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Keyword: ‘hayek’

A great David Stockman interview at Reason on TARP, the Fed, tax cuts, crony capitalism and our casino economy

April 6th, 2011 No comments

It’s 42 minutes long, but well worth a listen. (A short version is here.]

It ‘s nice to see Stockman become an Austrian economics thinker, but I must say that I think he really pulled his punches by failing to cooment on the fact that most of our failing government/Fed policies have all been SUCCESSES – successful in benefitting particular favored interests and successful in making government more powerful

I copy below the clip the explanation uploaded at YouTube by Reason.tv.

[View:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lq9NwyQSzhk:550:0]

Uploaded by on Jan 3, 2011 [emphasis added]

At the very start of the “Reagan revolution,” David Stockman exposed the myth that Ronald Reagan and the modern Republican Party are dedicated to small government.

In 1981, the 35-year-old Stockman gave up his Michigan seat in Congress to become Reagan’s budget director. A vocal critic of what he continues to call the “welfare-warfare state,” Stockman had signed on because he believed in the limited government rhetoric that Reagan espoused. Once inside the White House, Stockman quickly became disenchanted, and gave an interview to journalist William Greider that became the basis for an explosive Atlantic Monthly article in which Stockman admitted that Reagan’s spending cuts had been a “Trojan horse” used to justify tax cuts. In his 1985 memoir, The Triumph of Politics, Stockman chronicled Reagan’s reluctance to fulfill his campaign promise of shrinking the size and scope of government and balancing the budget. The result? The gross federal debt tripled while Reagan was in office.

Last fall, Stockman was the GOP-defector du jour once more, arguing against extending George W. Bush‘s tax rates in the New York Times, on 60 Minutes, the Colbert Report, Parker-Spitzer, ABC, NPR, and MSNBC. Stockman’s argument – that it’s irresponsible to cut taxes when cumulative U.S. debt is steadily mounting as a percentage of GDP – is based on the simple principle that balanced budgets come only when revenues actually meet expenditures. If we’re not willing to actually shrink government spending, he says, then we should pay full freight now, rather than forcing our children and grandchildren to foot the bill down the line.

Here’s what didn’t come across in Stockman’s media blitz: Since writing The Triumph of Politics he says he has “completed his homework” by reading libertarian economists such as Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, and Murray Rothbard. He thinks TARP was a big-government boondoggle and the bailouts of GM and Chrysler unconscionable. Stimulus spending is a hoax. He sees the abandonment of the gold standard in favor of floating exchange rates as the root cause of both the country’s fiscal problems and the 2008 financial crisis. He says that Rep. Ron Paul (R-Texas) is the only politician today “who gets it” and he’s hopeful that Paul’s growing power may begin to shed light on “the scholastic arrogance” of the Federal Reserve. He’s still against the welfare-warfare state and he thinks government should be cut down to size.
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Reason.tv’s Nick Gillespie sat down with Stockman for a wide-ranging discussion that touched on tax cuts, monetary policy, TARP, Ronald Reagan, his tenure as a Michigan Congressman, and the gold standard. The complete 42-minute interview is here.

If you’re in a hurry, check out the eight-and-a-half minute cut with selections from the same interview: [here]

Camera by Jim Epstein and Hawk Jensen. Edited by Epstein and Joshua Swain.

Go to Reason.tv for downloadable version of this and all our videos and subscribe to Reason.tv’s YouTube channel to receive automatic notification when new material goes live.

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Beyond ‘Nuclear Crony Capitalism’: Does state-created corporations mean we are stuck with a wonderfully confused ‘capitalist’ mess of socialized risk?

March 31st, 2011 No comments

Last night I was Sleepless in Tokyo because Matt Ridley and one of his commenters rewarded, with nice words and questions, a comment I left there on his “Nuclear Crony Capitalism” post.

So naturally I wrote more.

Here’s the relevant comment thread, plus my excited scribblings at the bottom (now up; thanks, Matt!). Skip to the bottom if you’re in a rush:

Posted by, TokyoTom (not verified)

Matt, great post — but I think you’ve only barely scratched the surface on the ‘crony capitalism’ institutionalization of risk.

I’ve spent a bit of time delving into this at my blog that Ludwig von Mises Inst kindly hosts:

– Sorry, but I can’t resist asking: Feel Sorry for Tokyo Electric Power Co?, http://tokyotom.freecapitalists.org/2011/03/27/39-resist-feel-tokyo-electric-power/, a tribute to Lew Rockwell’s ‘Feel Sorry for BP?’)

– Institutionalized moral hazard: Fun with Nuclear Power in Japan, or, prepare for a glowing twilight, with scattered fallout in the morning:  http://tokyotom.freecapitalists.org/2011/03/26/institutionalized-moral-hazard-fun-nuclear-power-japan-prepare-glowing-twilight-scattered-fallout-morning/

– My posts exploring the ramifications of the state grant of ‘limited liability’ corporation status: http://tokyotom.freecapitalists.org/?s=limited+liability

 – The case of BP: http://tokyotom.freecapitalists.org/?s=BP+gulf

 – Not surprisingly, similar issues arise with respect to the rest of the Govt-licensed energy sector and climate: http://tokyotom.freecapitalists.org/?s=climate+liability

 Thus small things contribute to the Road to Serfdom: http://tokyotom.freecapitalists.org/2011/03/27/rot-core-prophetic-words-hayek-grim-threat-posed-erosion-quot-market-morals-quot/ and http://tokyotom.freecapitalists.org/?s=prophetic+words+from+hayek+grim+threat

I hope you’ll take your concern for nuclear crony capitalism even further.

TT

Wednesday 30th March 2011 – 04:39am

 

Posted by, Matt Ridley

Tom,

very interesting. Thanks. will follow up.

Matt

Wednesday 30th March 2011 – 04:54am

 

Posted by, Robin Guenier (not verified)

Matt:

This is an intriguing post …. If one agrees (and I do) that the moral hazard enjoyed by financial institutions is deplorable, then logically it’s impossible not to take the same view of crony capitalism and nuclear power. And, as j ferguson and Tom have pointed out, it doesn’t end there. For example, I’ve been involved with the UK defence industry and recently with the appalling NHS computer system – in both cases, I’ve seen huge overruns and vast sums wasted. Classic examples, I suggest, of “government and capitalists colluding against the market”: neither the government nor its suppliers are penalised; all the pain is passed onto the public. And, if that is unacceptable – and surely it is – it’s hard to dispute Tom’s conclusion that the state grant of limited liability may be the problem: “one of the key roots of snowballing corporate statism”.

And yet … and yet: the industrial revolution and the huge benefits it has provided to society were built on the foundation of limited liability. Moreover, many major projects that would not have been implemented without an alliance between capitalists and government have turned out to be widely beneficial despite seemingly inevitable delays and cost overruns.

Is there a distinction to be drawn and, if so, where?

Robin

Wednesday 30th March 2011 – 07:32am

 

Posted by, Matt Ridley

Robin,

Yes. I agree with both points you make and see what you mean about limited liability’s role and the importance of govt-driven infrastructure. Compulsory purchase for railways and canals springs to mind: easier in Birtain than in France.

Not quite on the same lines, but sometimes I get criticised for being too hard on government and I reply that if Carnegie and Rockefeller and Maxwell were bad, then they weren’t half as bad as Hitler, Mao and Pol Pot.

I hope to get time to dig further into this issue.

Matt

Wednesday 30th March 2011 – 10:59am

My follow-up thoughts (readers may be disappointed that I haven’t loaded this down to cross-references to relevant posts from this blog):

Robin, your statement that “the industrial revolution and the huge benefits it has provided to society were built on the foundation of limited liablity” is a statement of fact – not one necessarily of causation – but so has been our financial house of cards: banks are corporations, shareholders have limited liability (and megabanks are public cos in which shareholders are even further removed from oversight), and depositors are insured by Uncle Same. As a result, depositors don’t bother to check out what a crapload of risk that traders and execs are piling on in order to get bonuses, and Uncle Sam and his legions of wizards set up regulations that the smart boys at Goldman and lawyers figure out how to finesse to load up ever more risk at the lowest possible capital – BANG! And all thanks to the wonders of institutionalized misincentives!

Sure, we got wonderful things from complex organizations, all of which remain in check somewhat by competitions. But there’s been a lot of abuse, alot of risk-shifting, alot of Superfund sites, alot of barriers to entry raised by the very regulations whose purported intent is to rein in the bad behavior, massive statism, and a ball and chain of costly and intrusive IP legislation and enforcement.

I’ve given a very short summary of the dynamics at this post but it’s a fairly obvious and understandable game of whack-a-mole, where government and the big boys – with their unlimited lives, purposes, facelessness, deep pockets and revolving doors – always seems to benefit while ordinary citizens and smaller firms and potential rivals get whacked.

It is very clear that limited liability of shareholders is a gift from government at the expense of un-consenting creditors (‘victims’ IOW), and thus is a subsidy from the public as a whole to the wealthier classes who owned corporations and still by and large are the shareholder class.

Corporations used to be very rare – the grants have a very dubious history, typically one of false justifications of offering a ‘public good’ in exchange for monopoly rights. The owners of very limited life, limited purpose firms somehow always managed to get the special deal extended. So we got bigger firms and more corruption, and labor unions and then regulations and workers and citizens finally started to get fed up.

The widespread statism and government-provided social welfarism – now falling into cynical kleptocracy and fuelling a breakdown in initiative, integrity and other virtues Hayek saw are necessary for market-based wealth generation to works to work – we now see are part of the price we’ve paid. The other part of course is damage to peoples’ lives, property, communities and to whatever public or community property that corporations can get their hands on and strip, without have an owner’s incentive to balance possible revenues over the long run.

Is this kit and caboodle a necessary part of “capitalism”? I don’t think so. Wall street banks and investment firms were private partnership for most of their lives, Amex was a listed corporation who owners had UNLIMITED liability, and Lloyds of London itself was not a firm but a private MARKET of names who all had unlimited liability. Many firms used to have only partially paid-in shares, so that managers had a call in case more capital was needed for new projects or to pay off debt.

Just because we’ve democratized corporate formation by opening the floodgates of socializing risk to anyone doesn’t mean ways can’t be found to put an end to institutionalized moral hazard. Eliminating unlimited liability would shift risk and responsibility for oversight back to a conveniently truant shareholder class from government and the public at large. It would of course mean that people not in a position to evaluate risks would be less likely to invest, making firms work harder to earn trust and get capital. Credit evaluation, rating agencies and insurers would all compete to step into the breach and to lower and spread risk.

Better-managed firms are more profitable than the big Frankensteins we have lumbering around these days; while reform would not happen overnight, it is not only desirable but possible. Firms whose shareholders bear the risk that they may be held liable for damages can be expected to be more cautious and thus could be exempted from the regulations that have been found needed for the Frankensteins. Thus both risks and barriers to entry could be lowered, and consumers and could determine what works best. Other initial steps could be to encourage firms whose shareholders have only fractionally paid-in shares. In the US, at least, corporations are creatures on state law, so just one state is needed to start such an experiment (which would be possible and protectable under the Constitution).

Well I’ve run on quite a bit in my excitement. My sincere apologies! Let me toddle off for a wee bit of sleep.

Tom

 

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Liberal Lessig attacks corporate rent-seeking, praises Tea Party candidates' call for a moratorium on earmarks

November 12th, 2010 No comments

Law professor Lawrence Lessig (once Stanford, now Harvard), the internet’s most famous lawyer and founder of the Creative Commons open licensing endeavor, has turned to issues of open and clean government (as I have previously noted), in part in his role as director of the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard.

In this concern, he remains refreshingly nonpartisan. Here are excerpts of what Lessig wrote on November 11 at Huffington Post:

Many of my friends have been puzzled that I have not been a strong critic of the Tea Party. Indeed, quite the opposite, I stand as a critical admirer. That means that while I don’t share most of the substantive ends of many in that movement, and I strongly object to the extremism of some, I am a genuine admirer of the urge to reform that is at the heart of the grassroots part of this, perhaps the most important political movement in the current political context.

My admiration for this movement grew yesterday, as at least the Patriots flavor of the Tea Party movement announced its first fight with (at least some) Republicans. The Tea Party Patriots have called for a GOP moratorium on “earmarks.” Key Republican Leaders (including Senator Jim DeMint and Congressman John Boehner) intend to introduce a resolution to support such a moratorium in their caucus. But many Republicans in both the House and Senate have opposed a moratorium. Earmarks, they insist, are only a small part of the federal budget. Abolishing them would be symbolic at best.

This disagreement has thus set up the first major fight of principle for the Tea Party. As leaders in the Tea Party Patriots described in an email to supporters,

For two years we have told the media and the rest of the country that we are nonpartisan and that we intend to hold all lawmakers to a higher standard.

This, they insist, is their first chance for that stand with the new Republican Congress. And the Tea Party Patriots have now mobilized their list to pressure Republicans to support this first and critical reform in the new Congress. …

Earmarks are not bribes. But they are an essential element in the corruption that is Congress today. As Washington Post reporter Robert Kaiser describes in his fantastic book, So Damn Much Money, they have become the key to an incredible economy of influence that effectively enables lobbyists to auction too many policy decisions to the highest special interest bidder. That economy won’t change simply by eliminating earmarks. But eliminating earmarks is an essential first step to starving this Republic-destroying beast.

A government in which access can be bought, and influence paid for is not the Republic our Framers intended. They wanted a Congress “dependent,” as Federalist #52 puts it, “upon the People alone.” But through both Democratic and Republican administrations, Congress has evolved to become “dependent” not upon “the People,” but upon “the Funders.” Earmarks are a critical element in that dependency. And if we’re going to end government captured by an elite, we have to end that dependency.

This fight is just the first in a series that this more principled wing of the Tea Party movement can expect. For the truth is that not everyone on the Right shares their passion for ending the corruption that now rules Congress. During the rise of the GOP in the 1990s, some of the rights suggested that it was just “socialist” to question the power of the rich to buy influence over our government. The ideals of the free market, these GOP leaders insisted, should include a free market to buy government policy.

That idea is heresy to anyone standing in the tradition of Adam Smith, Friedrich von Hayek, Milton Friedman and Ronald Reagan. (Friedman, for example, insisted on a free market within the rules set by the government; he didn’t believe in a free market for those rules.) Yet that idea governs too much of both the Republican and Democratic parties of the past 20 years. It is an important and valuable development for the Republic that a powerful and passionate political movement on the Right makes ending this free market in government influence a core plank in its platform.

But if the Tea Party is really to be “nonpartisan,” then it needs to stop limiting itself to speaking to Republicans alone. Important Democrats share at least some of their reform ideals, including otherwise liberal Democrats, such as Congresswoman Jackie Spear (D-CA). The movement should rally Members from both the Right and the Left for any reform that is right (as in correct). The Tea Party Patriots’ reform to abolish earmarks is plainly that.

Now, of course, I have no illusion that my admiration for the Tea Party can be returned. A movement against “elites” is not likely to listen to a Yale educated Harvard Professor. But if that movement is to be as central to the restoration of the American Republic as its most passionate supporters believe, then it needs to recognize that while we don’t share common ends, we do face a common enemy. Special-interest-government is anathema to both the true Right and the limping Left. Progress would be to work together to end it.

 

 

 

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Wow; a type of climate science review we'll never see at Mises Blog; at NRO, Jim Manzi takes down "wingnuttery" by Mark Levin

April 23rd, 2010 No comments

Last week at the NYT, Ross Douthat, himself stirred by Julian Sanchez’s recent perception of a problem of “epistemic closure” (an ideologically sealed news and thought echochamber) on the Right , and threw down a gauntlet to conservative intellectuals:

“Conservative domestic policy would be in better shape if conservative magazines and conservative columnists were more willing to call out Republican politicians (and, to a lesser extent, conservative entertainers) for offering bromides instead of substance, and for pandering instead of grappling with real policy questions.”

In response, an astonishing thing happened: Jim Manzi, a relatively informed and sophisticated commentator on climate policies at Cato (who I’ve disagreed with a number of times and whom Douthat referred to as one of the Right’s “impressive younger thinkers”), took up the challenge and – at NRO’s The Corner – in the heart of “Planet Gore” country, produced an April 21 post that pulled no punches in dismantling the climate change discussion in Mark Levin’s bestselling Liberty and Tyranny. Manzi had the effrontery to refer to Levin’s science discussion as “awful” and “wingnuttery“!

Readers beware, a liberal serving of graphic excerpts of Manzi’s piece follows (emphasis added):

“I’m not expert on many topics the book addresses, so I flipped to its treatment of a subject that I’ve spent some time studying — global warming — in order to see how it treated a controversy in which I’m at least familiar with the various viewpoints and some of the technical detail.

“It was awful. It was so bad that it was like the proverbial clock that chimes 13 times — not only is it obviously wrong, but it is so wrong that it leads you to question every other piece of information it has ever provided.

“Levin argues that human-caused global warming is nothing to worry about, and merely an excuse for the Enviro-Statists (capitalization in the original) to seize more power. It reads like a bunch of pasted-together quotes and stories based on some quick Google searches by somebody who knows very little about the topic, and can’t be bothered to learn. After pages d\evoted to talking about prior global cooling fears, and some ridiculous or cynical comments by advocates for emissions restrictions (and one quote from Richard Lindzen, a very serious climate scientist who disputes the estimated magnitude of the greenhouse effect, but not its existence), he gets to the key question on page 184 (eBook edition):

‘[D]oes carbon dioxide actually affect temperature levels?’

“Levin does not attempt to answer this question by making a fundamental argument that proceeds from evidence available for common inspection through a defined line of logic to a scientific view. Instead, he argues from authority by citing experts who believe that the answer to this question is pretty much no. Who are they? An associate professor of astrophysics, a geologist, and an astronaut.

“But he says that these are just examples:

‘There are so many experts who reject the notion of man-made global warming and the historical claims about carbon dioxide they are too numerous to list here.’

“He goes on to cite a petition “rejecting the theory of human-caused global warming” sponsored by the Oregon Institute of Science and Medicine and signed by more than 31,000 scientists. There are a few problems with this survey that Levin doesn’t mention. More than 20,000 of these “scientists” lack PhDs in any field. There was very little quality control: At least one person signed it as Spice Girl Geri Halliwell. Scientific American did the hard work of actually contacting a sample of individual signatories, and estimated that there are about 200 climate scientists who agree with the statement in the petition among the signatories. And most important by far, the text of the petition is not close to Levin’s claim of rejecting the notion of man-made global warming. In the key sentence it says that signatories do not believe that there is compelling scientific evidence that human release of greenhouse gases will cause catastrophic heating and disruption of the earth’s climate. Depending on the definition of “catastrophic,” I could agree to that. Yet I don’t reject the notion of man-made global warming.

“On one side of the scale of Levin’s argument from authority, then, we have three scientists speaking outside their areas of central expertise, plus a dodgy petition. What’s on the other side of the scale that Levin doesn’t mention to his readers?

“Among the organizations that don’t reject the notion of man-made global warming are: the U.S. National Academy of Sciences; The Royal Society; the national science academies of Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, India, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand. Russia, South Africa, and Sweden; the U.S. National Research Council; the American Association for the Advancement of Science; the American Chemical Society; the American Physical Society; the American Geophysical Union; and the World Meteorological Organization. That is, Levin’s argument from authority is empty.

“Of course, this roll call could be arbitrarily long and illustrious, and that does not make them right. Groupthink or corruption is always possible, and maybe the entire global scientific establishment is wrong. Does he think that these various scientists are somehow unaware that Newsweek had an article on global cooling in the 1970s? Or are they aware of the evidence in his book, but are too trapped by their assumptions to be able to incorporate this data rationally? Or does he believe that the whole thing is a con in which thousands of scientists have colluded across decades and continents to fool such gullible naifs as the U.S. Congressional Budget Office, numerous White House science advisors, Margaret Thatcher, and so on? Are the Queen of England and the Trilateral Commission in on it too?

“But what evidence does Levin present for any of this amazing incompetence or conspiracy beyond that already cited? None. He simply moves on to criticisms of proposed solutions. This is wingnuttery.

“[D]espite what intellectuals will often claim, most people (including me) don’t really want their assumptions challenged most of the time (e.g., the most intense readers of automobile ads are people who have just bought the advertised car, because they want to validate their already-made decision). I get that people often want comfort food when they read. Fair enough. But if you’re someone who read this book in order to help you form an honest opinion about global warming, then you were suckered. Liberty and Tyranny does not present a reasoned overview of the global warming debate; it doesn’t even present a reasoned argument for a specific point of view, other than that of willful ignorance. This section of the book is an almost perfect example of epistemic closure.”

Manzi’s piece brought a quick and flabbergasted reactions by NRO neocons Andy McCarthy, Kathryn Jean Lopez and Chris Horner, as noted by Julian Sanchez, Daniel Larison at American Conservative,
and others:

http://www.ordinary-gentlemen.com/2010/04/i-know-mark-levin-and-you-sir-are-no-mark-levin/

http://www.anonymousliberal.com/2010/04/adventures-in-bubble-world.html

Said Larison:

“Jim Manzi made the mistake of taking up this challenge and applying intellectual rigor and honesty to a prominent conservative radio host’s book on a subject he understands fairly well. The inevitable circling-of-the-wagons that has followed illustrates perfectly the problem Manzi was trying to address in Levin’s work. Not only do Manzi’s colleagues automatically defend Levin’s sub-par arguments, but they regard it as horribly bad form to dare criticize those arguments with the vehemence that their poor quality would seem to merit.”

To be honest, I was surprised by Manzi’s bad form as well. That, if not his ideologically weak climate science views, ought certainly to exclude him from commenting at LvMI. On climate science, Hayek be darned: we want conservatives – nay – neocons! – on climate science.

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Finally an LvMI commentator who sees the elephant in the room: effective reform to rein in rampant moral hazard at banks means removing limited liability!

April 22nd, 2010 No comments

[It looks like I’m having formatting problems; sorry, readers!]

I left the following comment on Kevin Dowd’s excellent April 9 Mises Daily piece, “The Current Financial Crisis – and After”, a transcript of a talk he apparently made at the Paris Freedom Fest on September 13, 2009 (emphasis added):

TokyoTom April 22, 2010 at 8:27 am

Kevin, many thanks for this lucid, spot-on and frightening piece.

No one else has mentioned it, so allow me to focus on a piece of your essay that I think has very wide implications that our leading lights at LvMI have been doing their best to ignore: the moral hazard and risk-shifting generation that is INHERENT in the state grant of LIMITED LIABILITY to corporate shareholders, and that has helped to encourage irresponsible behavior and increasing (and ultimately unsuccessful) regulation in the banking sector. It has also fuelled the cycles of corporate regulation, rent-seeking and political corruption.

I couldn’t agree more strongly with what you said here:

“the financial-services industry needs serious reform. Hard to believe as it might be, there was once a time when the industry was conservative and respected, when it focused on providing straightforward financial “products” to its customers and did so well. We have got to get back to that. No more financial hydrogen bombs blowing up the financial system.

The key to this is corporate-governance reform. I am talking, not about tinkering with the number of nonexecutive directors or a new Sarbanes-Oxley, but radical reform to make the banks accountable and to rein in the moral hazards that have run rampant. And the key to good corporate governance is to remove limited liability: we should abolish the limited-liability statutes and give the bankers the strongest possible incentives to look after our money properly.”

I believe that, as argued by James Glassman and William Nolan in a Wall Street Journal op-ed last February that referred to von Hayek, unless and until owners and executives have “more skin in the game” – like the conservatively managed private partnership Brown Brothers Harriman, we will continue to ride a tiger of selfish risk-shifting, moral hazard, and ever more disruptive government regulation.

I have argued in a series of posts, starting with my review of Huebert and Block’s criticisms of Long, the state grant of limited liability to shareholders (in particular the grant vis-a-vis those injured by corporate acts and involuntary creditors, which is a pure grant from the state and cannot be contracted for) has led to a number of perverse results, which can be fairly clearly seen in the financial crisis.

I hope your post will contribute to a much more serious examination by Austrians of the role played by the state grant of limited liability to corporate shareholders in facilitating flawed and irresponsible risk-taking by executives and traders, as well as in perversely fuelling a vicious cycle of rent-seeking and further counterproductive regulation, both within and outside the financial sector.

[But I’m not holding my breath.]

Sincerely,

TT

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Forget Mt. Vernon; see the Campaign for Liberty’s Principles

February 19th, 2010 No comments

Readers might have heard that Republican conservatives – who hope to retake control of Congress and the White House, head off/engulf TeaParty reformers, and thence to further drive the federal government into the ground – have joined together in announcing the “Mount Vernon Statement”. Daniel Larison at The American Conservative rightly notes that the Statement surely would have had Washington rolling in his grave.

As an alternative, I bring readers’ attention the more clear-sighted principles enumerated by the Campaign for Liberty. One wishes only that this statement paid a little more attention to (1) federalism and states rights as a check on the federal government, and (2) the need for states – which have been busy transferring power to the limited liability corporations that in turn desire a central pork/influence machine in Washington, DC – to start exercising their authority to limit limited liability and so to end the great moral hazard machines that corpoations have become.

Here are the Campaign for Liberty’s Principles; I hope readers will visit and register at the site:

Statement of Principles

Americans inherit from our ancestors a glorious tradition of freedom
and resistance to oppression.  Our country has long been admired by the
rest of the world for her great example of liberty and prosperity—a
light shining in the darkness of tyranny.

But many Americans today are frustrated.  The political choices they
are offered give them no real choice at all.  For all their talk of
“change,” neither major political party as presently constituted
challenges the status quo in any serious way.  Neither treats the
Constitution with anything but contempt.  Neither offers any kind of
change in monetary policy.  Neither wants to make the reductions in
government that our crushing debt burden demands.  Neither talks about
bringing American troops home not just from Iraq but from around the
world.  Our country is going bankrupt, and none of these sensible
proposals are even on the table.

This destructive bipartisan consensus has suffocated American political
life for many years.  Anyone who tries to ask fundamental questions
instead of cosmetic ones is ridiculed or ignored.

That is why the Campaign for Liberty was established: to highlight the
neglected but common-sense principles we champion and reinsert them
into the American political conversation.

The U.S. Constitution is at the heart of what the Campaign for Liberty
stands for, since the very least we can demand of our government is
fidelity to its own governing document.  Claims that our Constitution
was meant to be a “living document” that judges may interpret as they
please are fraudulent, incompatible with republican government, and
without foundation in the constitutional text or the thinking of the
Framers.  Thomas Jefferson spoke of binding our rulers down from
mischief by the chains of the Constitution, and we are proud to follow
in his distinguished lineage.

With our Founding Fathers, we also believe in a noninterventionist
foreign policy.  Inspired by the old Robert Taft wing of the Republican
Party, we are convinced that the American people cannot remain free and
prosperous with 700 military bases around the world, troops in 130
countries, and a steady diet of war propaganda.  Our military
overstretch is undermining our national defense and bankrupting our
country.

We believe that the free market, reviled by people who do not
understand it, is the most just and humane economic system and the
greatest engine of prosperity the world has ever known.

We believe with Ludwig von Mises, Henry Hazlitt, and F.A. Hayek that
central banking distorts economic decisionmaking and misleads
entrepreneurs into making unsound investments.  Hayek won the Nobel
Prize for showing how central banks’ interference with interest rates
sets the stage for economic downturns.  And the central bank’s ability
to create money out of thin air transfers wealth from the most
vulnerable to those with political pull, since it is the latter who
receive the new money before the price increases it brings in its wake
have yet occurred.  For economic and moral reasons, therefore, we join
the great twentieth-century economists in opposing the Federal Reserve
System, which has reduced the value of the dollar by 95 percent since
it began in 1913.

We oppose the dehumanizing assumption that all issues that divide us
must be settled at the federal level and forced on every American
community, whether by activist judges, a power-hungry executive, or a
meddling Congress.  We believe in the humane alternative of local
self-government, as called for in our Constitution.

We oppose the transfer of American sovereignty to supranational
organizations in which the American people possess no elected
representatives.  Such compromises of our country’s independence run
counter to the principles of the American Revolution, which was fought
on behalf of self-government and local control.  Most of these
organizations have a terrible track record even on their own terms: how
much poverty have the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
actually alleviated, for example?  The peoples of the world can
interact with each other just fine in the absence of bureaucratic
intermediaries that undermine their sovereignty.

We believe that freedom is an indivisible whole, and that it includes
not only economic liberty but civil liberties and privacy rights as
well, all of which are historic rights that our civilization has
cherished from time immemorial.

Our stances on other issues can be deduced from these general principles.

Our country is ailing.  That is the bad news.  The good news is that
the remedy is so simple and attractive: a return to the principles our
Founders taught us.  Respect for the Constitution, the rule of law,
individual liberty, sound money, and a noninterventionist foreign
policy constitute the foundation of the Campaign for Liberty.

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A note to Lew Rockwell regarding the reflexive irrelevancy of libertarians on the climate/big government morass

December 20th, 2009 4 comments

Lew Rockwell has a post up on the Mises Economics Blog – “The Left Fell into the Climate Morass” – that has just come to my attention. I`m not from the left, but as a right-leaning, free-market enviro, I offered Lew a few comments, which I copy below:

Lew, I think most of your criticism of the left and of environmentalists is apt, but “libertarians” have only to look in the mirror to see someone to blame for the lack of productive discourse on environmental and regulatory issues, and the reason why libertarians are being marginalized in the confused debate over the legitimate role of the state.

Libertarians in general continue to:

– ignore the opportunities created by widespread concerns about climate change risks to partner with both left and right to seek to undo counterproductive state/federal regulation:
http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/archive/2009/11/03/a-libertarian-immodestly-makes-a-few-modest-climate-policy-proposals.aspx

– refuse to follow-up on their own analyses to dig more deeply to see that the roots of the disastrous cycle of regulation (and snowballing fights over the wheel of government) lie in the grant of limited liability to corporate investors, and the resulting externalization of risk and undermining of common law property protections:
http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/search.aspx?q=limited+liability

– as Ed Dolan suggested, continue to act as the “conservatives” that Hayek despised by refusing to question the legitimacy of the favors provided to statist enterprises under the status quo, and turn a blind eye to the direct role that “libertarians” play in the gamesmanship such enterprises continue (such questions of motives being “ad homs” except when addressed to alarmists, in whch case it is “cui bono”):
http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/archive/2008/02/13/edwin-dolan-applying-the-lockean-framework-to-climate-change.aspx
http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/archive/2009/10/07/ad-homs-r-not-us-discussions-over-rent-seeking-necessitate-painful-wrestling-with-slippery-quot-cui-bono-quot-demons.aspx

– instead of acknowledging the legitimacy of concerns over man`s onslaught on nature and local communities (arising both from a lack of property rights problem and from the hand of kleptocratic governments) prefer a self-comforting irrelevancy, both on climate and on resource issues generally:
http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/archive/2009/10/30/the-road-not-taken-ii-austrians-strive-for-a-self-comforting-irrelevancy-on-climate-change-the-greatest-commons-problem-rent-seeking-game-of-our-age.aspx
http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/archive/2009/11/04/for-climate-fever-take-two-open-air-atom-bombs-amp-call-me-in-the-morning-quot-serious-quot-suggestions-from-kinsella-amp-reisman.aspx

– rather than honest engagement, prefer a tribal hatred of misanthropic “watermelons” and a smug love of strawmen and ad-homs:
http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/archive/2009/11/05/the-road-not-taken-v-libertarian-hatred-of-misanthropic-quot-watermelons-quot-and-the-productive-love-of-aloof-ad-homs.aspx

Time once again for some self-satisfied, but ultimately empty tribal holiday cheer?

http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/archive/2007/12/16/holiday-joy-quot-watermelons-quot-roasting-on-an-open-pyre.aspx

Sincerely,

Tom

John Quiggin plays Pin-the-tail-on-the-Donkey with "Libertarians and delusionism"

November 3rd, 2009 No comments

John Quiggin, a left-leaning Australian economist and professor at the University of Queensland, has noted my recent post on the penchant for bloggers
and readers at the Mises Blog to attack climate science – are “almost universally committed to delusional views on climate science“, as he puts it – though these are not words fairly put into my mouth.  Like me, though, Quiggin wonders why wonders why libertarians focus on climate science at the near-exclusion of policy discussions, since (1) he sees “plenty of political opportunities to use climate change to attack subsidies and other existing interventions” and (2) he supposes that the environmental movement`s widespread shift “from profound suspicion
of markets to enthusiastic support for market-based policies such as
carbon taxes and cap and trade” seems like a big win for libertarians.

Quiggin previously commented on “Libertarians and global warming” last June; this seems to be a follow up.

Quiggins posits that Austrians/libertarians exhibit a “near-universal rejection of mainstream climate science,” and asserts that:

we can draw one of only three conclusions
(a) Austrians/libertarians are characterized by delusional belief in
their own intellectual superiority, to the point where they think they
can produce an analysis of complex scientific problems superior to that
of actual scientists, in their spare time and with limited or no
scientific training in the relevant disciplines, reaching a startling
degree of unanimity for self-described “sceptics”
(b) Austrians/libertarians don’t understand their own theory and
falsely believe that, if mainstream climate science is right, their own
views must be wrong
(c) Austrians/libertarians do understand their own theory and correctly
believe that, if mainstream climate science is right, their own views
must be wrong

John concludes:

“Overall, though I, think that acceptance of the reality of climate
change would be good for libertarianism as a political movement. It
would kill off the most extreme and unappealing kinds of a priori
logic-chopping, while promoting an appreciation of Hayekian arguments
about the power of market mechanisms. And the very fact of uncertainty
about climate change is a reminder of the fatality of conceits of
perfect knowledge.”

While John asks a good question and reveals some appreciation of markets, it`s clear that he is still pretty much groping in the dark when it comes to understanding libertarians` concerns about climate policy, indeed, even as to libertarian aims and concerns generally. He also overlooks various cognitive/psychological factors that appear to be at play. Naturally, I appreciate the opportunity for discussion.

1. Before addressing his three possible conclusions, let me note that while “market-based policies such as
carbon taxes and cap and trade” may seem to John “like a big win for libertarians”, this is most definitely NOT the case for most libertarians in the context of climate change, as these “market-based policies” represent an enormous expansion of government that libertarians feel very strongly, based on past experience, will be profoundly porky, counterproductive and costly. In the face of the fight for favor in Washington and the choice of opaque cap-and-trade over a more open rebated carbon tax and other deregulatory options, there is good reason to believe that libertarians are right.

2. Regarding conclusion (a), let me first note that John reveals the self-same “conceit of perfect knowledge” that he accuses Austrians/libertarians of having: the “acceptance of reality of climate change” would undoubtedly be good for everyone, but just what is that reality, and how can a layman of any stripe confirm himself that climate is changing and that man is responsible? The very fact that this “reality” is nearly impossible to confirm personally (even over the course of a lifetime) means that even those whom John considers as having “accepted reality” have basically just adopted a frame of reference, on the basis of the consistency of the AGW frame with other previously established mental frames, a reliance on authority, peer-group acceptance, etc.

“Reality” in this case inevitably, for most people, has very large personal and social components; accordingly, both “acceptance” and “skepticism” of it may look like a group belief, which may help to explain why it is possible to perceive “a startling
degree of unanimity” of views on climate science, the contents of such views varying by group.

As for Austrians/libertarians, while I don`t think it is fair to conclude they (we) are characterized by delusional belief in
their own intellectual superiority, but that many do have a belief, not so much in the superiority of their intellect, but in the correctness of their views on political science and economics (this is common in other groups, of course). This may affect their views on climate science, for several reasons that I have noted to John previously, and may be related for some of them to his conclusions (b) and (c).

3. Concerning conclusions (b) and (c), these are both over-generalizations; libertarians are a heterogenous bunch. But if I may generalize myself, to me there appears no conflict whatsoever between Austrian views, which are primarily about interpersonal relations and the role of government, and climate science. “Mainstream science” has nothing to do with these views, so if Austrians are wrong about “mainstream climate science”, this does not imply that any Austrian views
must be wrong. So Quiggins` (c) is wrong.

Quiggins`(b) – that Austrians may not understand their own theory and
may falsely believe that, if mainstream climate science is right, their own
views must be wrong – may be right for some Austrians, but certainly not generally. Rather, what I suspect is going on is much more ordinary, as I previously noted to Quiggin as a comment on his related June post; that I need to repeat myself indicates that maybe John is having cognitive difficulties of his own (emphasis added):

John, thanks for this piece. As a libertarian who believes that
climate change IS a problem, I share some of your puzzlement and have
done considerable commenting
on this issue [see this long list]. Allow me to offer a few thoughts on various factors at
work in the general libertarian resistance to taking government action
on climate change:

– As Chris Horner noted in your linked
piece, many libertarians see “global warming [as] the bottomless well
of excuses for the relentless growth of Big Government.”  Even those who
agree that is AGW
is a serious problem are worried, for good reason, that government
approaches to climate change will be a train wreck – in other words,
that the government “cure” will be worse than the problem.


Libertarians have in general drifted quite far from environmentalists.
Even though they still share a mistrust of big government,
environmentalists generally believe that MORE
government is the answer, while ignoring all of the problems associated
with inefficient bureaucratic management (witness the crashing of many
managed fisheries in the US), the manipulation of such managment to
benefit bureaucratic interests, special interests and insiders
(wildfire fighting budgets, fossil fuel and hard rock mining, etc.) and
the resultant and inescapable politicization of all disputes due to the
absence of private markets. Libertarians see that socialized property
rights regimes can be just as “tragedy of the commons” ruinous as cases
where community or private solutions have not yet developed, and have
concluded that, without privatization, government involvement
inevitably expands. Thus, libertarians often see environmentalists as
simply another group fighting to expand government, and are hostile as
a result.

Libertarians are as subject to reflexive, partisan
position-taking as any one else. Because they are reflexively opposed
to government action, they find it easier to operate from a position of
skepticism in trying to bat down AGW scientific and economic arguments (and to slam the motives of those arguing that AGW
must be addressed by government) than to open-mindedly review the
evidence.
This is a shame( but human), because it blunts the libertarian
message in explaining what libertarians understand very well – that
environmental problems arise when property rights over resources are
not clearly defined or enforceable, and also when governments
(mis)manage resources.

I`ve discussed a number of times how we all easily fall into partisan cognitive traps, as summarized here.

A related piece of the dynamic is that some libertarians may feel that if they agree that AGW may be a problem, that this will be taken – wrongly – by others in the political arena as a conclusion that the libertarian message is no longer relevant.

4. Some support for these points can be seen in Edwin Dolan`s 2006 paper, “Science, Public Policy and Global Warming: Rethinking the Market Liberal Position” (Cato), in which Dolan suggests that many libertarian climate skeptics are acting quite as
if they are “conservatives” of the type condemned by Friedrich Hayek
Dolan cites Hayek’s 1960 essay, “Why I am Not a Conservative” (1960),
in which Hayek identified the following traits that distinguish
conservatism from market liberalism:

• Habitual resistance to change, hence the term “conservative.”
• Lack of understanding of spontaneous order as a guiding principle of economic life.
• Use of state authority to protect established privileges against the forces of economic change.
• Claim to superior wisdom based on self-arrogated superior quality in place of rational argument.
• A propensity to reject scientific knowledge because of dislike of the consequences that seem to follow from it.

Further support is provided by Jonathan Adler, a libertarian law professor at Case Western who focusses on resource issues, and who has concluded that climate change is a serious concern, and that man is contributing to it. His February 2008 post, “Climate Change, Cumulative Evidence, and Ideology” (and the comment thread) is instructive:

“Almost every time I post something on climate
change policy, the comment thread quickly devolves into a debate over
the existence of antrhopogenic global warming at all. (See, for
instance, this post
on “conservative” approaches to climate change policy.) I have largely
refused to engage in these discussions because I find them quite
unproductive. The same arguments are repeated ad nauseum, and no one is
convinced (if anyone even listens to what the other side is saying). …

“Given my strong libertarian leanings, it would certainly be
ideologically convenient if the evidence for a human contribution to
climate change were less strong. Alas, I believe the preponderance of
evidence strongly supports the claim that anthropogenic emissions are
having an effect on the global climate, and that effect will increase
as greenhouse gases accumulate in the atmosphere. While I reject most
apocalyptic scenarios as unfounded or unduly speculative, I am
convinced that the human contribution to climate change will cause or
exacerbate significant problems in at least some parts of the world.
For instance, even a relatively modest warming over the coming decades
is very likely to have a meaningful effect on the timing and
distribution of precipitation and evaporation rates, which will, in
turn, have a substantial impact on freshwater supplies. That we do not
know with any precision the when, where, and how much does not change
the fact that we are quite certain that such changes will occur.

“So-called climate “skeptics” make many valid points about the
weakness or unreliability of many individual arguments and studies on
climate. They also point out how policy advocates routinely exaggerate
the implications of various studies or the likely consequences of even
the most robust climate predictions. Economists and others have also
done important work questioning whether climate risks justify extreme
mitigation measures. But none of this changes the fact that the
cumulative evidence for a human contribution to present and future
climate changes, when taken as a whole, is quite strong. In this
regard, I think it is worth quoting something Ilya wrote below about
the nature of evidence in his post about 12 Angry Men”:

People
often dismiss individual arguments and evidence against their preferred
position without considering the cumulative weight of the other side’s
points. It’s a very easy fallacy to fall into. But the beginning of
wisdom is to at least be aware of the problem.

“The “divide
and conquer” strategy of dissecting each piece of evidence
independently can make for effective advocacy, but it is not a good way
to find the truth”

I  noted the following in response to Adler:

I think that there are many Austrians who understand WHY there might
be a climate change problem to which man contributes, as the atmosphere
is an open-access resource, in which there are no clear or
enforceable property rights that rein in externalities or that give
parties with differing preferences an ability to engage in meaingful
transactions that reflect those preferences. 

But, flawed human beings that we are, we have difficulty truly
keeping our minds open (subconscious dismissal of inconsistent data is
a cognitive rule) and we easily fall into tribal modes of conflict that
provide us with great satisfaction in disagreeing with those evil
“others” while circling the wagons
(and counting coup) with our
brothers in arms.

Sadly, this is very much in evidence in the thread to your own post.

5. I have pulled together a post that indicates that a number of libertarians are trying to engage in good faith on climate change, and which may also serve as a good introduction for interested readers to libertarian thinking on environmental issues.

6. Finally, let me note that many of the problems that concern libertarians also concern progressives, chief of these being the negative effects of state actions on communities, development and on open-access (and hitherto local, indigenous-managed) commons.  This is the same concern that the Nobel Prize committee expressed when extending the prize in Economics to Elinor Ostrom, signalling their desire for a change in international aid policy.

You might find these remarks by Nicholas Hildyard, Larry Lohmann, Sarah Sexton and Simon Fairlie in “Reclaiming the Commons” (1995) to be pertinent; domestic cap-and-trade is an enclosure of the atmospheric commons, for the benefit of firms receiving grants of permits and costs flowing regressively to energy consumers, and internationally represents a vast expansion of state authority and bureaucracies, with attendant enclosure of local resources:

The creation of empires and states, business conglomerates and
civic dictatorships — whether in pre-colonial times or in the modern
era — has only been possible through dismantling the commons and
harnessing the fragments, deprived of their old significance, to build
up new economic and social patterns that are responsive to the
interests of a dominant minority. The modern nation state has been
built only by stripping power and control from commons regimes and
creating structures of governance from which the great mass of humanity
(particularly women) are excluded. Likewise, the market economy has
expanded primarily by enabling state and commercial interests to gain
control of territory that has traditionally been used and cherished by
others, and by transforming that territory – together with the people
themselves – into expendable “resources” for exploitation. By enclosing
forests, the state and private enterprise have torn them out of fabrics
of peasant subsistence; by providing local leaders with an outside
power base, unaccountable to local people, they have undermined village
checks and balances; by stimulating demand for cash goods, they have
impelled villagers to seek an ever wider range of things to sell. Such
a policy was as determinedly pursued by the courts of Aztec Mexico, the
feudal lords of West Africa, and the factory owners of Lancashire and
the British Rail as it is today by the International Monetary Fund or
Coca-Cola Inc.

Only in this way has it been possible to convert peasants into
labour for a global economy, replace traditional with modern
agriculture, and free up the commons for the industrial economy.
Similarly, only by atomizing tasks and separating workers from the
moral authority, crafts and natural surroundings created by their
communities has it been possible to transform them into modern,
universal individuals susceptible to “management”. In short, only by
deliberately taking apart local cultures and reassembling them in new
forms has it been possible to open them up to global trade.[FN L.
Lohmann, ‘Resisting Green Globalism’ in W. Sachs (ed), Global Ecology:
Conflicts and Contradictions, Zed Books, London and New Jersey, 1993.]

To achieve that “condition of economic progress”, millions have
been marginalized as a calculated act of policy, their commons
dismantled and degraded, their cultures denigrated and devalued and
their own worth reduced to their value as labour. Seen from this
perspective, many of the processes that now go under the rubric of
“nation-building”, “economic growth”, and “progress” are first ad
foremost processes of expropriation, exclusion, denial and
dispossession. In a word, of “enclosure”.

Because history’s best-known examples of enclosure involved the
fencing in of common pasture, enclosure is often reduced to a synonym
for “expropriation”. But enclosure involves more than land and fences,
and implies more than simply privatization or takeover by the state. It
is a compound process which affects nature and culture, home and
market, production and consumption, germination and harvest, birth,
sickness and death. It is a process to which no aspect of life or
culture is immune. ..,

Enclosure tears people and their lands, forests, crafts,
technologies and cosmologies out of the cultural framework in which
they are embedded and tries to force them into a new framework which
reflects and reinforces the values and interests of newly-dominant
groups. Any pieces which will not fit into the new framework are
devalued and discarded. In the modern age, the architecture of this new
framework is determined by market forces, science, state and corporate
bureaucracies, patriarchal forms of social organization, and ideologies
of environmental and social management.

Land, for example, once it is integrated into a framework of
fences, roads and property laws, is “disembedded” from local fabrics of
self-reliance and redefined as “property” or “real estate”. Forests are
divided into rigidly defined precincts – mining concessions, logging
concessions, wildlife corridors and national parks – and transformed
from providers of water, game, wood and vegetables into scarce
exploitable economic resources. Today they are on the point of being
enclosed still further as the dominant industrial culture seeks to
convert them into yet another set of components of the industrial
system, redefining them as “sinks” to absorb industrial carbon dioxide
and as pools of “biodiversity”. Air is being enclosed as economists
seek to transform it into a marketable “waste sink”; and genetic
material by subjecting it to laws which convert it into the
“intellectual property” of private interests.

People too are enclosed as they are fitted into a new society where
they must sell their labour, learn clock-time and accustom themselves
to a life of production and consumption; groups of people are redefined
as “populations’, quantifiable entities whose size must be adjusted to
take pressure off resources required for the global economy. …

enclosure transforms the environment into a “resource” for national or
global production – into so many chips that can be cashed in as
commodities, handed out as political favours and otherwise used to
accrue power. …

Enclosure thus cordons off those aspects of the environment that are
deemed “useful” to the encloser — whether grass for sheep in 16th
century England or stands of timber for logging in modern-say Sarawak
— and defines them, and them alone, as valuable. A street becomes a
conduit for vehicles; a wetland, a field to be drained; flowing water,
a wasted asset to be harnessed for energy or agriculture. Instead of
being a source of multiple benefits, the environment becomes a
one-dimensional asset to be exploited for a single purpose – that
purpose reflecting the interests of the encloser, and the priorities of
the wider political economy in which the encloser operates….

Enclosure opens the way for the bureaucratization and enclosure of
knowledge itself. It accords power to those who master the language of
the new professionals and who are versed in its etiquette and its
social nuances, which are inaccessible to those who have not been to
school or to university, who do not have professional qualifications,
who cannot operate computers, who cannot fathom the apparent mysteries
of a cost-benefit analysis, or who refuse to adopt the forceful tones
of an increasingly “masculine” world.

In that respect, as Illich notes, “enclosure is as much in the
interest of professionals and of state bureaucrats as it is in the
interests of capitalists.” For as local ways of knowing and doing are
devalued or appropriated, and as vernacular forms of governance are
eroded, so state and professional bodies are able to insert themselves
within the commons, taking over areas of life that were previously
under the control of individuals, households and the community.
Enclosure “allows the bureaucrat to define the local community as
impotent to provide for its own survival.”[FN I Illich, ‘Silence is a
Commons’, The Coevolution Quarterly, Winter 1983.] It invites the
professional to come to the “rescue” of those whose own knowledge is
deemed inferior to that of the encloser.

Enclosure is thus a change in the networks of power which enmesh
the environment, production, distribution, the political process,
knowledge, research and the law. It reduces the control of local people
over community affairs. Whether female or male, a person’s influence
and ability to make a living depends increasingly on becoming absorbed
into the new policy created by enclosure, on accepting — willingly or
unwillingly — a new role as a consumer, a worker, a client or an
administrator, on playing the game according to new rules. The way is
thus cleared for cajoling people into the mainstream, be it through
programmes to bring women “into development”, to entice smallholders
“into the market” or to foster paid employment.[FN P. Simmons, ‘Women
in Development’, The Ecologist, Vol. 22, No.1, 1992, pp.16-21.]

Those who remain on the margins of the new mainstream, either by
choice or because that is where society has pushed them, are not only
deemed to have little value: they are perceived as a threat. Thus it is
the landless, the poor, the dispossessed who are blamed for forest
destruction; their poverty which is held responsible for
“overpopulation”; their protests which are classed as subversive and a
threat to political stability. And because they are perceived as a
threat, they become objects to be controlled, the legitimate subjects
of yet further enclosure. …

People who would oppose dams, logging, the redevelopment of their
neighbourhoods or the pollution of their rivers are often left few
means of expressing or arguing their case unless they are prepared to
engage in a debate framed by the languages of cost-benefit analysis,
reductionist science, utilitarianism, male domination — and,
increasingly, English. Not only are these languages in which many local
objection — such as that which holds ancestral community rights to a
particular place to have precedence over the imperatives of “national
development” — appear disreputable. They are also languages whose use
allows enclosers to eavesdrop on, “correct” and dominate the
conversations of the enclosed. …

Because they hold themselves to be speaking a universal language,
the modern enclosers who work for development agencies and governments
feel no qualms in presuming to speak for the enclosed. They assume
reflexively that they understand their predicament as well as or better
than the enclosed do themselves. It is this tacit assumption that
legitimizes enclosure in the encloser’s mind – and it is an assumption
that cannot be countered simply by transferring what are
conventionbally assumed to be the trappings of power from one group to
another….

A space for the commons cannot be created by economists,
development planners, legislators, “empowerment” specialists or other
paternalistic outsiders. To place the future in the hands of such
individuals would be to maintain the webs of power that are currently
stifling commons regimes. One cannot legislate the commons into
existence; nor can the commons be reclaimed simply by adopting “green
techniques” such as organic agriculture, alternative energy strategies
or better public transport — necessary and desirable though such
techniques often are. Rather, commons regimes emerge through ordinary
people’s day-to-day resistance to enclosure, and through their efforts
to regain livelihoods and the mutual support, responsibility and trust
that sustain the commons.

That is not to say that one can ignore policy-makers or
policy-making. The depredations of transnational corporations,
international bureaucracies and national governments cannot be allowed
to go unchallenged. But movements for social change have a
responsibility to ensure that in seeking solutions, they do not remove
the initiative from those who are defending their commons or attempting
to regenerate common regimes — a responsibility they should take
seriously.

Might there be good reason NOT to rush into a vast expansion of government world-wide?

 

Elinor Ostrom? Austrians praise the Nobel laureate’s work on how human communities successfully manage resource conflicts

October 15th, 2009 No comments

Elinor Ostrom awarded the Nobel prize in economics? Who? no doubt some of you are wondering.

Well, sharp-eyed readers will have noted that I have referred to her any number of times (which I will reprise later, as this post has gotten too lengthy).

I excerpt below some of the praise Elinor Ostrom has been receiving from Austrian economists familiar with her (emphasis added).

1.  First, though, from the press release:

Elinor Ostrom has demonstrated how common property can be successfully managed by user associations. Oliver Williamson has
developed a theory where business firms serve as structures for conflict resolution. Over the last three decades these seminal
contributions have advanced economic governance research from the fringe to the forefront of scientific attention.

Economic transactions take place not only in markets, but also within firms, associations, households, and agencies. Whereas economic theory has comprehensively illuminated the virtues and limitations of markets, it has traditionally paid less attention to other institutional arrangements. The research of Elinor Ostrom and Oliver Williamson demonstrates that economic analysis can shed light on most forms of social organization.

Elinor Ostrom has challenged the conventional wisdom that common property is poorly managed and should be either regulated by central authorities or privatized. Based on numerous studies of user-managed fish stocks, pastures, woods, lakes, and groundwater basins, Ostrom concludes that the outcomes are, more often than not, better than predicted by standard theories. She observes that resource users frequently develop sophisticated mechanisms for decision-making and rule enforcement to handle conflicts of interest, and she characterizes the rules that promote successful outcomes.

The background explanation is useful and contains a pointed criticism of many centrally-directed approaches to common pool resources (emphasis added):

If we want to halt the degradation of our natural environment and prevent a repetition of the many collapses of natural-resource stocks experienced in the past, we should learn from the successes and failures of common-property regimes. Ostrom’s work teaches us novel lessons about the deep mechanisms that sustain cooperation in human societies.

It has frequently been suggested that common ownership entails excessive resource utilization, and that it is advisable to reduce utilization either by imposing government regulations, such as taxes or quotas, or by privatizing the resource. The theoretical argument is simple: each user weighs private benefits against private costs, thereby neglecting the negative impact on others.

However, based on numerous empirical studies of natural-resource management, Elinor Ostrom has concluded that common property is often surprisingly well managed. Thus, the standard theoretical argument against common property is overly simplistic. It neglects the fact that users themselves can both create and enforce rules that mitigate overexploitation.
The standard argument also neglects the practical difficulties associated with privatization and government regulation. …

There are many …. examples which indicate that user-management of local resources has been more successful than management by outsiders. …

[T]he main lesson is that common property is often managed on the basis of rules and procedures that have evolved over long periods of time. As a result they are more adequate and subtle than outsiders – both politicians and social scientists – have tended to realize. Beyond showing that self-governance can be feasible and successful, Ostrom also elucidates the key features of successful governance. One instance is that active participation of users in creating and enforcing rules appears to be essential. Rules that are imposed from the outside or unilaterally dictated by powerful insiders have less legitimacy and are more likely to be violated. Likewise, monitoring and enforcement work better when conducted by insiders than by outsiders. These principles are in stark contrast to the common view that monitoring and sanctioning are the responsibility of the state and should be conducted by public employees.

2.  Words of praise from libertarians:

Vernon L. Smith (2002 Nobel laureate for economics), Forbes, October 12:

For many of us she has long occupied our radar screen. Let me tell you why.

Relentlessly, Ostrom has pursued answers to two questions:

(1)
Since “everybody’s property is nobody’s property,” how is it that there
are so many cases where collectives of ordinary people with no
education and with none of the economists’ knowledge of “the tragedy of
the commons,” in fact discover ingenious rules (institutions) for
taking the “tragedy” out of a productive resource they hold in common?

Numerous other examples include Japanese lands held by thousands in
common under governance structures that avoided “tragedy;” also ancient
solutions to communal water and irrigation systems that create
effective enough private rights conferring benefits and costs that
constrain use.
This should not be too surprising, because “property
(originally propriety) rights” are about human rights and the challenge of defining them incentive-compatibly for mutual benefit.

(2)
As a distinguished political-economic scientist she will be the first
to tell you that there are also plenty of commons problems that
represent institutional failures and fragilities
; she has asked why,
and what makes the difference between success and failure? The
fragilities include inshore fisheries and groundwater basins with
continuing commons problems; failures include salt water fisheries and
irrigation systems hamstrung by the complexity of the rules.

Success is associated with clarity in the definition of and
bounds on individual rights (and opportunities) to take action, and the
geography of the commons; details for monitoring, operations, sanctions
and mechanisms for conflict resolution emerge from within the
collective and out of motivated people’s direct experience with
environmental context and each other.
When too many of these
problem-solving elements fail, the governance systems fail or require
continuing attention to their fragility characteristics. A fatal source
of disintegration is the inappropriate application of uninformed
external authority
, including intervention to prevent application of
efficacious rules to political favorites. Also detrimental to good solutions is the OPM (other people’s money) problem.

Peter Boettke, The Austrian Economists, October 12:

I told David [Henderson] that she is amazing and well deserving of the Nobel award for her pioneering work on rational choice theory (as if the choosers were human) and institutional analysis.  I then bent his ear about her work on governing the commons, institutional diversity, and learning. …

What Lin’s work demonstrates … is how individuals can in a variety of settings work to find (or stumble upon) institutional solutions that promote social cooperation and human betterment.  It is about voluntary civic association, a subset of which is commercial life, that her works highlights; not the absence of individual choice.  … My blurb on the back of her book, Understanding Institutional Diversity reads as follows: “What emerges from Elinor Ostrom’s book is precisely what the title suggests — an understanding of the diverse nature of institutions that exist in human societies to promote human cooperation or to hinder it.”

She is both a methodological individualist (rightly understood) and a spontaneous order theorists.  In this regard, Lin Ostrom (and Vincent) have represented one manifestation of the research program in the sciences of man (praxeology) by Mises and Hayek in the 1940s.  Actors of limited cognitive capabilities are studied for how the[y] shape and our [sic] shaped by the social structures that emerge in a variety of situations to provide voluntary solutions to complex and difficult problems, and they do so in a way that promotes social cooperation under the division of labor.  Read Human Action, chapter VIII, and Individualism: True and False, pp. 11-14 (in Individualism and Economic Order), and then look at Lin’s work in Governing the Commons; Understanding Institutional Diversity; and the 3 volume McGinnis, edited volumes, Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis and I think you will see what I am talking about. She has done fundamental research on the central idea of Ricardo’s Law of Association as Mises termed it.  Humanly rational choice and institutional analysis combine to address the most pressing question in the social world — why do some institutional patterns produce societies of peace and prosperity, while others produce societies that suffer under violence and poverty?

Lin Ostrom is firmly seated in the mainline tradition of economic scholarship from Adam Smith and David Hume to F. A. Hayek and James Buchanan …..  [H]er methods were chosen to be appropriate to the task she was pursuing.  Humanly rational choice, institutional analysis, field work, and experimental design were her tools for social understanding.  She did not limit her work to that of Max U notions of “choice” nor instituitonally antiseptic models of ‘markets’ nor one size fits all models of economic development.  Instead, she has been a major contributor to public choice economics, new institutional economics, and to our understanding of polycentricity and political economy.

[in comment] At the
home page for her institute — The Workshop in Political Theory and
Policy Analysis — they describe their work as a New Science of
Governance for a New Age. And they describe their task as follows: “The
betterment of humankind depends on the ability of fallible human beings
to make decisions, manage resources, and govern themselves. This is the
basis of democracy, and of civilization itself. It is also the basis
for more than 30 years of research and inquiry at the Workshop in
Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University in
Bloomington.

The Workshop’s teaching and research probes the inner workings of
human institutions—structures of rules used to govern people and
resources, in this usage—in order to better understand what works and
what does not. Institutions affect every facet of life, from public
services to family and community structures to natural resources and
beyond, and the Workshop’s research helps people design and adapt their
institutions so that they generate better outcomes.”

This is why the work is so intriguing. First, at the core is a model
of man as fallible — cognitively limited. Second, is a focus on the
emergence of institutions — not necessarily state-led institutional
impositions. Third, is a focus on governance, not government.

 

Peter Boettke, comment at Marginal Revolution, October 13:

She is a former President of the Public Choice Society, as was
Vincent. She uses game theory, she engages in institutional analysis,
she has conducted experiements in the lab, she has conducted field work
both in the US and abroad, she considers herself a political economist,
etc. Her presidential address to the APSA summed up her theoretical agenda as “A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action.”

She
is most deserving of this Nobel, and she has made a unique contribution
theoretically and empirically to the study of self-governance. But
there is no need to pick a fight where one isn’t there. Her prize fits
nicely in a stream of recognitions ANALYTICALLY
by the committee to scholars such as Hayek (1974), Buchanan (1986),
Coase (1991), North (1993), and V. Smith (2002). These are all scholars
within the discipline of economics/political economy that recognize the
cognitive limitations of man, and focus analytical effort on
institutional analysis.

Lin Ostrom’s contributions come from
an analytical framework that grounded in rational choice theory (as if
the choosers are human) and builds to an institutional analysis
(as if
history mattered). The distinction between “rules in form” and “rules
in use” means she studies in close detail the social norms that
underlie self-governance in the management of resources and the
management of social relationships.

It is amazing body of work.

Alex Tabarrok, Marginal Revolution, October 12:

Elinor Ostrom may arguable [sic] be considered the mother of field work in development economics.  She has worked closely investigating water associations in Los Angeles, police departments in Indiana, and irrigation systems in Nepal.  In each of these cases her work has explored how between the atomized individual and the heavy-hand of government there is a range of voluntary, collective associations that over time can evolve efficient and equitable rules for the use of common resources.

With her husband, political scientist Vincent Ostrom, she established the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis in 1973 at Indiana University, an extraordinarily productive and evolving association of students and professors which has produced a wealth of theory, empirical studies and experiments in political science and especially collective action.  The Ostrom’s work bridges political science and economics.  Both are well known at GMU since both have been past presidents of the Public Choice society and both have been influenced by the Buchanan-Tullock program.  You can also see elements of Hayekian thought about the importance of local knowledge in the work of both Ostroms (here is a good interview).  My colleague, Peter Boettke has just published a book on the Ostrom’s and the Bloomington School.

Elinor Ostrom’s work culminated in Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action which uses case studies to argue that around the world private associations have often, but not always, managed to avoid the tragedy of the commons and develop efficient uses of resources.  (Ostrom summarizes some of her findings from this research here).  Using game theory she provided theoretical underpinnings for these findings and using experimental methods she put these theories to the test in the lab.

For Ostrom it’s not the tragedy of the commons but the opportunity of the commons.  Not only can a commons be well-governed but the rules which help to provide efficiency in resource use are also those that foster community and engagement.  A formally government protected forest, for example, will fail to protect if the local users do not regard the rules as legitimate.  In Hayekian terms legislation is not the same as law.  Ostrom’s work is about understanding how the laws of common resource governance evolve and how we may better conserve resources by making legislation that does not conflict with law.

Bob Subrick, Stationary Bandit, October 12:

Ostrom’s “Governing the Commons” develops Hayek’s theme of spontaneous order through numerous real world examples.  Non-market institutions solve collective action problems that the price mechanism cannot.  That is the point of Hayek’s later writings– non-market institutions coordinate behavior.  Also, her emphasis on the lack of a “one-size-fits-all” approach resonates with those who are sympathetic to Hayek.

Paul Romer, Charter Cities, October 12:

Elinor’s fieldwork, followed up by her experimental work, pointed us in exactly the right direction. To understand BOTH why we don’t need police officers in some cases AND
why police officers don’t follow the rules in other cases, we have to
expand models of human preferences to include a contingent taste for
punishing others.
In reaching this conclusion, she arrived at a point
similar to that reached by Avner Greif (whom the Nobel committee
correctly cites.) They, more than anyone else in the profession,
spelled out the program that economists should follow. To make the
rules that people follow emerge as an equilibrium outcome instead of a
skyhook, economists must extend our models of preferences and gather
field and experimental evidence on the nature of these preferences.

Economists
who have become addicted to skyhooks, who think that they are doing
deep theory but are really just assuming their conclusions, find it
hard to even understand what it would mean to make the rules that
humans follow the object of scientific inquiry. If we fail to explore
rules in greater depth, economists will have little to say about the
most pressing issues facing humans today – how to improve the quality
of bad rules that cause needless waste, harm, and suffering.

Cheers
to the Nobel committee for recognizing work on one of the deepest
issues in economics. Bravo to the political scientist who showed that
she was a better economist than the economic imperialists who can’t
tell the difference between assuming and understanding.

Lynne Kiesling, Knowledge Problem, October 12:

Both Ostrom’s work on governance institutions and common-pool resources
and Williamson’s work on governance institutions and the transactional
boundary of the firm contribute meaningfully to our understanding of
how individuals coordinate their plans and actions in decentralized,
complex systems. …

Ostrom’s work highlights the ability of communities of
individuals, using their local knowledge and taking into account their
individual preferences and constraints, to develop governance
institutions that enable beneficial outcomes to emerge. As I put it in my book on institutional design in electricity,

Given the pervasiveness of incomplete property rights,
even in commercial transactions, how are we able to engage in so much
mutually beneficial exchange? We achieve it through the design of
institutions to govern the commons (Ostrom 1990, 2005). These
institutions can specify use rights, means for enforcing those use
rights, and penalties for violating those rights. Again, defining and
enforcing use rights is costly, but institutional design to do so
happens when its benefits are high enough
, and the institutional form
varies depending on the environment and context.

The Ostrom works cited therein, Governing the Commons and Understanding Institutional Diversity,
are full of rich insights that can be applied to environmental policy,
regulation, economic development, and many other areas of economics and
political science.

David R. Henderson, WSJ, October 12:

… I think it’s a great choice. The reason is that mainstream economics
has become highly mathematical and increasingly independent from
reality. Many economists sit in their offices and derive proofs. Few go
out and do the time-consuming work of examining the institutional
structures that humans build to solve their own real-world problems.
Among those few are Ms. Ostrom and Mr. Williamson.

Both draw on rich data from outside the field of economics. Ms.
Ostrom draws much of hers from case studies of common-property
resources and Mr. Williamson from business historians such as the late
Alfred Chandler. Some have summarized their work by saying that
institutions other than free markets often work well. But that
statement can mislead you to conclude that government solutions are the
answer. Free markets are only a subset of free institutions. A better
way to sum up their work is that what Ms. Ostrom and Mr. Willamson
really show is that voluntary associations work.

Most economists are familiar with the late Garrett Hardin‘s classic
article, “The Tragedy of the Commons.” His idea was that when no one
owns a resource, it is overused because no one can control its usage
and each person has an incentive to use it before others do. This
insight has helped us understand much human behavior and has led people
to advocate either having the resource privately owned or having it
controlled by government.

Not so fast, said Ms. Ostrom.
Examining dozens of case studies, she found cases of communal ownership
that worked—that is, that didn’t lead to the tragic outcomes envisioned
by Hardin—as well as ones that didn’t.
Were there systematic
differences? Yes, and interestingly the ones that worked did have a
kind of property rights system, just not private ownership.

Based on her work, Ms. Ostrom proposed
several rules for managing common-pool resources, which the Nobel
committee highlights. Among them are that rules should clearly define
who gets what, good conflict resolution methods should be in place,
people’s duty to maintain the resource should be proportional to their
benefits, monitoring and punishing is done by the users or someone
accountable to the users, and users are allowed to participate in
setting and modifying the rules. Notice the absence of top-down
government solutions.
In her work on development economics, Ms. Ostrom
concludes that top-down solutions don’t help poor countries. Are you
listening, World Bank?

In a 2006 article with Harini Nagendra, Ms. Ostrom wrote: “We
conclude that simple formulas focusing on formal ownership,
particularly one based solely on public [government] ownership of
forest lands, will not solve the problem of resource use.” …

Economists talking about real humans and not mathematical
abstractions and winning the Nobel prize for it? Good on ya, Nobel
committee.

John V.C. Nye, Forbes, October 12:

Oliver Williamson and Elinor Ostrom are both leaders in the growing
field of the New Institutional Economics. Both can be seen as pioneers
in understanding how markets work in the real world where transactions
costs are high, establishing smoothly functioning markets is costly,
information is incomplete, and hiring and production options are
limited. They show how firms, communities and organizations come to
solve these problems absent government regulation and how the choices
they make can be disrupted or worsened by bad state policy or sustained
by good rules that promote stable property rights and reliable contracts. …

Elinor operationalized the core insight of Ronald Coase that
creating and accessing markets is often quite costly and hence
organization, hierarchy and collective agreement can, under the right
conditions, serve as viable or even superior alternatives to market
competition.
While the lack of private property often leads to the
tragedy of the commons, it is surprising how often tragedy has been
avoided throughout the world. The answer is that small groups with
tight social structures can substitute community monitoring and peer
controls for a market that is non-existent and private property that is
neither well-defined nor reliably enforced. Of course, such local
enforcement tied to community norms, moral suasion, and restricted
geographical domains does not scale well to the modern world of
extensive impersonal exchange.
But she has studied areas as diverse as
police departments in Indiana to irrigation in Nepal.

But as
Elinor has demonstrated, ham-fisted reforms that attempt to bring the
illusion of modernity to the developing world by a naive adoption of
Western best-practice laws without the structures that support and
enforce those rules often leads to a destruction of indigenous practice
that works reasonably well without substituting a functioning and
reliable market of impersonal exchange.
Much of the disaster that is
foreign aid can be tied to the blunt importation of best-practice rules
without understanding how their implementation interacts with existing
practice.

Her work centers on a variety of case studies of
private associations throughout the world but is tied to the mainstream
methodologies in the social sciences through her use of game theory
and related analysis. She also tests her hypotheses in various
laboratory experiments designed to isolate the core behavioral
assumptions and in so doing continues in the tradition begun by
Nobelist Vernon Smith. Moreover, her work on real-world institutions
and the rules that sustain efficient outcomes is a natural complement
to the work of laureate Douglass North who also draws upon the ideas of
Coase and Williamson in understanding how political and social
institutions promote or retard growth.

Greg Ranson, Taking Hayek Seriously, October 13:

Peter Boettke, Lynne Kiesling, Peter Klein, Vernon Smith, David Henderson, Don Boudreaux,
and other Hayekian economists are all applauding the award of the Nobel
Prize in Economics to Lin Ostrom and Oliver Williamson. …

In many ways Ostrom & Williamson are very much contributing to an
intellectual tradition championed by Hayek and other leading
“Hayekians” like James Buchanan and Douglass North.

Henry Farrell, Crooked Timber, October 12:

[T]his is also a very interesting statement of what the Nobel committee see as important in economics.

Lin’s work focuses on the empirical analysis of collective goods problems –
how it is that people can come up with their own solutions to problems
of the commons if they are given enough room to do so. Her landmark
book, Governing the Commons, provides an empirical rejoinder
to the pessimism of Garret Hardin and others about the tragedy of the
commons – it documents how people can and do solve these problems in
e.g the management of water resources, forestry, pasturage and fishing
rights.
She and her colleagues gather large sets of data on the
conditions under which people are or are not able to solve these
problems, and the kinds of rules that they come up with in order to
solve them.

This is … a vote in favor of detailed, working-from-the-ground-up, empirical work, which doesn’t rely on
sharply contoured theoretical simplifications and flashy statistical
techniques so much as the accumulation of good data, which reflects the
messiness of the real social institutions from which it is gathered.
Quoting from Governing the Commons:

“An important challenge facing policy scientists is to develop theories of
human organization based on realistic assessment of human capabilities
and limitations in dealing with a variety of situations that initially
share some or all aspects of a tragedy of the commons. … Theoretical
inquiry involves a search for regularities … As a theorist, and at
times a modeler, I see these efforts [as being] at the core of a policy
science. One can, however, get trapped in one’s own intellectual web.
When years have been spent in the development of a theory with
considerable power and elegance, analysts obviously will want to apply
this tool to as many situations as possible. The power of a theory is
exactly proportionate to the diversity of situations it can explain.
All theories, however, have limits. Models of a theory are limited
still further because many parameters must be fixed in a model, rather
than allowed to vary. Confusing a model – such as that of a perfectly
competitive market – with the theory of which it is one representation
can limit applicability still further. (pp.24-25)”

One plausible characterization of her life’s work is that it is about
demonstrating the empirical weaknesses of a ‘cute’ economic model (the
Tragedy of the Commons) that assumed a role in policy discussions far
out of proportion to its actual explanatory power, and replacing it
with a set of explanations that are nowhere near as neat, but are far
more true to the real world. …

It is also a vote in favor of supplementing quantitative work with
qualitative understanding – Lin spends a lot of time (albeit less than
she used to) in the field, soaking up practical knowledge which informs
her work in striking ways. She is hands-on in a way that very few
economists, political scientists or sociologists are. It is also
interesting to note that the Nobel committee pays specific attention to the political implications of her work.

“Elinor Ostrom has challenged the conventional wisdom that common property is
poorly managed and should be either regulated by central authorities or
privatized.
Based on numerous studies of user-managed fish stocks,
pastures, woods, lakes, and groundwater basins, Ostrom concludes that
the outcomes are, more often than not, better than predicted by
standard theories.”

This reflects what she and her husband Vincent refer to as “polycentricity,” a normative approach to
governance which stresses the degree to which higher levels of
government should not crowd out self-organization at lower levels. Her
work implies that both pure marketization and top-down government
control can have badly adverse consequences for resource management,
because they rob individuals of the capacity to govern themselves, and
because they both lead to the depletion of important forms of local
collective knowledge.
… Ostrom stresses repeatedly that even the best
functioning markets are undergirded by an array of collective
institutions which order people’s market interactions
, and that in the
absence of such rules, self interested behaviour will have highly
adverse consequences.

Greg Ransom, Taking Hayek Seriously, October 14:

Elinor Ostrom Endorses Hayek’s Model of Economic Science

See Elinor Ostrom & Charlotte Hess, “Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a Common-Pool Resource”.

Ostrom also frequently cites Hayek’s work on social rules and local knowledge in many of her books & book articles and in her journal publications.

Most frequently Ostrom cites Hayek’s Law, Legislation and Liberty and Hayek’s “The Use of Knowledge in Society”.

As economist Art Carden says, “Ostrom’s win can be considered a win for the Hayekian worldview as opposed to the Samuelsonian worldview.”

Rot at the core: When will Tom Woods and other "Free Market intellectuals" have second thoughts about the state grant of limited liability to shareholders?

March 4th, 2009 3 comments

Tom Woods, in his recent “Another “Free Market” Intellectual Has Second Thoughts” post at the Mises Economics Blog, notes with great disappointment that Richard Posner is about to publish a book that will apparently abandon the free market and call for greater government intervention.

While I share Mr. Wood’s disappointment that Posner and others are not more vigorously defending free markets, I suggested in comments on Mr. Wood’s post that perhaps free market intellectuals are not yet really pulling their own weight in examining and describing the flaws in the market system that contributed to the current financial crisis, or in explaining the types of reforms that would actually be appropriate.  In particular, it seems to me that the role played by the state grant of limited liability to corporate shareholders in facilitating flawed and irresponsible risk-taking by executives and traders, as well as in perversely fuelling a vicious cycle of rent-seeking and further counterproductive regulation, should be much more seriously examined. 

In short, I believe that, as argued by James Glassman and William Nolan in a recent Wall Street Journal op-ed, unless and until owners and executives have “more skin in the game”, we will continue to ride a tiger of selfish risk-shifting, moral hazard, and ever more disruptive government regulation.

I copy below my comments on Tom Wood’s post:

Tom, it’s hard to judge an unpublished book, but I suspect you’re
right to do so. Has Posner given any more solid clues as to where he’s
headed?

However, as it’s clear that things went wrong, I can’t help but
wonder when can we expect to hear more from you and others on what
government factors (besides the Fed, Freddie and Fannie) “fatally
deformed” the financial markets, and laying out a “new, genuinely
free-market paradigm for the economy”. Isn’t there a good book or two
in there from Austrians?

It seems to me that that James Glassman and William Nolan have a key
insight into the type of reforms needed in a WSJ piece that refers to
von Hayek. They argue that “an irresponsible attitude toward risk led
to terrible mistakes in judgment” and conclude that “bankers need more
skin in the game”
. How to move in that direction?  Glassman and Nolan
point to the success of the Brown Brothers Harriman partnership, which
lacks the limited liability feature of modern corporations, and specifically recommend that governments recognize (by less burdensome laws and regulations) that entities like partnerships where owners face unlimited personal liability are more responible risk managers.

As I have argued in a series of posts, starting with my review of
Huebert and Block‘s criticisms of Long
, the state grant of limited
liability to shareholders (in particular the grant vis-a-vis those
injured by corporate acts and involuntary creditors, which is a pure
grant from the state and cannot be contracted for) has led to a number
of perverse results, which can be fairly clearly seen in the financial
crisis:

TT