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Keyword: ‘limited liability’

It’s a rachet, and racket: State-made limited liability corporations are the health of the massive Regulatory State

April 21st, 2015 No comments

[from a Facebook post]

State-made limited liability corporations are the health of the massive Regulatory State, which is likewise the health of the crony corporations. It’s a rachet, and racket.

Are you a Bootlegger, or a Baptist?

In free, voluntary markets, there is no Get-Out-of-Personal-Liability-for-Harms-Caused-to-Others-Free Card.

Limited liability for shareholders is a state-granted favor that is demonstrably at the bottom of the dynamic of people forever running to a gamed “democratic” government, to make government make its creations behave more nicely (with the regulations then serving to protect the big, to limit competition, and to fuel corruption and further government capture). As soon as governments began creating corporate monopolies and/or limited liability cos, then judges followed suit by rejecting strict common-law protections of private property in favor of a pollution-/corporation-favoring “balance” of equities that Block and Rothbard noted.

In a private law society, one finds ALWAYS individuals and associations of individuals who may negotiate liability caps with voluntary counterparties, but remain potentially personally liable up to the remainder of their personal assets for harms that their activities (and those of their agents) caused to others.

While the persons who actually directly caused harms would of course be liable, their principals would try to limit their own potential exposure by either closely managing their agents or making sure that others were independent contractors.

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Fun exploration of limited liability corporations, and of anarchist community, with “principled libertarian” Stephan Kinsella

February 20th, 2014 No comments

I haven’t been in communication with anti-IP stalwart and occasional sparring partner Stephan Kinsella for some time (I lost my appetite for his hostility), but I saw him recently on Facebook, where he had reposted a review he had done of the movie “Avatar”; as I had liked his review, I stopped by to say hello. [Note: my various #Avatar-related posts, from my blogging/commenting days at the Mises Institute, are here: http://tokyotom.freecapitalists.org/?s=avatar.]

What follows are his Facebook post and our ongoing dialog to date (some other persons also appear; cross-links after the name); stay tuned!

1. Kinsella (Feb 12 at 10:54 pm)

I confess, I am not the a very good movie reviewer. When I occasionally do one, they start looking dated within months. Anyway, I remember this one from 2009. I got tons of grief for it from fellow libertarians, e.g., if I recall, Michael Barnett.

http://www.lewrockwell.com/lrc-blog/avatar-is-great-and-libertarian/

2. TokyoTom (Feb 13 at 2:52 pm)

I didn’t give you any grief about it, Stephan – in fact I praised you for it – but then I’m a good statist, like you:
http://tokyotom.freecapitalists.org/2009/12/22/envirofacist-avatar-comments-quot-avatar-quot-resources-property-rights-corporations-government-enabled-theft/

3. Andy Katherman (Feb 13 at 11:51 pm)

Great movie review Stephan. I wrote something very similar back in 2010 on my blog (http://www.libertyforlaymen.com/…/natural-law-take-on…). Mind you, I was in my anarcho-libertarian “infancy” and more of a minarchist/Constitutionalist back then.

It’s funny James Cameron is probably more of a pinko-commie-ish-enviornmentalist than a libertarian, but I had the same reaction in that he actually presented a brilliant case for the necessity of property rights and lockean homesteading than pretty much any other movie that comes to mind… all the while doing it with great visual effects and a pretty decent plot!

4. TokyoTom (Feb 14 at 8:32 am)

Andy, Cameron wasn’t presenting a brilliant case for the necessity of property rights and lockean homesteading, but an allegory for the reality of corporate resource development around much of the world where native title is ignored, and a fantasy of natives fighting back. Of course it’s a more tangled reality, with governments frequently involved, wanting royalties, and arrogating rights to balance interests. BP and the Gulf of Mexico and the Kochs, Albertan oil sands and Keystone, for example.

5. Kinsella (Feb 14 at 8:43 am)

why add the word “corporate” Tom? What does that add to anything. There is nothing inherent in corporations that makes them more likely to violate rights. It’s just a form of business organization.

6. Andy Katherman (Feb 14 at 3:30 pm)

Disagree “TokyoTom”. I concede Cameron is probably an eco-nut of the “watermelon” variety (green on the outside, commie red on the inside) and has disdain for commerce, free markets, and “Capitalism” (properly understood)… and may not even care about property rights. But, the movie really is a terrific demonstration why property rights are a vital normative concept to reduce conflict over scarce resources. And, it also provided a case why aggression is Bad and why self-defense of homesteaded land/property/resources (Home Tree) is good and JUST. Yes, it is an allegory and it gets a bit weird at times (mystical-ish) but so what. It’s a frickin’ movie not a revisionist documentary. I still hold it is a great work of fiction and a mostly libertarian one at that.

7. Kinsella (February 15 at 12:32am)
Tom has long been a gadfly type. He supports all manner of unlibertarian proposals, but wants to fly the libertarian radical flag, and of course people like him start to feel uncomfortable so they start attacking anyone wiht principles. They basically become useless nihilists.

8. TokyoTom (February 17 at 12:01pm)

Stephan, that last comment is a very impressive demonstration of confused, unprincipled, unconstructive blatheration. It’s the kind of reflexive, self-satisfied hostility I expect to see of statists, but am a bit embarrassed to see from self-ascribed ‘anarchists’/libertarians. Nice show.

9. Kinsella (February 17 at 12:03pm)

apparently the existence of principled libertarians drives the pragmatists and minarchists and middle-of-the-roaders nuts.

10. TokyoTom (February 17 at 12:04pm)

Andy, thanks for the comment. Dunno why you feel the need to bash Cameron as a “watermelon” “eco-nut”, when he has made it clear in other contexts that he is standing up for the rights of native peoples.

The struggle he addressed in Avatar is still very much underway; see this from recent news? “To get the gold, they will have to kill every one of us”

11. TokyoTom (February 17 at 12:08pm)

Stephan suggests that “There is nothing inherent in corporations that makes them more likely to violate rights. It’s just a form of business organization.”

I imagine Stephan can likewise not see the moral hazard trainwrecks that have also been set in motion by governments insuring deposits, protecting the shareholders of listed companies, owning and developing resources, or in regulating on the basis of pollutions or public health and safety, either.

12. Kinsella (February 17 at 12:12pm)

Governments violate rights when they insure deposits. You see, Tom, that is what libertarians are against–aggression, rights violations. People who privately organize their business arrangements in a certain way do not inherently or necessarily do this. See, so it’s irrelevant whether there is a “moral hazard” or not. Libertarians are not opposed to “moral hazards.” We are opposed to aggression.

13. Kinsella (February 17 at 12:16pm)

And the state does not “protect shareholders.” I have explained this in depth already. http://www.stephankinsella.com/…/kol100-the-role-of…/

and http://www.stephankinsella.com/…/kol115-mises-canada…/

14. TokyoTom (February 17 at 12:26pm)

Stephan suggests that I am a “gadfly” “unlibertarian” who “attack[s] anyone wiht principles” and who is a “useless nihilist” whom he has “principled libertarians” (AKA, himself) has “drive[n] nuts.”

I think that, unfortunately, what we have here is Stephan demonstrating the roots of property lie not in principles, but in the reflexive, bristling defense of what people (individuals and groups) regard as valuable enough to defend.

Calm down, Stephan.

15. TokyoTom (February 17 at 12:52pm)

Stephan is the kind of Bootlegger-Baptist critic who himself is a vociferous Baptist who is uncomfortable looking at how Govt sets up the Bootleggers who are gaming the system.

In free, voluntary markets, there is no Get-Out-of-Personal-Liability-for-Harms-Caused-to-Others-Free Card.

Limited liability for shareholders is a state-granted favor that is demonstrably at the bottom of the dynamic of people forever running to a gamed “democratic” government to make Govt make its creations behave more nicely (with the regulations then serving to protect the big, to limit competition, and to fuel corruption and further govt capture). As soon as governments began creating corporate monopolies and/or limited liability cos, then then judges followed suit by rejecting strict defense of property in favor of a pollution-/corporation-favoring “balance” of equities that Block noted.

16. Kinsella (February 17 at 2:28pm)

I explained in detail in the talks and blog post linked, why this is wrong. There is no reason to assume passive shareholders ought to be liable for torts committed by others. In a private law society, there is no reason to think shareholders would be liable in the first place.

17. TokyoTom

Stephan consistently attacks arguments I don’t make. It must be because he is more principled than I am:
http://tokyotom.freecapitalists.org/?s=limited+liability+kinsella

18. Kinsella (February 17 at 2:51pm)

Tom, you just stated your view that state limited liability for shareholders is some kind privilege. that implies it is giving someone a limitation on liability that they otherwise would have in a free market. It’s not a privilege unless it changes the situation.

19. TokyoTom (February 17 at 2:56pm)

Stephan: “In a private law society, there is no reason to think shareholders would be liable in the first place.”

In a private law society, one finds ALWAYS individuals and associations of individuals who may negotiate liability caps with voluntary counterparties, but remain potentially personally liable up to the remainder of their personal assets for harms that their activities (and those of their agents) caused to others.

While the persons who actually directly caused harms would of course be liable, their principals would try to limit their own potential exposure by either closely managing their agents or making sure that others were independent contractors.

Stephan defends a state-created order where it is now extremely difficult, if not impossible, for us (and tort victims) to determine WHO in fact acted and is responsible for vast harms, such as those produced by BP, WVa’s “Freedom Industries”, TVA, TEPCO and the like. Instead, Stephan grotesquely calls polluting companies “victims”.

20. Dan Cotter (February 17 at 3:17pm)

Does anybody else find it strange when people write their comments as if they are speaking to an audience rather than just directly speaking to the person they’re conversating with?

21. TokyoTom (February 17 at 3:44pm)

Dan, I’ve been talking with Stephan Kinsella for several years – putting me a ten-foot-pole distance has too often been one of his penchants, because his principles mean I stink. We’ve had a bit of a hiatus, so when I visited here, you can see that I addressed him directly; he shifted to the third person here: https://www.facebook.com/nskin…/posts/10151972701413181….

22. Kinsella (February 17 at 9:22pm)

haha, are you really criticizing me for using third person…? come on dude.

23. Kinsella (February 17 at 9:25pm)

“remain potentially personally liable up to the remainder of their personal assets for harms that their activities (and those of their agents) caused to others.”

This is almost right. You are liable for harms (some types anyway) caused by your *actions*. (“activities” is intentionally vague)

But shareholders do not act to cause the harm caused by employees of the company they have stock in.

“While the persons who actually directly caused harms would of course be liable, their principals would try to limit their own potential exposure by either closely managing their agents or making sure that others were independent contractors.”

Calling shareholders “principals” is question-begging. They are passive. I have explained this. So have other that I linked to–e.g. rothbard and pilon and hessen.

“Stephan defends a state-created order where it is now extremely difficult, if not impossible, for us (and tort victims) to determine WHO in fact acted and is responsible for vast harms, such as those produced by BP, WVa’s “Freedom Industries”, TVA, TEPCO and the like. Instead, Stephan grotesquely calls polluting companies “victims”.”

How is this supposed to be an argument that shareholders are causally responsible for torts of employees? Everyone seems to simply assume this respondeat superior type vicarious liability.

24. TokyoTom (Feb 19 at 4:52pm)

“‘activities’ is intentionally vague”

This is intentionally hair-splitting obfuscation; one “acts” – we call what people do both “activities” and “actions”.

– “shareholders do not act to cause the harm caused by employees of the company they have stock in.”

It is not my premise that they always/necessarily do — though of course, sometimes shareholders may be actively involved in torts tied to the business activities conducted by the corporation they own shares of. When judges “pierce the corporate veil”, they essentially treat shareholders as principals/partners/sole proprietors.

– “Calling shareholders “principals” is question-begging. They are passive. I have explained this.”

Suggesting I was calling shareholders principals is either stupidity or a deliberate misreading; I was clearly referring to private law orders/contractual arrangements outside of corporations, not state-made corporations: https://www.facebook.com/nskin…/posts/10151972701413181… (PS–I really don’t like this attack style, but perhaps tit-for-tat is the best approach with anarchists who prefer to set examples of disrespect.)

But yes, of course now, within the state-made corporate form — and especially within listed companies, shareholders MAY be (but are NOT necessarily) “passive”. But this is itself quite problematic, though not my chief point.

– “How is this supposed to be an argument that shareholders are causally responsible for torts of employees? Everyone seems to simply assume this respondeat superior type vicarious liability.”

You attack arguments that I do not make. This is your style is your wont, Stephan — I find it wanting. I have NEVER argued that “shareholders are/should be causally responsible for torts of employees” or just “assumed respondeat superior type vicarious liability”.

Partners and sole proprietors were/are not deemed automatically responsible for torts committed by their employees, yet the risk and expense of potential lawsuits has always served to have them pay attention to risks that their employees and agents might harm others. An artificial state-made liability cap freed shareholders from downside risks, and incentivized blind eyes to practices that were costly to others.

It is clear that respondeat superior doctrine was expanded judicially and by law as firms left the realm of private businesses and became favored creatures of the state.

I am glad you are paying some attention to questions of individual responsibility, though of course you have NOT done so consistently, when you persisted in calling “BP” a “victim” and ignoring the corporate problem of discerning who it is who acts:

“It is one of the salient features of corporations that they confuse themselves and everyone else as to WHO, precisely, is responsible for their actions and the harms they cause others, and it is time for Austrians to examine such features closely. – See more at: More about “the biggest victim”, BP, and how we can help it end its “victimization”

Poor statists! If we close our eyes tightly enough, we can see clearly that Corporations are innocent VICTIMS, of governments that foist on them meaningless grants like limited liability & IP, and of malevolent, grasping citizens

Thanks for playing, and for your decent Avatar post.

25. Kinsella (Feb 20 at 2:24 am)

“It is not my premise that they always/necessarily do — though of course, sometimes shareholders may be actively involved in torts tied to the business activities conducted by the corporation they own shares of. When judges “pierce the corporate veil”, they essentially treat shareholders as principals/partners/sole proprietors.”

I am at a loss to identify the coherent libertarian principle you are trying to invoke. Who cares about the modern positive state law of ‘piercing the corporate veil,’ for example–what possible relevance has this for justice?

“Suggesting I was calling shareholders principals is either stupidity or a deliberate misreading;”

oh, i assure you, I am merely stupid, not dishonest.

–Wait.

“I was clearly referring to private law orders/contractual arrangements outside of corporations, not state-made corporations: ”

Wasn’t clear to me, kemosabe, but then I don’t have your IQ or whatever.

“Partners and sole proprietors were/are not deemed automatically responsible for torts committed by their employees, yet the risk and expense of potential lawsuits has always served to have them pay attention to risks that their employees and agents might harm others. An artificial state-made liability cap freed shareholders from downside risks, and incentivized blind eyes to practices that were costly to others. ”

What does this frenetic screed of incoherent babble have to do with libertarian principles? Answer: not much.

“It is clear that respondeat superior doctrine was expanded judicially and by law as firms left the realm of private businesses and became favored creatures of the state. ”

So… you are in favor of respondeat superior. well Rothbard, Pilon, Hessen and I are not. Congratulations on your glomming onto the state schema.

26. TokyoTom (Feb 20 at 5:35 pm)

You disappoint by never failing to disappoint, Stephan.

1. “I am at a loss to identify the coherent libertarian principle you are trying to invoke. Who cares about the modern positive state law of ‘piercing the corporate veil,’ for example–what possible relevance has this for justice?”

You are at a loss to understand the libertarian principle that a man — even a shareholder — might be called to account for his own acts? I agreed that shareholders should not be liable qua shareholders, and simply indicated that they might be liable based on their own actions. Corporate “veil piercing” is justified if based on a fact-finding that a shareholder directed a tortious act.

2. “Wasn’t clear to me, kemosabe, but then I don’t have your IQ or whatever.”

Real gentlemen don’t find admissions of error so difficult, and sneering, gratuitous contempt and off-handed offensiveness so easy. Whatever.

3. Me: “Partners and sole proprietors were/are not deemed automatically responsible for torts committed by their employees, yet the risk and expense of potential lawsuits has always served to have them pay attention to risks that their employees and agents might harm others. An artificial state-made liability cap freed shareholders from downside risks, and incentivized blind eyes to practices that were costly to others. ”

You: “What does this frenetic screed of incoherent babble have to do with libertarian principles? Answer: not much.”

Kindly demonstrate that this is both babble, and babble not related to libertarian principles. Austrians are keenly attuned to moral hazard, and I was describing what I perceive as dynamics, not a principled position on liability rules (though LvMI has published pieces calling for a prohibition on corporations in the banking sector). But if I recall correctly, you too have indicated that you oppose the state structuring of/stamp of approval on corporations.

Your own frothing has nothing to do with libertarian principles, and in fact demeans them.

4. Me: “It is clear that respondeat superior doctrine was expanded judicially and by law as firms left the realm of private businesses and became favored creatures of the state. ”

You: “So… you are in favor of respondeat superior. well Rothbard, Pilon, Hessen and I are not. Congratulations on your glomming onto the state schema.”

Congrats on another false and unjustifiable conclusion. Par for your course. Austrians Mises, Hayek, Rothbard, Block, Cordato etc. all describe what they discern of the dynamics of human action within institutional structures; please congratulate them too for glomming onto the state schema.

Ad hom is a shameful game, Stephan. It discredits your good work that you that you thrill to it so much.

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Note to Larry Lessig: Shall we amend the Constitution, but ignore possible reforms to limited liability corporation laws in the fifty states?

April 22nd, 2013 No comments

[Note: Cross-posted from my HLS blog.]

When Larry Lessig launched his “Anti-Corruption Pledge” last year, I commented on the Wiki page he set up for it, and left a copy in an earlier blog post.

Larry responded the next day. I copy here both his reply and my counter-comment:

But even if Limited Liability is a more fundamental problem, which I’m not convinced it is, but if: You still need the means to address it, which you don’t have till you address the money problem first. Lessig 10:44, 5 March 2012 (EST)
Larry, thanks for your comment, but I’m not sure I follow you. I think it is a fundamental mistake to ignore that corporations are created in states, despite their tendency to accept if not push for the federalization of corporate law.
Sure, we can try to address money in campaigns at a federal level, but that’s no reason to turn our back on the leverage that we have in fighting for more responsible corporations – and corporate owners. It’s alot easier to win at least one small victory when you’re also fighting in 50 smaller fora rather than just one big one. TokyoTom 14:44, 17 March 2012 (EDT)
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Note to Larry Lessig on his "Anti-Corruption Pledge": Limited liability corporations are the taproot of both growing government and anonymous rent-seeking.

March 4th, 2012 2 comments

I refer to the very recently-launched “Anti-Corruption Pledgehere, which is the latest project by prolific Larry Lessig, now a Harvard Law prof and head of a corporate reform center there (and whom I have introduced and discussed in a number of preceding posts).

Larry further describes the purpose and motivation of the Pledge at his blog. (I note that I’m strongly in favor of pledges, as I noted in this blog post discussing the Kochs.)

I left the following comment on the discussion page of the wiki that Lessig created for The Anti-Corruption Pledge:

Larry, you aren’t really attacking the chief problem, which the role that STATE-Created limited liability corporations play in centralization and aggrandizement of power in Washington, which then further attracts rent-seeking by increasingly anonymous (who owns and runs these corporations, anyway?) organizations that wish to use a bloated government to receive favorable inside deals and to raise barriers to entry in their respective markets.

Corporations drive the growth of government because their LIMITED LIABILITY aspect means government protects shareholders from liability in the event of tort damage to workers/others/society. Citizens tired of holding the bag then must continually push legislatures and courts for “reform” that perversely helps to entrench the largest firms against newcomers.

Corporations are not simply the “Health of the State”, but they’re created in STATES, which accordingly MUST be a main venue to seek to rein them in. States can stop creating limited liability companies, can deregulate for non-limited liability firms (where owners retain a large tail of risk), etc.

http://tokyotom.freecapitalists.org/?s=limited+liability

Anonymity is not per se bad – the Federalist Papers and Anti-Federalist Papers were written anonymously – it’s the anonymity afford to those whom have already received important government privileges (viz., limited liability) that renders them and their agents unaccountable that is the problem.

Thus I don’t see that public funding or limiting and requiring transparency of your broadly worded “political expenditures” (contributions? campaign ads?) really address the root problem.

Fortunately, there are 50 states in which to start campaigning for responsibility owned businesses whose owners are NOT protected by governments from the communities in which they operate.

Large, entrenched public companies are already seeing across-the-board declines in profitability and market capitalization (ask Robert Monks); they can be brought down by Schumpeter’s process of “Creative Destruction”.

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Limited Liability, Redux: As Bob Monks says, "corporate governance has failed and it’s time to move on." So what’s next? Unleash the Hounds!

December 10th, 2011 No comments

This is a precis of my preceding post.

As I noted, veteran shareholder activist Robert A.G. Monks has concluded that – in brief (emphasis added):

the people who exercise power for the corporations need to be accountable to somebody.  Over the years, it has become clear that they really are not accountable to anybody, and our experiment in self-regulation and minimal oversight has failed.  In practice, this has meant that a small group of individual CEOs exercise power over financing elections and lobbying the passage and enforcement of laws. …

Society is a give-and-take proposition but for now, the powerful take much more than they contribute and that is not sustainable. 

For me, corporate governance has failed and it’s time to move on.
So what do we do? I’ve already discussed this in a number of posts relating to how the state grant of limited liability to corporate shareholders has released moral hazard on a massive scale, leading to pollution and labor problems, a cycle of pressure for government ‘protection’ and government capture. These problems have been compounded by the “Principal – Agent problem” on which Bob Monks is throwing in the towel, which problem has its roots in limited liability of shareholders and has been exacerbated by the very securities laws that purport to protect shareholders of listed companies.
.
I left the following response at Bob’s blog (emphasis added):

 

Posted by TokyoTom on Nov 3, 2011 at 12:32 PM

Bob, the answer is simple:— Let shareholders of publicly-listed firms alone to figure out how to protect their own interests [sink or swim], and

— Let better managed firms that don’t tap public markets (and thus who have smaller numbers of more sophisticated investors who don’t need the dubious ‘protections’ of Government) eat the lunches of the bigger, more bureaucratic and less profitable public firms.
In other words, the existing system can’t be saved, and it is not worth the effort.

What we need is a whole lot more of Schumpeter’s ‘Creative Destruction’, which we can expect from private firms — which have been growing as Sarbanes-Oxley has helped large firms build barriers by walling off access to capital markets.

One action item that I still see as necessary is to encourage the use of alternative corporate/organization forms where shareholders/owners retain a significant tail of risk. Since it is the moral hazard and risk-shifting made possible by state-granted limited liability status that has also fuelled the growth of the regulatory state, states can also experiment with dramatically lowering regulations for smaller local firms where shareholders have unlimited liability or must pony up additional capital to pay damages for any torts.Sincerely,Tom

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Unwinding limited liability: Can we roll back the regulatory state by shifting ultimate responsibility for managing risks to enterprise owners?

November 15th, 2011 No comments

[This is an edited re-post.]

Libertarians have not quite focussed on how the state grant of limited liability to shareholders – something that cannot be obtained merely by voluntary transactions) has set in motion and greatly fuelled the growth of the state and battles over the wheel of government — battles in which insider elites, generally acting through corporations, have the overwhelming advantage.

I have posted extensively on limited liability; for the interested reader perhaps the following post will be a quick introduction:

The Cliff Notes version of my stilted enviro-fascist view of corporations and government

For those of you who prefer NOT to let their fingers do the walking, I have noted elsewhere that (ed: some slight revisions):

I am NOT arguing FOR a general rule that shareholders SHOULD be liable for corporate torts; rather, I have:

(1) pointed out that limited liability itself has served to muddle the question of whom, exactly, should be responsible for the very real harms that corporations frequently cause,

(2) noted that the limited-liability corporate form has enabled risk-generation and -shifting on a massive scale, with innocent third parties frequently being stuck holding the bag (not simply when liabilities exceed assets, but more generally since the cycle of escalating government interventions to rein in corporations perversely ends up raising barriers to entry and giving corporations “rights” to engage in activities that damage others, which rights curtail recourse even when sufficient assets are available),

(3) argued that libertarians should reconsider the grant of limited liability for torts (as opposed to limited liability as to those who contract with the corporation on a voluntary basis) not simply because it is clearly non-libertarian to begin with, but because it has had profound consequences in feeding the snowballing and increasingly centralized regulatory state– consequences at a serious enough level that state-loving libertarians concede simply by troubling themselves to argue against curtailing limited liability,

(4) noted that the most efficiacious way to roll back the regulatory state lie in the direction of shifting ultimate responsibility for managing risks to enterprise owners (and ending the counterproductive regulatory risk-management experiment), and

(5) noted that a curtailment of limited liability for torts could be hedged by shareholders via insurance, and could be achieved by state governments and the federal government offering more lenient regulation to busness enterprises that operate as partnerships, unlimited liability corporations, or in cases where shares are NOT “fully paid up” so that calls for signifcant additional capital could be made against shareholders if needed to pay claims. “Creative destruction” by new firms will eventually bring down the limited liability firms.

It is perfectly appropriate to examine the justifications FOR and the consequences of the state grant of limited liability; for this purpose, I disagree with Kinsella that one must first “provide a theory of liability that coherently distinguishes shareholders from any other patron of the company”.

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WSJ: Governance guru Robert A.G. Monks blames investors for crisis (but both he and WSJ miss that irresponsible, ineffective shareholders is a consequence of limited liability and "public co" regulation)

September 22nd, 2011 No comments

I ran across the following at the NACD Directorship website: (emphasis added)

Governance guru blames investors for crisis

Robert Monks recently told the International Corporate Governance Conference that the losses shareholders incurred during the economic crisis prove investors must be more assertive in exerting their ownership over corporations.

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Scrupulosity II: A note to Stephan Kinsella on growing statism. limited liability, deposit insurance, and rampant moral hazard (and moral confusion)

June 5th, 2011 No comments

In addition to the comment that I blogged the other day regarding Jeffrey Tucker’s June 2 post, Scrupulosity and the Condemnation of Every Existing Business, I posed a question to Jeffrey in response to this further comment by him:

But Rothbard was not just an anarchist. He was an anarcho-CAPITALIST. From what I can tell, Rothbard has yet to win THAT victory among libertarians. They have learned from his anti-state writings, but have they learned from his economic writings on the absolute centrality of capital accumulation for the advance of civilization?

My question:

TokyoTom June 4, 2011 at 7:20 am

Jeffrey, are state-created corporations – the ones that embody moral hazard via a gift of limited liability to shareholders, have an eternal life, and in which responsible persons are fairly anonymous and bear little or no direct obligations to the outsiders they affect – are “absolutely central to capital accumulation and for the advance of civilization”?

Did we have no capital accumulation in the days of business partnerships and associations, before governments started giving away the store to their own little Franskensteins? Didn’t all businesses once have a rather clear set of owners, where the buck stopped?

Please clarify.

Tom

Stephan Kinsella kindly jumped in; his response to me on June 4 is here.

I use this blog post to copy my response to Stephan:

TokyoTom June 5, 2011 at 5:58 am

Thanks for your comments, Stephan.

1. Calling shareholders “passive” might be a fair representation of the existing, government-created system – especially for listed, “public” companies, but that’s pretty much my point. This is NOT true of partnership or other traditional types of business organization, and the grant of limited liability itself deliberately signals shareholders that they can turn a blind eye to activities that profit the company while posing costs and risks to others.

Sure, it’s probably not now “fair” to passive shareholders to “attribute vicarious liability to them … for torts committed by employees”, but that is both a strawman and besides the point. The point is that the government grant of limited liability MAKES A DIFFERENCE; the strawman is that I am certainly NOT proposing a new rule that shareholders be assigned liability for acts by corporate employees, but simply that the limitation on liability be eliminated – just as other grants by the government of liability limits (nuclear power, offshore oil drilling, and pollution permitting generally) should be eliminated.

Your assertion that limited liability of shareholders “would also be present in a free society in which private contractual ‘corporations’ arose” is totally unsupported. Can you point to where Rothbard, Hessen or Pilon argue that private contracts that limit liability of investors against voluntary creditors could serve to limit their personal liability against INVOLUNTARY creditors, viz., tort victims?

Just as you, surely, have no objection to private agreements between parties to protect the information created by one of them (private “intellectual property”) but simply oppose state-created IP, so too should you (as a lawyer!) be able to understand that in principle, of course, I have no objection to contract-based companies, but oppose the obvious and important favors granted by the state in the case of all corporations?

2. Not to be missed is that the grant of limited liability is extremely important and consequential:

See: The Cliff Notes version of my stilted enviro-fascist view of corporations and government – TT’s Lost in Tokyo http://bit.ly/9oBkC7

It has allowed owners to divorce themselves from formal reponsibility for the acts of their agents/employees, to divorce themselves from the communities in which their firms act, and to dodge claims of moral responsibility.

So we are left with massive corporations which are massively entangled with government and are powerful buyers of favors, which citizens forever clamor for “more control!”, and which lack any clear locus of responsibility — and in which we find anarchist libertarians like yourself and Lew Rockwell acting as their lawyers, and calling them and their shareholders “the biggest victims” (not the little people on the short end of the stick of projects like Gulf oil drilling, nuclear reactor meltdowns or even mundane health/air/water/soil damage from pollution) whenever bad decisions resulting from government-institutionalized buck-passing results in unfortunate “accidents”.

As Mises long ago noted, moral hazard matters. Mises on fixing externalities: progress along the Kuznets curve is not magic, but the result of institution-building – TT’s Lost in Tokyohttp://bit.ly/cM4iVb

Clearly, our continuing crises in our banking sector are due not simply to money-printing by the Fed, but to massive moral hazard within banks, investment banks and other advisers, all of which can be laid at least in part at the foot of government. Government’s role in guaranteeing deposits has the effect of telling them they get a free lunch, and don’t need to worry about how well the banks invest their deposits – and of shifting to our wonderful government the risk of failure. Government responds by imposing “prudential rules” (like “investment-grade” requirements and capital standards that are always gamed by insiders to put bonuses in pockets, while leaving risks to the banks and thus the government. Somehow – inevitably – the government is always late to diagnose the gaming and to tighten up rules – which, like Sarbanes^Oxley and other rules imposed on super-duper “public” companies, serve to further raise barriers to entry and to distance managers from shareholder control.

Tell me again that the massive games that a fairly insulated managerial class is engaged in at mega-firms are both natural and inconsequential?

3. While in principle any partnership can keep going even when one partner dies or decides to leave and new partners are added, surely you are aware that this is a very cumbersome process, not in small part because of the concerns that the partners and its lenders, suppliers and customers all have about who, precisely, is managing the business and who has liability for potential losses?

Just as for limited liability, the grants of legal entity status, unlimited life, unlimited purposes and the ability to own subsidiaries are all substantial AND consequence-laden gifts from the state.

Show me a partnership that has any of these, without a grant from the state. Precisely because all of these matter, business people of all stripes clamor to incorporate (or to adopt a new, state-created limited partnership form that makes pass-through tax treatment possible).

4. Your long paragraph of the entity theory that “the state has foisted” on us has much I agree with. The state creation of corporations has do much to muddle who, exactly, is responsible for injuries to third parties caused by “the corporation”. In fact, this is one of my points about limited liability and other benefits that the state bestowed on individual investors – and you and Lew exhibited the same confusion yourself last year when you were stumbling over yourselves to feel sorry for BP’s shareholders, executives and employees:

Corporations uber Alles: Conveniently inconsistent on “abstractions” like “the environment”, Austrians overlook their preference for “corporations” over individuals,& their lack of interest in problem-solving – TT’s Lost in Tokyo http://bit.ly/lWpvol

http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/search.aspx?q=kinsella+victim

Getting rid of limited liability would do much to provide moral clarity, and to end not simply risk-shifting and purchase of government favor, but demands by citizens for preventative regulation by government.

5. I would note that, just as if deposit insurance were eliminated, market actors would step up to advise on which banks are safe and to provide deposit insurance, so too would insurers step up if limited liability were ended.

We are NOT talking about bringing down capitalism.

Thanks for the substantive engagement.

Best,

Tom

 I note my related earlier posts on deposit insurance and moral hazard:

http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/search.aspx?q=deposit+insurance

http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/search.aspx?q=moral+hazard

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Yes, the Economist was right in 1999 that industrial capitalism was built on limited liability. But were the resulting statism, bubbles and risk-shifting really necessary?

April 5th, 2011 No comments

Here is another piece of my dialogue on the comment thread to Matt Ridley‘s “Nuclear crony capitalism” post that I blogged on earlier.

Posted by, Robin Guenier (not verified) (emphasis added)

Tom:

I disagree. I’m sure that limited liability was a key factor in making available to mankind many of the benefits developed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I think that the Economist put it well in 1923 when it suggested that whoever invented the concept might earn ““a place of honour with Watt, Stephenson and other pioneers of the industrial revolution”. Of course, it was the latter not the former who, as you say, “kicked off” all that technological innovation. But, for its widespread exploitation, it needed huge amounts of capital. And that was provided by private investors – I cannot see how that would have happened without limited liability.

However, as I indicated in an earlier post, I strongly agree about the pernicious consequences of the many current examples of moral hazard. But I’m unconvinced that they’re a direct result of limited liability. For that, I think it’s necessary to look elsewhere.

Robin

Friday 1st April 2011 – 09:25am
I just left the following comment, which I don’t see up yet (emphasis added):
Robin, thanks for your further thoughts.

In retrospect, isn’t it clear that the Economist is praising stock market BUBBLES, which are destructive disruptions created by artificial credit expansions by banks and central banks? http://www.economist.com/node/347323

Unwary individual investors, lulled by government regulations of “public companies” that have removed managers from all shareholder oversight, have been badly burned — and much capital wasted and directed into the pockets of executives and traders, who have shifted risks of failure to shareholders and to the governments that continue to bail out these failed organizations.

Sure, all that technological innovation required huge amounts of capital, which was provided by private investors. But capital is created by savings. Those savings could have been more wisely invested if shareholders bore greater residual risk – and were thus more incentivized to monitor the risk-taking by executives.

I think there is growing empirical evidence that firms that are more closely overseen by shareholders are more profitable. This, in addition to the hurdles to the public capital markets created by Sarbanes-Oxley, is leading to greater reliance on private capital-raising.

Tom


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“The first principle is that you must not fool yourself – and you are the easiest person to fool.”
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Do contributions by corporations to 'progress' mean we should ignore sick dynamics set in motion by limited liability?

April 5th, 2011 No comments

I post here some of my further dialogue on the comment thread to Matt Ridley‘s “Nuclear crony capitalism” post that I blogged on earlier.

Posted by, Robin Guenier (not verified)

Tom:

Yes, I agree with much you say. But, nonetheless, I’m sure that limited liability has, on the whole, been beneficial. I haven’t time now to elaborate properly on this so I’ll confine myself to the following:

The concept of limited liability is very old. But it didn’t take off until 1811 when New York State allowed manufacturing companies to adopt limited status. Thereafter, it became widely accepted throughout the USA – and in Britain in 1854. As a direct result, because private investors no longer risked total ruin (even prison) if their company went bust, vast sums of new capital became available to finance the new industries that went on to transform the world and radically improve the lot of millions of people. In my view, without limited liability that transformation is most unlikely to have happened.

Robin

Thursday 31st March 2011 – 09:30am

Posted by, TokyoTom (not verified) [emphasis added]

Robin, thanks for your response.

I understand your argument, but the acceleration of innovation at the time of the Industrial Revolution was NOT kicked off or led by corporations.

Perhaps I naively have more faith in human ingenuity than you, but I suspect that the great leap in human welfare could and would have continued without limited liability corporations. We don’t get do-overs, so it’s hard to know; but there were plenty of sophisticated organizations where partners and shareholders retained personal liability or significant residual risk (e.g., companies with shares that were NOT fully paid-in).

In any case, limited liability has also led directly to where we are today, with (i) large governments – purportedly on missions to protect the public from now faceless capitalists who are anonymous to the communities they affect – entangled deeply in a revolving-door game of rent-seeking, influence and corporate welfare, and (ii) publics now nursed and cosseted by governments who demand from bankrupt government more of the ‘welfare’ that the government have so generously bestowed on large, ‘too-big-to-fail’ financial and other firms whose self-interested managers and traders, unchecked by shareholders, have lodged their companies firmly on the shoals of institutionalized agency problems and moral hazard.

The real need is simply to understand the roots of our present problems, so we can find productive approaches to move ahead. More government bailouts – either for everyone or for the most disfunctional and damaging firms – is clearly not going to improve the situation, though of course it may give more power to politicians and bureaucrats, and may put more money in the pockets of industry ‘leaders’ who are socializing risks and privatizing gains.

Sincerely,

Tom

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