively diffuse. As a recent Science commentary put
it: “Once the world has warmed by 4° C, conditions will be so
different from anything we can observe today (and still more different
from the last ice age) that it is inherently hard to say where the
warming will stop.”

“Exhibit C” concerns possibly disastrous releases over the long run of bad-feedback components
of the carbon cycle that are currently omitted from most general
circulation models. The chief worry here is a significant supplementary
component that conceptually should be added on to climate sensitivity
S1. This omitted component concerns the potentially powerful
self-amplification potential of greenhouse warming due to heat-induced
releases of sequestered carbon. … Over the long run, a CH4
outgassing-amplifier process could potentially precipitate a
cataclysmic strong-positive-feedback warming. This real physical
basis for a highly unsure but truly catastrophic scenario is my Exhibit
C in the case that conventional CBAs and IAMs do not adequately cover
the deep structural uncertainties associated with possible
climate-change disasters.  Other examples of an actual real physical
basis for a catastrophic outcome could be cited, but this one will do
here.  The real physical possibility of endogenous heat-triggered
releases at high temperatures of the enormous amounts of
naturally-sequestered GHGs is a good example of indirect carbon-cycle
feedback effects that I think should be included in the abstract
interpretation of a concept of “climate sensitivity” that is relevant
here. What matters for the economics of climate change is the
reduced-form relationship between atmospheric stocks of
anthropogenically-injected CO2-e GHGs and temperature change. … When
fed into an economic analysis, the great open-ended uncertainty about
eventual mean planetary temperature change cascades into
yet-much-greater yet-much-more-open-ended uncertainty about eventual
changes in welfare.”

“Exhibit
D” concerns what I view as an unusually cavalier treatment of damages or
disutilities from extreme temperature changes. The “standard” CBA
treats high-temperature damages by a rather passive extrapolation of
whatever specification is assumed (typically arbitrarily) to be the
low-temperature “damages function.”  … Seemingly minor changes in
the specification of high-temperature damages can dramatically alter
the gradualist policy ramp outcomes recommended by the “standard” CBA.
Such fragility of policy to postulated forms of disutility functions
are my Exhibit D in making the case that the “standard” CBA does not
adequately cope with deep structural uncertainty – here structural
uncertainty about the specification of damages.”

“An
experiment without precedent is being performed on planet Earth by
subjecting the world to the shock of a geologically-instantaneous
injection of massive amounts of GHGs. Yet the “standard” CBA seems
almost oblivious to the extraordinarily uncertain consequences of
catastrophic climate change.”

“Almost
nothing in our world has a probability of exactly zero or exactly one.
What is worrisome is not the fact that extreme tails are long per se
(reflecting
the fact that a meaningful upper bound on disutility does not exist),
but that they are fat (with probability density). The critical
question is how fast does the probability of a catastrophe decline
relative to the welfare impact of the catastrophe. Other things being
equal, a thin-tailed PDF is of less concern because the probability of
the bad event declines exponentially (or faster). A fat-tailed
distribution, where the probability declines polynomially, can be much
more worrisome. … To put a sharp point on this seemingly abstract issue, the
thin-tailed PDFs that Nordhaus requires implicitly to support his
gradualist “policy ramp” conclusions have some theoretical tendency to
morph into being fat tailed when he admits that he is fuzzy about the
functional forms or structural parameters of his assumed thin-tailed
PDFs – at least for high temperatures. … When one combines fat
tails in the PDF of the logarithm of welfare-equivalent consumption
with a utility function that is sensitive to high damages from extreme
temperatures, it will tend to make the willingness to pay (WTP) to
avoid extreme climate changes very large.”

“Presumably
the PDF in the bad fat tail is thinned, or even truncated, perhaps from
considerations akin to what lies behind the value of a statistical life
(VSL). (After all, we would not pay an infinite amount to eliminate
altogether the fat tail of climate-change catastrophes.) Alas, in
whatever way the bad fat tail is thinned or truncated, a CBA based upon
it remains highly sensitive to the details of the thinning or
truncation mechanism, because the disutility of extreme climate change
has “essentially” unlimited liability. In this sense climate change
is unique (or at least very rare) because the conclusions from a CBA
for such an unlimited-liability situation have some built-in tendency
to be non-robust to assumed tail fatness.”

“Reasonable
attempts to constrict the fatness of the “bad” tail can still leave us
with uncomfortably big numbers, whose exact value depends non-robustly
upon artificial constraints, functional forms, or parameters that we
really do not understand. The only legitimate way to avoid this
potential problem is when there exists strong a priori knowledge that
restrains the extent of total damages. If a particular type of
idiosyncratic uncertainty affects only one small part of an
individual’s or a society’s overall portfolio of assets, exposure is
naturally limited to that specific component and bad-tail fatness is
not such a paramount concern. However, some very few but very
important real-world situations have potentially unlimited exposure due
to structural uncertainty about their potentially open-ended
catastrophic reach. Climate change potentially affects the whole
worldwide portfolio of utility by threatening to drive all of planetary
welfare to disastrously low levels in the most extreme scenarios.”

“Conclusions
from CBA [are] more fuzzy than we might prefer, because they are
dependent on essentially arbitrary decisions about how the fat tails
are expressed and about how the damages from high temperatures are
specified. I would make a strong distinction between thin-tailed
CBA, where there is no reason in principle that outcomes should not be
robust, and fat-tailed CBA, where even in principle outcomes are
highly sensitive to functional forms and parameter values. For ordinary
run-of-the-mill limited exposure or thin-tailed situations, there is at
least the underlying theoretical reassurance that finite-cutoff-based
CBA might (at least in principle) be an arbitrarily-close approximation
to something that is accurate and objective. In fat-tailed unlimited
exposure situations, by contrast, there is no such theoretical
assurance underpinning the arbitrary cutoffs or attenuations – and
therefore CBA outcomes have a theoretical tendency to be sensitive to
fragile assumptions about the likelihood of extreme impacts and how
much disutility they cause.”

“My
target is not CBA in general, but the particular false precision
conveyed by the misplaced concreteness of the “standard” CBA of climate
change. By all means plug in tail probabilities, plug in disutilities
of high impacts, plug in rates of pure time preference, and so forth,
and then see what emerges empirically. Only please do not be surprised
when outcomes from fat-tailed CBA are fragile to specifications
concerning catastrophic extremes.  The extraordinary magnitude of the
deep structural uncertainties involved in climate-change CBA, and the
implied limitations that prevent CBA from reaching robust conclusions,
are highly frustrating for most economists, and in my view may even
push some into a state of denial. After all, economists make a living
from plugging rough numbers into simple models and reaching specific
conclusions (more or less) on the basis of these numbers. What are we
supposed to tell policy makers and politicians if our conclusions are
ambiguous and fragile?”

“It is
threatening for economists to have to admit that the structural
uncertainties and unlimited liabilities of climate change run so deep
that gung-ho “can do” economics may be up against limits on the ability of quantitative analysis to give robust advice in such a grey area. But if this is the way things are with the economics of climate change, then this is the way things are – and non-robustness to subjective assumptions is an inconvenient truth to be lived with rather than a fact to be denied or evaded
just because it looks less scientif…cally objective in CBA. In my
opinion, we economists need to admit to the policy makers, the
politicians, and the public that CBA of climate change is unusual
in being especially fuzzy because it depends especially sensitively on
what is subjectively assumed about the high-temperature damages
function, along with subjective judgements about the fatness of the
extreme tails and/or where they have effectively been cut off.
Policy makers and the public will just have to deal with the idea that
CBA of climate change is less crisp (maybe I should say even less
crisp) than CBAs of more conventional situations.”

“The
moral of the dismal theorem is that under extreme uncertainty,
seemingly casual decisions about functional forms, parameter values,
and tail thickness may be dominant. We economists should not pursue
a narrow, superficially precise, analysis by blowing away the
low-probability high-impact catastrophic scenarios as if this is a
necessary price we must pay for the worthy goal of giving crisp advice.
An artificial infatuation with precision is likely to make our analysis
go seriously askew and to undermine the credibility of what we say by
effectively marginalizing the very possibilities that make climate
change grave in the first place.“

“The
issue of how to deal with the deep structural uncertainties in climate
change would be completely different and immensely simpler if systemic
inertias (like the time required for the system to naturally remove
extra atmospheric CO2) were short (as is the case for SO2;
particulates, and many other airborne pollutants). Then an important
part of an optimal strategy would presumably be along the lines of
“wait and see.” With strong reversibility, an optimal
climate-change policy should logically involve (among other elements)
waiting to see how far out on the bad fat tail the planet will end up,
followed by midcourse corrections if we seem to be headed for a
disaster. This is the ultimate backstop rebuttal of DT given by some
critics of fat-tailed reasoning, including Nordhaus. Alas, the problem
of climate change is characterized everywhere by immensely long
inertias – in atmospheric CO2 removal times, in the capacity of the
oceans to absorb heat (as well as CO2), and in many other relevant
physical and biological processes. Therefore, it is an open question
whether or not we could learn enough in sufficient time to make
politically feasible midcourse corrections. When the critics are
gambling on this midcourse-correction learning mechanism to undercut
the message of DT, they are relying more on an article of faith than on
any kind of evidence-based scientific argument.

“I
think the actual scientific facts behind the alleged feasibility of
“wait and see”policies are, if anything, additional evidence for the
importance of fat-tailed irreversible uncertainty about ultimate
climate change.

“The
relevance of “wait and see”policies is an important unresolved issue,
which in principle could decide the debate between me and Nordhaus, but
my own take right now would be that the built-in pipeline inertias
are so great that if and when we detect that we are heading for
unacceptable climate change, it will likely prove too late to do
anything much about it for centuries to come thereafter (except,
possibly, for lowering temperatures by geoengineering the atmosphere to
reflect back incoming solar radiation). In any event, I see this whole
“wait and see” issue as yet another component of fat-tailed uncertainty
– rather than being a reliable backstop strategy for dealing with
excessive CO2 in the atmosphere.

Nordhaus
states that there are so many low-probability catastrophic-impact
scenarios around that ‘if we accept the Dismal Theorem, we would
probably dissolve in a sea of anxiety at the prospect of the infinity
of infinitely bad outcomes.’ This is rhetorical excess and, more to the
point here, it is fallacious. Most of the examples Nordhaus gives have
such miniscule thin-tailed probabilities that they can be written off.”

“Nordhaus
summarizes his critique with the idea there are indeed deep
uncertainties about virtually every aspect of the natural and social
sciences of climate change – but these uncertainties can only be
resolved by continued careful analysis of data and theories. I heartily
endorse his constructive attitude about the necessity of further
research targeted toward a goal of resolving as much of the uncertainty
as it is humanly possible to resolve. I would just add that we
should also recognize the reality that, for now and perhaps for some
time to come, the sheer magnitude of the deep structural uncertainties,
and the way we express them in our models, will likely dominate
plausible applications of CBA to the economics of climate change.”

(emphasis added)

Giant snakes?  What could a few colossal bones found in Colombia have to do with us now?

1.  A recent paper in Nature about the discovery of several specimens of a giant snake (“Titanoboa”) that lived in Latin America 60 million years ago captured attention last week, including among climate change bloggers (yes, “skeptics” too).  Why?  Not only because the snakes were enormous (more than 40 feet and over a ton) – making anacondas look like garter snakes – but because their size appears to tell us something about the climate about during the Paleocene.  Based on existing knowledge of the size, metabolism and temperature tolerances of  snakes, scientists believe that the size of the snake appears to indicate that not only was the world overall quite warm during the Paleocene (with palms growing at the poles), but that average temperatures in the tropics would have been from 3° to 5° Celsius (5° to 9° F) warmer than they are today in order for such large snakes to  survive.

The period in which these snakes lived was followed a few million years later by the Paleocene – Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM) in 56 million BC, when a pulse of CO2 and methane drove already warm temperatures sharply higher (by 5° Celsius / 9° F) in less than 10,000 years. During the PETM, CO2 levels rose to about 2000 ppm, or roughly 6 times  where they are now. The PETM resulted in a massive extinction of species.

The size of the snakes and the temperatures at their time and shortly after during the PETM also tell us that climate is sensitive (on geological scales, sometimes rather short-term) to atmospheric levels of carbon and methane – and remind us that there is a “fat tail” of uncertain climate change risks posed by mankind`s ramped up efforts to release as much as possible of the CO2 that has been stored up in the form of fossil fuels, methane and limestone over millions years.  

2.  I have mentioned the issue of “fat tails” previously, in connection with attempts at applying cost – benefit analysis (CBA) to determine whether to tax CO2 emissions.  While economists like Yale`s William Nordhaus who have applied CBA to climate policy have been saying for decades that taxing carbon makes sense on a net basis, our own Bob Murphy has criticized Nordhaus`s approach on rather narrow (and decidedly non-Austrian) grounds.

But Nordhaus has also been strongly criticized by economists such as Harvard`s Martin Weitzman, who basically argue that Nordhaus has UNDERSOLD the case for carbon pricing or that the results of such CBA imply a greater certainty of knowledge (and complacency) than is deserved.  Weitzman points out basic difficulties inherent in applying CBA to policies addressing climate change, particularly where there seems to be a grave possibility that we do not understand how drastically the climate might respond to our influences.  Weitzman`s comments (scheduled to appear in the February issue of The Review of Economics and Statistics) were the focus of the lead essay by Jim Manzi in Cato Unbound`s August 2008 issue, which I reviewed.

Nordhaus has since responded to Weitzman, and this time with Bob Murphy stepped in as a defender of CBA.  Weitzman has now replied to Nordhaus, and has kindly permitted me to quote from the current draft of such reply.  It seems that Weitzman provides a compelling statement of some the limits of CBA, as applied to climate change. It seems to me that any Austrian ought to be sympathetic to Weitzman`s criticisms of the limits of CBA.

(NB:  Weitzman`s draft response is a .pdf file that I cannot upload, though I have uploaded a version convert to .txt format.  I am happy to forward the .pdf to any interested readers.)

The rest of the post sets out the most salient (for a layman) of Weitzman`s key points:

“there is enormous structural uncertainty about the economics of extreme climate change,
which, if not unique, is pretty rare. I will argue on intuitive grounds
that the way in which this deep structural uncertainty is
conceptualized and formalized should influence substantially the
outcomes of any reasonable CBA (or IAM) of climate change. Further, I
will argue that the seeming fact that this deep structural
uncertainty does not influence substantially outcomes from the
“standard” CBA hints at an implausible treatment of uncertainty.”

“The
pre-industrial-revolution level of atmospheric CO2 (about two centuries
ago) was

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about280 parts per million (ppm). The ice-core data show that
carbon dioxide was within a range roughly between

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≈180 and

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≈280 ppm
during the last 800,000 years. Currently, CO2 is at

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≈385 ppm, and
climbing steeply. Methane was never higher than

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≈750 parts per billion
(ppb) in 800,000 years, but now this extremely potent GHG, which is
thirty times more powerful than CO2, is at

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≈1,780 ppb. The sum total of
all carbon-dioxide-equivalent (CO2-e) GHGs is currently at

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≈435 ppm.
Even more alarming in the 800,000-year record is the rate of change of
GHGs, with increases in CO2 being below (and typically well below)

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≈40
ppm within any past sub-period of ten thousand years, while now CO2 has
risen by

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≈40 ppm in just the last quarter century.

Thus, anthropogenic
activity has elevated atmospheric CO2 and CH4 to levels extraordinarily
far outside their natural range – and at a stupendously rapid rate. The
scale and speed of recent GHG increases makes predictions of future
climate change highly uncertain.  There is no analogue for anything
like this happening in the past geological record. Therefore, we do not
really know with much confidence what will happen next.”

“To keep atmospheric CO2 levels at twice pre-industrial-revolution levels would require not just stable but sharply declining emissions within a few decades from now. Forecasting
ahead a century or two, the levels of atmospheric GHGs that may
ultimately be attained (unless drastic measures are undertaken) have
likely not existed for tens of millions of years and the rate of change
will likely be unique on a time scale of hundreds of millions of years.

Remarkably,
the “standard”CBA of climate change takes essentially no account of the
extraordinary magnitude of the scale and speed of these unprecedented
changes in GHGs – and the extraordinary uncertainties they create for
any believable economic analysis of climate change. Perhaps even
more astonishing is the fact that the “policy ramp” of gradually
tightening emissions, which emerges from the “standard” CBA, attains
stabilization at levels of CO2-e GHGs that approach

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≈700 ppm. The
“standard” CBA [of Nordhaus] thus recommends imposing an impulse or
shock to the Earth’s system by geologically-instantaneously jolting
atmospheric stocks of GHGs up to

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≈21/2 times their highest past level
over the last 800,000 years – without even mentioning what an
unprecedented planetary experiment such an “optimal” policy would
entail.”

“So-called
“climate sensitivity” (hereafter denoted S1) is a key macro-indicator
of the eventual temperature response to GHG changes. Climate
sensitivity is defi…ned as the global average surface warming following
a doubling of carbon dioxide concentrations. … the median upper 5%
probability level over all 22 climate-sensitivity studies cited in
IPCC-AR4 (2007) is 6.4° C – and this stylized fact alone is telling.
Glancing at Table 9.3 and Box 10.2 of IPCC-AR4, it is apparent that the
upper tails of these 22 PDFs tend to be sufficiently long and heavy
with probability that one is allowed from a simplistically-aggregated
PDF of these 22 studies the rough approximation P[S1>10° C]

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≈1%. The
actual empirical reason why these upper tails are long and heavy with
probability dovetails nicely with the theory of my paper: inductive
knowledge is always useful, of course, but simultaneously it is limited
in what it can tell us about extreme events outside the range of
experience – in which case one is forced back onto depending more than
one might wish upon the prior PDF, which of necessity is largely
subjective and relatively diffuse. As a recent Science commentary put
it: “Once the world has warmed by 4° C, conditions will be so
different from anything we can observe today (and still more different
from the last ice age) that it is inherently hard to say where the
warming will stop.”

“Exhibit C” concerns possibly disastrous releases over the long run of bad-feedback components
of the carbon cycle that are currently omitted from most general
circulation models. The chief worry here is a significant supplementary
component that conceptually should be added on to climate sensitivity
S1. This omitted component concerns the potentially powerful
self-amplification potential of greenhouse warming due to heat-induced
releases of sequestered carbon. … Over the long run, a CH4
outgassing-amplifier process could potentially precipitate a
cataclysmic strong-positive-feedback warming. This real physical
basis for a highly unsure but truly catastrophic scenario is my Exhibit
C in the case that conventional CBAs and IAMs do not adequately cover
the deep structural uncertainties associated with possible
climate-change disasters.  Other examples of an actual real physical
basis for a catastrophic outcome could be cited, but this one will do
here.  The real physical possibility of endogenous heat-triggered
releases at high temperatures of the enormous amounts of
naturally-sequestered GHGs is a good example of indirect carbon-cycle
feedback effects that I think should be included in the abstract
interpretation of a concept of “climate sensitivity” that is relevant
here. What matters for the economics of climate change is the
reduced-form relationship between atmospheric stocks of
anthropogenically-injected CO2-e GHGs and temperature change. … When
fed into an economic analysis, the great open-ended uncertainty about
eventual mean planetary temperature change cascades into
yet-much-greater yet-much-more-open-ended uncertainty about eventual
changes in welfare.”

“Exhibit
D” concerns what I view as an unusually cavalier treatment of damages or
disutilities from extreme temperature changes. The “standard” CBA
treats high-temperature damages by a rather passive extrapolation of
whatever specification is assumed (typically arbitrarily) to be the
low-temperature “damages function.”  … Seemingly minor changes in
the specification of high-temperature damages can dramatically alter
the gradualist policy ramp outcomes recommended by the “standard” CBA.
Such fragility of policy to postulated forms of disutility functions
are my Exhibit D in making the case that the “standard” CBA does not
adequately cope with deep structural uncertainty – here structural
uncertainty about the specification of damages.”

“An
experiment without precedent is being performed on planet Earth by
subjecting the world to the shock of a geologically-instantaneous
injection of massive amounts of GHGs. Yet the “standard” CBA seems
almost oblivious to the extraordinarily uncertain consequences of
catastrophic climate change.”

“Almost
nothing in our world has a probability of exactly zero or exactly one.
What is worrisome is not the fact that extreme tails are long per se
(reflecting
the fact that a meaningful upper bound on disutility does not exist),
but that they are fat (with probability density). The critical
question is how fast does the probability of a catastrophe decline
relative to the welfare impact of the catastrophe. Other things being
equal, a thin-tailed PDF is of less concern because the probability of
the bad event declines exponentially (or faster). A fat-tailed
distribution, where the probability declines polynomially, can be much
more worrisome. … To put a sharp point on this seemingly abstract issue, the
thin-tailed PDFs that Nordhaus requires implicitly to support his
gradualist “policy ramp” conclusions have some theoretical tendency to
morph into being fat tailed when he admits that he is fuzzy about the
functional forms or structural parameters of his assumed thin-tailed
PDFs – at least for high temperatures. … When one combines fat
tails in the PDF of the logarithm of welfare-equivalent consumption
with a utility function that is sensitive to high damages from extreme
temperatures, it will tend to make the willingness to pay (WTP) to
avoid extreme climate changes very large.”

“Presumably
the PDF in the bad fat tail is thinned, or even truncated, perhaps from
considerations akin to what lies behind the value of a statistical life
(VSL). (After all, we would not pay an infinite amount to eliminate
altogether the fat tail of climate-change catastrophes.) Alas, in
whatever way the bad fat tail is thinned or truncated, a CBA based upon
it remains highly sensitive to the details of the thinning or
truncation mechanism, because the disutility of extreme climate change
has “essentially” unlimited liability. In this sense climate change
is unique (or at least very rare) because the conclusions from a CBA
for such an unlimited-liability situation have some built-in tendency
to be non-robust to assumed tail fatness.”

“Reasonable
attempts to constrict the fatness of the “bad” tail can still leave us
with uncomfortably big numbers, whose exact value depends non-robustly
upon artificial constraints, functional forms, or parameters that we
really do not understand. The only legitimate way to avoid this
potential problem is when there exists strong a priori knowledge that
restrains the extent of total damages. If a particular type of
idiosyncratic uncertainty affects only one small part of an
individual’s or a society’s overall portfolio of assets, exposure is
naturally limited to that specific component and bad-tail fatness is
not such a paramount concern. However, some very few but very
important real-world situations have potentially unlimited exposure due
to structural uncertainty about their potentially open-ended
catastrophic reach. Climate change potentially affects the whole
worldwide portfolio of utility by threatening to drive all of planetary
welfare to disastrously low levels in the most extreme scenarios.”

“Conclusions
from CBA [are] more fuzzy than we might prefer, because they are
dependent on essentially arbitrary decisions about how the fat tails
are expressed and about how the damages from high temperatures are
specified. I would make a strong distinction between thin-tailed
CBA, where there is no reason in principle that outcomes should not be
robust, and fat-tailed CBA, where even in principle outcomes are
highly sensitive to functional forms and parameter values. For ordinary
run-of-the-mill limited exposure or thin-tailed situations, there is at
least the underlying theoretical reassurance that finite-cutoff-based
CBA might (at least in principle) be an arbitrarily-close approximation
to something that is accurate and objective. In fat-tailed unlimited
exposure situations, by contrast, there is no such theoretical
assurance underpinning the arbitrary cutoffs or attenuations – and
therefore CBA outcomes have a theoretical tendency to be sensitive to
fragile assumptions about the likelihood of extreme impacts and how
much disutility they cause.”

“My
target is not CBA in general, but the particular false precision
conveyed by the misplaced concreteness of the “standard” CBA of climate
change. By all means plug in tail probabilities, plug in disutilities
of high impacts, plug in rates of pure time preference, and so forth,
and then see what emerges empirically. Only please do not be surprised
when outcomes from fat-tailed CBA are fragile to specifications
concerning catastrophic extremes.  The extraordinary magnitude of the
deep structural uncertainties involved in climate-change CBA, and the
implied limitations that prevent CBA from reaching robust conclusions,
are highly frustrating for most economists, and in my view may even
push some into a state of denial. After all, economists make a living
from plugging rough numbers into simple models and reaching specific
conclusions (more or less) on the basis of these numbers. What are we
supposed to tell policy makers and politicians if our conclusions are
ambiguous and fragile?”

“It is
threatening for economists to have to admit that the structural
uncertainties and unlimited liabilities of climate change run so deep
that gung-ho “can do” economics may be up against limits on the ability of quantitative analysis to give robust advice in such a grey area. But if this is the way things are with the economics of climate change, then this is the way things are – and non-robustness to subjective assumptions is an inconvenient truth to be lived with rather than a fact to be denied or evaded
just because it looks less scientif…cally objective in CBA. In my
opinion, we economists need to admit to the policy makers, the
politicians, and the public that CBA of climate change is unusual
in being especially fuzzy because it depends especially sensitively on
what is subjectively assumed about the high-temperature damages
function, along with subjective judgements about the fatness of the
extreme tails and/or where they have effectively been cut off.
Policy makers and the public will just have to deal with the idea that
CBA of climate change is less crisp (maybe I should say even less
crisp) than CBAs of more conventional situations.”

“The
moral of the dismal theorem is that under extreme uncertainty,
seemingly casual decisions about functional forms, parameter values,
and tail thickness may be dominant. We economists should not pursue
a narrow, superficially precise, analysis by blowing away the
low-probability high-impact catastrophic scenarios as if this is a
necessary price we must pay for the worthy goal of giving crisp advice.
An artificial infatuation with precision is likely to make our analysis
go seriously askew and to undermine the credibility of what we say by
effectively marginalizing the very possibilities that make climate
change grave in the first place.“

“The
issue of how to deal with the deep structural uncertainties in climate
change would be completely different and immensely simpler if systemic
inertias (like the time required for the system to naturally remove
extra atmospheric CO2) were short (as is the case for SO2;
particulates, and many other airborne pollutants). Then an important
part of an optimal strategy would presumably be along the lines of
“wait and see.” With strong reversibility, an optimal
climate-change policy should logically involve (among other elements)
waiting to see how far out on the bad fat tail the planet will end up,
followed by midcourse corrections if we seem to be headed for a
disaster. This is the ultimate backstop rebuttal of DT given by some
critics of fat-tailed reasoning, including Nordhaus. Alas, the problem
of climate change is characterized everywhere by immensely long
inertias – in atmospheric CO2 removal times, in the capacity of the
oceans to absorb heat (as well as CO2), and in many other relevant
physical and biological processes. Therefore, it is an open question
whether or not we could learn enough in sufficient time to make
politically feasible midcourse corrections. When the critics are
gambling on this midcourse-correction learning mechanism to undercut
the message of DT, they are relying more on an article of faith than on
any kind of evidence-based scientific argument.

“I
think the actual scientific facts behind the alleged feasibility of
“wait and see”policies are, if anything, additional evidence for the
importance of fat-tailed irreversible uncertainty about ultimate
climate change.

“The
relevance of “wait and see”policies is an important unresolved issue,
which in principle could decide the debate between me and Nordhaus, but
my own take right now would be that the built-in pipeline inertias
are so great that if and when we detect that we are heading for
unacceptable climate change, it will likely prove too late to do
anything much about it for centuries to come thereafter (except,
possibly, for lowering temperatures by geoengineering the atmosphere to
reflect back incoming solar radiation). In any event, I see this whole
“wait and see” issue as yet another component of fat-tailed uncertainty
– rather than being a reliable backstop strategy for dealing with
excessive CO2 in the atmosphere.

Nordhaus
states that there are so many low-probability catastrophic-impact
scenarios around that ‘if we accept the Dismal Theorem, we would
probably dissolve in a sea of anxiety at the prospect of the infinity
of infinitely bad outcomes.’ This is rhetorical excess and, more to the
point here, it is fallacious. Most of the examples Nordhaus gives have
such miniscule thin-tailed probabilities that they can be written off.”

“Nordhaus
summarizes his critique with the idea there are indeed deep
uncertainties about virtually every aspect of the natural and social
sciences of climate change – but these uncertainties can only be
resolved by continued careful analysis of data and theories. I heartily
endorse his constructive attitude about the necessity of further
research targeted toward a goal of resolving as much of the uncertainty
as it is humanly possible to resolve. I would just add that we
should also recognize the reality that, for now and perhaps for some
time to come, the sheer magnitude of the deep structural uncertainties,
and the way we express them in our models, will likely dominate
plausible applications of CBA to the economics of climate change.”

(emphasis added)

I noted in a previous post that Rob Bradley, CEO of the Institute for Energy Research and lead blogger at MasterResource, has cheered on big coal and bashed what he calls “Malthusian anti-energy crusaders”,  but ignoring while he does so the questions of (1) whether there are any legitimate disputes as to the environmental impacts of coal production and consumption and (2) the role of government in contributing to or perpetuating these disputes.

In response, Rob says that his bona fides are not to be questioned.  I quote below the relevant portions of the comment thread (emphasis added):

TokyoTom { 02.05.09 at 2:50 am }

Rob, are the John Badens, Terry Andersons, Bruce Yandles, Elinor Ostroms and others who want to find ways to manage our commons better – by improving ownership, incentives and pricing signals – also part of a “Malthusian crusade”?

I just wanna make sure I know who to hate.

As for that big fly ash breach/spill in Tennessee, I’m glad that you didn’t point out how this was a result of government ownership of TVA, with the added benefit that costs will be borne not only by direct and indirect victims, but by taxpayers as well. No sense in pointing out how government is so often in the way, particularly if it detracts from our “we hate enviros!” message. Last thing we ever want to do is to reach a shared understanding with enviros of the institutional underpinnings of problems, since that means our funders might lose some of their fairly purchased, government-given special privileges.

rbradley { 02.05.09 at 9:46 pm }

TT:

I have several thousand pages in the public domain on free market theory and history applied to energy, including criticisms of political capitalism.

The ball is in your court to buy and read any of my six energy books–and to visit my website http://www.politicalcapitalism.org. Particularly focus on Enron on this website.

Capitalism at Work (2009) is the latest book that I invite you to read and review.

TokyoTom { 02.05.09 at 10:21 pm }

Rob, does this mean that you are a “free-marketer” in principle, but can’t be bothered to show it in your public policy discussions?

rbradley { 02.06.09 at 9:28 am }

TT:

It means that you have to do your homework. I take on opposing views as a matter of course in my books and essays–I hope you understand that I do not have time to regurgitate my arguments in a personal debate with you.

But if you are really a “libertarian,” you need to get more critical toward climate alarmism and the history of Malthusianism–and more realistic towards government failure versus market failure.

I am signing off with you but look foward to your review of Capitalism at Work–a multi-disciplinary treatise on heroic capitalism that as a libertarian you should study.

TokyoTom { 02.07.09 at 4:44 am }

Rob, Roy Cordato (linked at my name) said this:

“The starting point for all Austrian welfare economics is the goal seeking individual and the ability of actors to formulate and execute plans within the context of their goals. … [S]ocial welfare or efficiency problems arise because of interpersonal conflict. [C] that similarly cannot be resolved by the market process, gives rise to catallactic inefficiency by preventing useful information from being captured by prices.”

“Environmental problems are brought to light as striking at the heart of the efficiency problem as typically seen by Austrians, that is, they generate human conflict and disrupt inter- and intra-personal plan formulation and execution.”

“The focus of the Austrian approach to environmental economics is conflict resolution. The purpose of focusing on issues related to property rights is to describe the source of the conflict and to identify possible ways of resolving it.”

“If a pollution problem exists then its solution must be found in either a clearer definition of property rights to the relevant resources or in the stricter enforcement of rights that already exist. This has been the approach taken to environmental problems by nearly all Austrians who have addressed these kinds of issues (see Mises 1998; Rothbard 1982; Lewin 1982; Cordato 1997). This shifts the perspective on pollution from one of “market failure” where the free market is seen as failing to generate an efficient outcome, to legal failure where the market process is prevented from proceeding efficiently because the necessary institutional framework, clearly defined and enforced property rights, is not in place.”

Do you agree?

My focus in reviewing your comments and those of other posters is whether you are contributing in good faith to conflict RESOLUTION – conflict over readily understandable preferences – or to “winning” the struggle over government for the benefit of your clients.

I think that`s perfectly fair.

So far, I don`t see much of an effort at good faith engagement [with the enviros].

Here`s to hoping that you demonstrate here that you are a free-marketer, and not a rent-seeker.

Rob Bradley has a new post up at MasterResource, cheering on big (and now “clean”) coal, which has apparently received assurances from the Obama administration – after being bad-mouthed by NASA scientist Jim Hansen, Steven Chu and Obama himself – that, despite pressures from the “Malthusian anti-energy crusade” regarding climate change impacts, the recent massive TVA fly-ash spill and opposition to destructive mountaintop removal practices in Appalachia, coal will remain profitable during Obama’s term and central to US energy supplies.  Hooray!

But I wasn’t quite clear on all of Rob’s message, so I asked him a few questions in the comment thread:

Rob, are the John Badens, Terry Andersons, Bruce Yandles, Elinor Ostroms and others who want to find ways to manage our commons better – by improving ownership, incentives and pricing signals – also part of a[n evil] “Malthusian crusade”?

I just wanna make sure I know who to hate.

As for that big fly-ash breach/spill in Tennessee, I’m glad that you didn’t point out how this was a result of government ownership of TVA, with the added benefit that costs will be borne not only by direct and indirect victims, but by taxpayers as well. No sense in pointing out how government is so often in the way, particularly if it detracts from our “we hate enviros!” message. Last thing we ever want to do is to reach a shared understanding with enviros of the institutional underpinnings of problems, since that means our funders might lose some of their fairly purchased, government-given special privileges.

While it’s clear that “free-market” Rob cares little about whether the coal industry continues commercial activities that shift the environmental costs and risks (including potential costs arising from GHG emissions) to others, I forgot to ask Rob whether, as a hearty cheerleader for those poor coal underdogs, he also supports their position that the government should subsidize their change in business model by (a) having Uncle Sam pay the bulk of capital costs for IGCC (integrated gas combined cycle plant) [something like $1 billion for the first one with CCS], (b) giving them a further break (reduced royalties) on the sweet deals they already have for stripping coal from public lands and (c) – now that the federal government is getting into the busy of running the financial sector – making sure that power producers that want to use coal have easy access to credit, by twisting the arms of those uppity Wall Street financiers who with their fancy new “Carbon Principles” and “Enhanced Due Diligence” seem a bit too reluctant to extend credit for coal-fired power plants.

Here’s hoping Rob weighs in further.  I want to make sure I’m not messing up when I try to distinguish the “white hats” from the “black hats”.   From what I can tell so far, seeking to manipulate government policy for your own benefit is evil – as long as you’re not a coal firm, and we call the evil ones “Malthusians”.  Right?

Austrian-leaning economist Bob Murphy, whose efforts last year to discount the work of Yale’s William Nordhaus on how cost-benefit analysis merits current action on climate change I previously examined, is back with more, this time defending Nordhaus’ work from the criticism that I alerted him to by Martin Weitzman with respect to limits on the usefulness of CBA in the event of uncertainty (‘fat tails”). 

Bob, in a post on MasterResource, explains that Nordhaus has reviewed Weitzman’s work and found limits to it.  But he fails both to address most of the points I raised previously, including whether CBA is consistent with Austrian perspectives, and to note that Nordhaus still supports action now to price carbon.

I left the following comment with Bob at the MasterResource thread:

Bob, while you’re shoring up “cost-benefit analysis” – the tool of states and bureaucrats everywhere – perhaps you may care to address the point that, under traditional libertarian analysis, if anyone can demonstrate that others’ GHG emissions negatively affect his property (by altering temperatures, rainfall or causing flooding), he has the right to enjoin ALL such activities (and is not compelled to suffer them, subject to whatever compensation he can collect)?

Perhaps the “excitableness” of the “alarmists” may have something to do with the problems of collective action and public choice – viz., in circumstances where pollution laws and regulations provide effective “rights to pollute”, and where emissions are worldwide, how does one deal with existing rent-seekers and move the state, and do it in a meaningful way? There are plenty of private initiatives underway, and even though Austrians dissaprove of efforts to use the state, surely they can understand calls to group action, and that many of the “alarmists” sincerely believe that a fight over the wheel of government is inescapable.

Fundamental Austrian analysis straigthforwardly discussed the problems of conflicting preferences in the absence of property rights and where states are involved, but your lack of understanding or sympathy is rather striking. Why you think it helpful to label one side – a huge swath of people and organizations including Exxon and the Catholic Church – as “alarmists” while ignoring not only the institutional problem but those who profit from the status quo is rather beyond me.

Also, why so little interest in exploring policy options that you would support, like allowing immediate depreciation of capital investment and further public utility deregulation?

 Roger Koppl, another commenter, raised similar questions:

How do you square Nordhaus’s CBA with “Austrian” (or computable economics) arguments about complexity and the difficulty of prediction? Why shouldn’t we chastise Nordhaus for hubris? The pretense of knowledge and all that.

More later.

Robert L. Bradley, Jr. is an energy expert (author, former speechwriter for Key Lay and director of public policy analysis at Enron, founder and CEO of Institute for Energy Research) with libertarian leanings. 

But in a series of posts on climate issues on the recently launched  “free market” energy group blog MasterResource that he spearheads, Rob doesn’t come off as much of a libertarian, free-market guy as he suggests, since he doesn’t so much advocate for free market approaches to such issues as he takes evident pleasure in mocking enviros (and the preferences they share with many others) – all while ignoring that the status quo isn’t free of rent-seekers (precisely as Roderick Long and Ed Dolan have criticized libertarians).

1.  Take, for example, his January 25 post, Why Do the Alarmists Feel Bad About Debates–and Debating?.  In this post, Rob examines an online debate between scientist Joe Romm of Climate Progress and Jerry Taylor of Cato, notes that Joe later seems to acknowledge that Jerry did better in the debate, but skips over some of Joe’s chief criticisms of “skeptic” opponents by concluding:

Mr. Romm has all but conceded that the skeptics of climate alarmism beat the alarmists in debate, posting about it here and here. He blames it on the dishonesty of the “deniers,” but in fact they might have a much stronger intellectual and practical case. And I dare say that Romm does not feel he did particularly well against Taylor in their online debate and is not itching to debate him again, particularly in person.

But if I am wrong, I say: let’s get a big audience for it. Make the stakes high. Sell tickets. Poll the audience. It will be that entertaining!

Here was my comment to Rob:

Well Rob, Joe Romm isn’t ALL alarmists, but I’d say it’s rather clear that he’s saying that “scientists” are not good policy debaters – as it’s something that they’re not trained in. I suppose you would hardly disagree.

On top of that, Joe Romm and others simply are not trained in public choice or Austrian perspectives on political economy issues, so he clearly doesn’t understand what Jerry patiently tries to explain. But there’s rather alot of that to go around – across the political spectrum and on many, many issues – and I rather fail to understand how mocking that who lack understanding is a good way to open their minds to how wealth creation occurs and to the perils of using the state.

In addition, Jerry Taylor is clearly different from – more open and intellectually honest – most of the other debaters Joe Romm refers to.

2.  In another thread, Rob suggested that “doing nothing” was the preferred policy approach to climate; thankfully, in response to a comment from me, Rob expressly noted that

a free-market approach is not about “do nothing” but implementing a whole new energy approach to remove myriad regulation and subsidies that have built up over a century or more.

Great!  Inquiring minds are waiting to hear about what it is that Rob Bradley and others at “MasterResource” actually recommend as an approach to climate concerns!

Meanwhile, can we stop pretending that “enviros” are the only ones fighting over the wheel of government, much less that they can hold a candle to wealthy corporate insiders?

Jerry Taylor of Cato is one careful observer of the carbon follies who sees the handwriting on the wall for some type of carbon pricing system coming from the Congress during the Obama Administration.  Strikingly, in an interesting post up at MasterResource (a new self-styled “free market” energy blog spearheaded by former Enron speechwriter Robert Bradley), Jerry is cheering on environmental hard-liners!

It’s worth a gander to understand why.

Jerry’s post borrows the “Bootleggers and Baptists” lingo of Bruce Yandle to comment on the dynamics by which both  Baptists/moralists (in this case, the enviros) and the bootleggers/rent-seekers (in this case, the firms trying to reap benefits from government prohibitions) are seeking to come to terms on new carbon-related government policies.  Jerry  first explains and warns that the core of the mandatory cap-and-trade program proposed by the United States Climate Action Partnership (USCAP a coalition of big business and environmental groups) includes “a replay of the old-source/new-source standards incorporated in the Clean Air Act (CAA), which likewise established tough emissions standards for future power plants but much lighter rules for plants currently in operation”.

Because his concern over this replay of a costly aspect of the CAA, Jerry cheers on the criticism of this plan coming from other parts of the environmental community, in particular from Joe Romm, a former Acting Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Department of Energy who comments frequently on climate change policy issues at the ClimateProgress.org blog of the Center for American Progress.  Says Jerry:

Why should a libertarian skeptic about the dangers of climate change applaud environmental absolutism in this case? Several reasons.

First, the bifurcated old-source/new-source regulation makes no economic sense whatsoever. It distorts the power market by artificially advantaging older plants relative to newer plants. It spawns a huge legislative/legal-industry to fight over old-source/new-source distinctions until the end of time, creating substantial deadweight losses. It creates huge, unearned windfalls for politically clever corporations and thus encourages future market-rigging mischief. It would be far, far better to settle on one standard and apply it across the board to old sources and new sources alike.

Second, without corporate support, … that bill would likely be rendered economically toothless, with loopholes and timetables delaying serious emissions reductions until some time relatively far into the future. I am unaware of any significant environmental initiative that was successfully signed into law that didn’t manage to scare-up significant, widespread corporate support.

Third, there is a virtue in political honesty. If politicians want to argue for laws that will seriously reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, then let’s have an honest discussion about the costs and benefits of those proposed laws. Symbolically potent gestures that are more empty than real feeds the public belief in free lunches. While one could argue that it’s better to get an empty gesture than a real one, when the latter has far more costs than the former, I can’t believe that any good will come from a culture of political dishonesty and voter illusion.

(emphasis added)

Well, I agree that casting a light on potential political deals may be a valuable way to influence the outcome in ways that improve policy, but it may very well be that voter “dis-illusion” with political dishonesty is just what the doctor ordered, in getting voters to demand both greater honesty and less government in general.

I appreciate that guys like Jerry Taylor are trying to point out how members of USCAP are trying to lock in advantages for themselves over competitors and new entrants, but why isn’t there now (and why wasn’t there during the Bush administration) any concerted focus by libertarians on less-costly and market-friendly alternatives that still address enviros concerns, like public utility deregulation and allowing immediate depreciation of investments in energy inffrastructure, prizes for carbon-capture and fusion technologies, and making sure that information about climate change (and corporate performance on various yardsticks) is widely disseminated? 

As I have previously noted,  Iain Murray of CEI, Bruce Yandle of Clemson and PERC, Gene Callahan and Jonathan Adler at Case Western have all made suggestions in this regard – to deafening silence from libertarians in general.  At Mises, scorn of enviros and of their preferences with respect to open-access commons seems to be the order of the day.  Let’s wave the white flag, shall we?

Bruce Bartlett, who worked in both the Reagan and Pappy Bush administrations and was a trenchant critic of the recent Bush administration, has a new article in the Politico that argues that conservatives should resign themselves to rising welfare costs that have been bequeathed to the Obama administration (with further damaging increases as the Bush administration and now Obama and Dems implement plans to deal with the economic crisis) and should focus instead on finding least-damaging ways to raise the taxes needed to close the fiscal deficit.

Bartlett’s key point is as follows – it almost sounds like Bartlett is arguing for a shift from taxes on income, capital and labor to consumption taxes (query: carbon taxes?):

I think conservatives would better spend their diminished political capital figuring out how to finance the welfare state at the least cost to the economy and individual liberty, rather than fighting a losing battle to slash popular spending programs. But this will require them to accept the necessity of higher revenues.

It is simply unrealistic to think that tax cuts will continue to be a viable political strategy when the budget deficit exceeds $1 trillion, as it will this year. Nor is it realistic to think that taxes can be kept at 19 percent of GDP when spending is projected to grow by about 50 percent of GDP over the next generation, according to both the Congressional Budget Office and the Government Accountability Office. And that’s without any new spending programs being enacted. 

If conservatives refuse to participate in the debate over how revenues will be raised, then liberals will do it on their own, which will likely give us much higher tax rates and a tax system that is more harmful to growth than necessary to fund the government. Instead of opposing any tax hike, I think it makes more sense for conservatives to figure out how best to raise the additional revenue that will be raised in any event. 

In the end, the welfare state is not going away, and it will be paid for one way or another. The sooner conservatives accept that fact, the sooner they will regain political power.